ProSAVANA’s communication strategy and its impact: An analysis of JICA’s disclosed and leaked documents

TWITTER
FACEBOOK
No! to landgrab, Japan | 22 August 2016

ProSAVANA’s Communication Strategy and its Impact:
An Analysis of JICA’s Disclosed and Leaked Documents

No! to landgrab, Japan

This analysis paper is a product of collective work of a group of Japanese citizens and NGOs requesting and gathering more than one hundred primary documents related to ProSAVANA (especially JICA’s documents) in Japanese, English and Portuguese and carrying out an analytical reading. It aims to dismantle: (a) what the three governments, JICA and the related organs (JICA’s consultants, EMBRAPA and FGV) had been discussing, planning, conducting and instructing; (b) when, where and how these actions were formulated and carried out; (c) for what purpose; and (d), what the consequences of these attempts were. In short, it tries to (re)discover what ProSAVANA was and turned to be.

Download the full report in PDF (8MB) (Note: Document was revised on September 1, 2016)


See also

• The 46 leaked documents related to ProSAVANA
• Some of the disclosed documents related to ProSAVANA
• "Preliminary analysis of the JICA primary documents" (January 2016)


Introduction
 
Chapter 1. Background of the “Social Communication Strategy” 

1-1. ProSAVANA and its Initial Activities 
1-1-1. Emergence of ProSAVANA 
1-1-2. ProSAVANA’s Golden Age (2011-2012) 
1-1-3. ProSAVANA’s Troubled Shift: Initial Confrontation with Protests 

1-2. Emergence and Nature of Protests of Three Civil Societies 
1-2-1. Protests by Mozambican CS: Constitutional Rights
1-2-2. Brazilian and Japanese CS: Solidarity and Responsibility
(a) Brazil CS: international solidarity
(b) Japanese CS: Responsibility of Donors and Consumers

Chapter 2. ProSAVANA’s “Social Communication Strategy” 

2-1. Trilateral Agreement and JICA’s Contracts with Local Agencies 
2-1-1. Agreement at Joint Coordination Committee and JICA’s contracts
2-1-2. JICA’s 2013 Contract with CV&A 
(a) JICA’s Contract and the Background of CV&A 
(b) JICA’s ToR to CV&A: Objective and Methodology 

2-2. Formulation of “ProSAVANA’s Communication Strategy” 
2-2-1. Discovery and Nature of “the Strategy” Report 
2-2-2. Pre-determined Directions Observed in “the Strategy” Report 
(a) Overall and SWOT Analysis 
(b) “Peril” of ProSAVANA: Ignored Root Causes 
(c) “Myths” and “False Interpretations” by CS?
(d) Summary of ProSAVANA’s “Communication Strategy” 
2-2-3. Principal Target of “the Strategy”: Local Communities 
(a) Direct Contact with Communities “to Devalue the Associations”
(b) Creation of Functioning Local structure through Régulos & SDAE
(c) Creation of a “Network of Collaborators” in Each of 19 Districts 
2-2-4. “Communication Strategy” towards CS
(a) “Dialogue Will Only Have Reduced Effects or No Results” 
(b) “Dangers of International NGOs”
(c) Tentative of Incorporation of Mozambican CSOs
(d) Counter-actions against CS (Especially of Brazil and Japan)

2-3. Active Implementation of “the Strategy” in the Provinces
2-3-1. “Devaluing” of CS by “Mozambican Authorities” 
(a) “External Conspiracy Theory” by Minister and DPA Director
(b) “Joint Actions with Media” and “Expense Offers” Despite Refusal
(c) “Domestic Conspiracy Theory” by DPA Director 
2-3-2. Full Adaptation of “the Strategy”
(a) Intimidations from Top to Bottom
(b) “JICA’s Ambiguous and Nebulous role”
(c) Incorporation of Local Entities into a “Collaborators Network”
(d) Boosting Projects for Recapturing Communication Space
2-3-3. Aftermath of Implementation of “the Strategy”: Forced Silence 

Chapter 3. Background of “Stakeholder Engagement Project” 

3-1. Background of Contract with MAJOL 
3-1-1. From CV&A to MAJOL: Objective and Conditions 
(a) Continuation and Difference 
(b) JICA’s Contract with MAJOL: Objective 
(c) Direct Intervention in CS as a Mission 
(d) Calling Subcontractors “Independent” and “Third Party”
3-1-2. JICA’s Discovery of MAJOL and its Expectations
(a) Hiring Consultants with Mozambican CS Background 
(b) Raising Questions about a Conflict of Interests 

3-2. JICA’s Concealment and Denial of “Stakeholder Engagement Project”
3-2-1. JICA’s False Explanation 
(a) “MASA is discussing how...JICA is not in the position”
(b) “Not much change” and not Japan’s Money
3-2-2. Delayed and Denied Disclosure 
(a) Delayed Disclosure of JICA’s Contract with MAJOL
(b) Required Outcomes and Items from JICA to MAJOL
(c) Denial of Disclosure: Contravention of JICA’s Guidelines 
(d) Negligence of JICA’s Guidelines by JICA and MASA
(e) Inexistence of a Portuguese Version of JICA’s Guidelines
(f) Independent Exposure of the Related Documents

3-3. Background of MAJOL’s Reports for Analysis 
3-3-1. Nature of MAJOL’s Reports 
(a) List of Examined Reports 
(b) Existence of Two Different Inception Reports
3-3-2. JICA’s Customary Treatment of Reports
(a) JICA’s Intervention in Subcontractors’ Reports
(b) Characteristics of JICA’s Inception Reports

3-4. Differences Between MAJOL’s Draft and JICA’s Disclosed Document
3-4-1. Eliminations of Pages and Appendices
3-4-2. Elimination of References
3-4-3. Elimination of Contents

Chapter 4. Analysis of “Stakeholder Engagement” Inception Reports
 
4-1. Analysis of Objective and Methodology 
4-1-1. Unmasked Real Objective of the Project 
(a) “Developing Alliance” with ProSAVANA
(b) “Achieving Buy-in from Civil Society”
(c) “Rebranding of ProSAVANA” 
(d) “ProSAVANA Advisory Committee”
4-1-2. Methodology and Initial Results: Reconfirmed Real Objective 
(a) Methodology: Rating Influence and Interest
(b) Preliminary Results and Reconfirmed Real Objective

4-2. Analysis of Overall Results and Approach 
4-2-1. MAJOL’s Overall Results and their Problems
(a) Overall Results and Imprudent Writings
(b) Contradictory Fact: Sudden Death of UNAC’s President 
4-2-2. Framed Approach 
(a) JICA’s Secretist Approach: “Individual Consultations
(b) Discovering Cleavage among Civil Society .
(c) Invention of “Conflicts” and Denomination of “Hardliners” 
4-2-3. JICA’s Concealment of Names and its Background
(a) Concealed Names of the Non-“hardliners” 
(b) Concealed Organisations: OXFAM and ActionAid
(c) CTV: the Best Rated Organisation
(d) CARE: JICA’s Promotion and Exclusion from Survey 
(e) Non-entry of WWF Despite its Active Role 
4-2-4. Will to Conceal “Alliance” and Will to Show “Hardliners” 
(a) WeEffect:“The most strategic partner to be cultivated” 
(b) Will to Show “Hardliners”: Collective Hostility 
(c) Only those “who demonstrate willingness to engage” to be Invited

Chapter 5. Analysis of Stakeholder Mapping Report 

5-1. Stakeholder Mapping: Nature, Approach, Results & Methodology 
5-1-1. Nature and Approach of Stakeholder Mapping 
(a) Nature of Stakeholder Mapping Report 
(b) Approach: Governmental Indication of the “Subject of Target” 
5-1-2. Outcomes: Who “Promote/Impede Development of Alliance”
(a) Violation of Non-interference: Targeting Individuals
(b) Red for “Hardline”/Green for “Supportive of ProSAVANA”
5-1-3. Analysis of Methodology of “Stakeholder Mapping” 
(a) Design of Questionnaires 
(b) Selection of Objects: Exclusion of UNAC 
(c) Survey Environment 
(d) Treatment of the Raw Data: Cultivating Narrow Deference
(e) Violation of Code of Ethical Practice in Social Survey
 
5-2. Utilisation of Results into Action 
5-2-1. Utilisation of Results into Action 
(a) “Small Enough to be Disregarded in Terms of Negotiations”
(b) “First Founders”: Provincial and Environmental Networks
(c) Promoting Non-inclusive Decision-making Among CS
(d) JICA’s Plan for Negotiations with the Selected Organisations 
5-2-2. Nampula Workshop as Testing Ground for the Project
(a) Selective Invitation to/Exclusion from the Nampula Workshop 
(b) MAJOL’s Explanation and Denial of Authenticity by JICA 
(c) MAJOL’s Tactics of “Saving Face” to Move ProSAVANA Forward 
(d) Contestation of the Process and Challenged Legitimacy 

5-3. Aftermath of the Nampula Workshop and End of MAJOL’s Contract
5-3-1. Aftermath of the Workshop: Confirmed Manoeuver towards UNAC
(a) UNAC as “subject to intensive lobbying” 
(b) Expectations for Cleavage within UNAC 
(c) De-empowerment of UNAC by Utilising Parliamentarians 
5-3-2. Aftermath: Continued Hostility and Counter-“campaign”
(a) “Sensitisation activities” against “No to ProSAVANA Campaign” 
(b) “Rebranding of ProSAVANA” together with CS in Brazil 

Conclusion

Epilogue 
Original source: No! to landgrab, Japan
TWITTER
FACEBOOK
TWITTER
FACEBOOK

Post a comment

Name

Email address (optional - if you want a reply)

Comment