

ProSAVANA's Communication Strategy and its Impact: An Analysis of JICA's Disclosed and Leaked Documents

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No! to landgrab, Japan¹

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¹ No to Land Grab, Japan was formed by experts and concerned citizens engaged in global issues on food and agriculture in 2010. They sent an open letter on ProSAVANA to JICA expressing serious concerns about its impact to family farmers in Mozambique in December, 2011. Since then they have actively been engaged in the advocacy activities on ProSAVANA. <http://landgrab-japan.blogspot.de/2011/12/jica.html>

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Introduction

Background

In May 2016, a series of ProSAVANA's primary documents whose disclosure had been denied by the governments of Mozambique, Brazil and Japan (including JICA, *Japan International Cooperation Agency*) was suddenly leaked to the public.

By then, four years had past since the civil society organisations of these three countries began their joint advocacy activities ("struggle (*luta*)") on ProSAVANA (*Triangular Cooperation for Agriculture Development in the African Tropical Savannah-Japan, Brazil and Mozambique*). This mega-developmental programme targeting 19 districts in 3 provinces of northern Mozambique was planned and set up based on the assumed presupposition that there was "vast uncultivated land" available waiting for agribusiness to explore. The planners and promoters of ProSAVANA were those who were involved and "inspired" by Japan's cooperation in the Brazilian Cerrado (PRODECER). To them, PRODECER was a successful programme that helped transform "wasteland" into the largest soy producing area in the world.

However, from the viewpoint of the local indigenous and traditional communities, PRODECER resulted in fatal damages to the environment and their livelihood and brought land conflicts and social injustice not only to the region but beyond. After discovering the details of ProSAVANA and PRODECER in 2012, the largest peasant movement in Mozambique stood up and began its resistance against ProSAVANA.

The voices of the Mozambican peasants moved the citizens, social movements and NGOs of Mozambique, Brazil, Japan and the world. Soon after, the first-ever cross-tri-frontier and trans-continental civic activities were set up in order to protect the rights and food sovereignty of local peasants and communities collectively. The "struggle" has encouraged and empowered the peoples and organisations of the three countries, succeeding in public and private policy shifts, bringing fruitful outcomes, and offering fresh learning experiences, but has also resulted in tremendous pains, especially to the leaders of Mozambican peasants and civil society organisations.

Ever since the Mozambican peasants proclaimed their protest, they began to face endless and repeated intimidation, abuses, pressure, oppression, manipulations and marginalisation. Now, with the disclosure and exposure of collections of governmental primary documents, it has been revealed that ProSAVANA had a common "Social Communication Strategy" and "action & intervention plans".

Already in December 2012, two months after the first UNAC statement, the representatives of the three countries gathered in Mozambique (Nampula city) and agreed to hire consultants to formulate a communication strategy and action plans for the programme. JICA contracted a Portuguese consulting agency (CV&A). By September 2013, the "ProSAVANA: Communication Strategy" was complete and

submitted in the form of a final report to JICA.

Although the details of “the strategy” will be introduced and analysed in this paper, it should not be forgotten that the civil societies of the three countries are learning about this only now. During all the past months and years, the leaders of the peasants and civil society organisations were suffering from the oppressive and manipulative actions of the ProSAVANA promoters, characterised by a hidden and predetermined collective strategy, without knowing why and what was happening behind the scenes.

It should be also noted that the formulation and adaptation of “the strategy” coincided with the deterioration of peace, democracy and governance in Mozambique. As the “internalisation” (domestication) of ProSAVANA promoted by “the strategy” and JICA induced direct interventions by Mozambican governmental officials to national and local organisations, suffering and fear of the leaders deepened within Mozambican civil society. In August 2015, the president of UNAC died in the middle of this situation. Yet, tragedy did not end there.

In late September, JICA established a new project called “Stakeholder Engagement Project” under ProSAVANA without notifying civil societies. JICA contracted a Mozambican consulting agency (MAJOL) on 2 November 2014, and instructed the agency to carry out a detailed survey of Mozambican civil society, making direct contacts and “individual consultations” with some organisations in order to “rebrand ProSAVANA” and establish an “Advisory Committee for ProSAVANA” on behalf of JICA and the three governments. Despite official and repeated requests from Japanese civil society for information sharing and disclosure of the contracts, JICA kept refusing. Through the pressure from a Japanese parliamentarian the details of the contract were finally disclosed in mid February 2016, a month before the end of their contract. By then, Mozambican civil society was facing all sorts of suspicions and divisions. Only through the exposure of the documents was it revealed that the divisions among the civil society were deliberately created. JICA admitted that the ProSAVANA’s “Communication Strategy” were in effect even today.

Without knowing or reading all these details, the Mozambican peasants sensed a huge injustice was being carried out by ProSAVANA and came to a realisation that “the struggle” was no longer only about the “landgrabbing” and “development models,” but also about “people’s sovereignty (liberation and independence)” and democratic governance assured in the hard-won constitution following their struggle with colonialism, wars and dictatorship.

Since beginning of the protest, the three governments always insisted that these claims were “*misunderstandings*,” “*mal-interpretations*,” “*myths*,” “*ghost-lies*,” “*exaggerations*,” “*manipulations*” and “*conspiracies*” of the civil societies. Now, with the exposure of a bevy of key documents, it is revealed that the claims made by the civil societies were grounded. The governments and JICA had a lot to hide, but it seems that due to the good conscience of some people, this activity did not go on. Thanks to the exposure,

ProSAVANA's jigsaw puzzle was finally completed at a crucial moment for the programme and for Mozambican society.

Objective

This analysis paper is a product of collective work of a group of Japanese citizens and NGOs requesting and gathering more than one hundred primary documents related to ProSAVANA (especially JICA's documents) in Japanese, English and Portuguese and carrying out an analytical reading. It aims to dismantle: (a) what the three governments, JICA and the related organs (JICA's consultants, EMBRAPA and FGV) had been discussing, planning, conducting and instructing; (b) when, where and how these actions were formulated and carried out; (c) for what purpose; and (d), what the consequences of these attempts were. In short, it tries to (re)discover what ProSAVANA was and turned to be.

From a thorough examination and careful analysis of these documents, it is now clear that the trilateral agreement of setting up a "Social Communication Strategy" made on 3 December 2012 and the formulation and establishment of "the strategy" by the initiatives and financial commitment of JICA had a strong impact on the nature of ProSAVANA and the democratic governance of Mozambique. This paper will reveal this process based on the analysis of the primary documents and information obtained through participatory observation.

Structure

This analysis is composed of 5 chapters. Chapter 1 shares the background information about ProSAVANA and the civil protests in order to provide the information about why the programme needed a "Social Communication Strategy". Special attention is given to how ProSAVANA was formulated, developed and shifted in the initial phase of the programme. The analysis of the recently disclosed and leaked documents will be reflected on in this chapter. Chapter 2 is about how the process of the establishment of "the strategy" took place and what the consequences of the implementation of the "intervention plans and actions" were. Chapter 3 is about the background of JICA's "Stakeholder Engagement Project" which was established as a part of "the strategy". This chapter is designed to offer basic information about the framework of the project, its practitioners (consultants) and the relevant documents for reader analysis. Chapters 4 and 5 are dedicated to the actual analysis of the reports submitted by MAJOL consultants to JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ for the project, including the aftermath of the project. Finally, in the Conclusion, the overall findings and considerations resulting from detailed analysis of these documents will be shared.

Chapter 1. Background of the “Social Communication Strategy”

1-1. ProSAVANA and its Initial Activities

1-1-1. Emergence of ProSAVANA

On 9 July 2009, the Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso met with President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva at the L'Aquila Summit and agreed to promote the Japan-Brazil partnership for advancing a triangular programme in the “African (tropical) savannah” based on their previous partnership in agricultural development in the Brazilian Cerrado.² Three months later, on 18 September 2009, the governments of Japan (represented by JICA: *Japan International Cooperation Agency*), Brazil and Mozambique signed an accord of ProSAVANA (*Triangular Cooperation Programme for Agriculture Development in African Tropical Savannah- Japan, Brazil and Mozambique*) in Maputo.³

This programme was planned based on the following recognitions (valorisations and assumptions): (a) the “*success*” of the Japanese involvement in agricultural development in the Brazilian Cerrado (PRODECER); (b) the “*agro-climatic similarity*” between the Cerrado and northern Mozambique (especially along the Nacala Corridor); (c) the existence of “*vast uncultivated land*” in the region; (d) the “*low productivity*” of local peasants stemming from the lack of knowledge and their production scale; (e) the inevitability of introducing large-scale agribusiness development; and (f) the necessity of adopting some of the experiences of PRODECER for (d).⁴

1-1-2. ProSAVANA’s Golden Age (2011-2012)

After several low profile years, in April 2012, “ProSAVANA” suddenly appeared to the Mozambique public. Large groups of Japanese and Brazilian public-private delegates visited Mozambique under the “ProSAVANA Joint Investment Promotion Mission to the Nacala Corridor” and a flood of news coverage of this delegation and “ProSAVANA” occurred on national television and in newspapers.⁵ The delegation was composed of 19 Japanese and 17 Brazilians including the representatives of 8 Japanese agribusiness companies and 18 Brazilian farm owners and agribusiness companies, and visited the capital (Maputo) and two northern provinces (Nampula and Niassa) from 16 to 20 April 2012 (JICA powerpoint, 5 June 2012).⁶

² http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_aso/g8_09/jb_sk.html

³ http://www.jica.go.jp/topics/2009/20090928_01.html

⁴ The accord is on the following page:

<https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4703-leaked-prosavana-master-plan-confirms-worst-fears>

⁵ One can find some of the TV programmes on the following site:

https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=prosavana

⁶ Some of the contents of the powerpoint is the following paper:

<http://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp-content/uploads/Observador-Rural-12-English.pdf>

Their central objective of the mission was to evaluate the “*potentiality*” of the region for “*the promotion of agribusiness along the Nacala Corridor*”, and special attention was given to the scale of “*available*” land in the region (estimated as over 14 million hectares).⁷ The Japanese and Brazilian media accompanying the mission enthusiastically covered the visit and called the region the “*Last Frontier*” for agriculture development, especially for soy production.⁸ On the return, the leader of the Brazilian delegation, Member of Parliament Luiz Nishimori, appeared on Brazilian parliament TV, and shared one of the Brazilian interests in ProSAVANA (*Câmara do Brasil*, 27 June 2012). That was to offer young Brazilian farm owners in the south of the country, where the availability of land is limited, the opportunity to carry out large-scale modernised agriculture in northern Mozambique.⁹

Earlier, already in August 2011, a major Brazilian newspaper reported a story about a mission of 40 Brazilian farm owners of Mato Grosso (the Cerrado region, “heart of soy culture”) visiting Mozambique (*Folha de São Paulo*, 14 August 2011). This article included an interview with the President of the Association of Cotton Producers of Mato Grosso, Carlos Ernest Augustin:

- “Mozambique is a Mato Grosso in the heart of Africa with land for free, without many environmental regulations and with much less transport cost to China... Today land is too expensive in Mato Grosso and it is impossible to obtain permission for deforestation.”¹⁰ *Authors’ translation.

The news agency Reuters published the story of “*an offer of 50-year concessions for Brazilian producers to develop 6 million hectares (15 million acres) of its savannah*” made by Mozambique’s Agriculture Minister José Pacheco after his visit in April 2011 (*Reuters*, 15 August 2011).¹¹ Within a few days an article appeared correcting that “*the offer*” was not about “*sales of land*” but an “*invitation to explore*” (*Angola Press*, 21 August 2011).¹²

Minister Pacheco visited Brazil for ProSAVANA’s international seminar organised by JICA and ABC (*Agency for Brazilian International Cooperation*) entitled “Mozambique Agribusiness: Japan-Brazil Cooperation and Opportunity for Investment” held on 25 April 2011 in Sao Paulo (JICA, 24 May 2011).¹³ The event gathered over 170 Brazilian governmental officers and company representatives who were interested in agricultural development in Mozambique (*ibid.*:2).

⁷ http://www.jica.go.jp/topics/news/2012/20120514_02.html

⁸ *Brazilian Nikkei* (May 1, 2012); *Nikkei Online* (August 18, 2012); *Sankei Business* (August 20, 2012). The details of the articles could be found the following paper:

[http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/files/files/ProSavana%20Analysis%20based%20on%20Japanese%20source%20\(FUNADA2013\).pdf](http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/files/files/ProSavana%20Analysis%20based%20on%20Japanese%20source%20(FUNADA2013).pdf)

⁹ <http://farmlandgrab.org/21652>

¹⁰ <http://farmlandgrab.org/19076>

¹¹ <http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFN1E77E05H20110815>

¹² http://www.angop.ao/angola/pt_pt/noticias/africa/2011/7/34/Governo-nega-ter-vendido-seis-milhoes-hectares-terra-brasileiros,812bd47b-26c1-42a1-bf8b-90a353fdeb0f.html

¹³ JICA’s disclosed document (business trip reports) dated 24 May 2011.

The vice president of JICA, who attended the seminar, shared the objective of the seminar as being: (1) “appealing to JICA’s commitment to the participants, especially of the private sector”; and (2) “inducing investment eagerness from private sectors (especially *Nikkei* (Brazilian) and Japanese) to participate in agribusiness in Mozambique (*ibid.*:1). Later, it was confirmed that Roberto Rodrigues, ex-Agriculture Minister of Brazil and at the time head of an agribusiness section of FGV (*the Getúlio Vargas Foundation*), as well as a famous promoter of “Green Revolution” in and outside of Brazil, was invited to “seek synergies between FGV and ABC” (FGV presentation, 5 June 2012).¹⁴ Later on, FGV was chosen to be the sole Brazilian consultant agency for the formulation of ProSAVANA’s Agriculture Development Master Plan (ProSAVANA-PD).

On the following day of the seminar, Minister Pacheco, Ambassador Marco Farani (Minister of ABC), and Kenzo Oshima (Vice President of JICA) gathered to hold a “ProSAVANA High-level Triangular Meeting” (*ibid.*:2). The minutes of ProSAVANA’s coordination meetings have remained closed to the public by JICA. Nonetheless, some of the minutes were privately leaked and made available in May 2016 on the international NGO portal ([www. Farmlandgrab.org](http://www.Farmlandgrab.org)). According to the minutes:

- *“The three parties took note of the strong interest of the Brazilian, Japanese and Mozambican private sector in the implementation of the project (*ProSAVANA). The three parties agreed to use the existing mechanism to promote the private sector involvement for the dynamic development of the Nacala Corridor through their investment. Brazilian and Japanese side stressed the interest to dispatch joint public-private mission to Mozambique possibly by the end of Japanese Fiscal Year 2011 (*March 2012).”* (MoM, 26 April 2011)¹⁵ *Authors’ inserts.

The joint mission was carried out in April as previously mentioned, and two months later all the participants of the mission gathered in Tokyo for JICA’s seminar entitled “Debriefing Session of the Joint Public-Private Mission for the Promotion of Agribusiness Investment in the Nacala Corridor” on 5 June 2012 (JICA disclosed document).¹⁶ The Brazilian agency FGV Projetos also participated in the seminar and gave a presentation entitled “Tropical Belt: Nacala Corridor, ProSavana Program (*sic.*)”.¹⁷ The presentation of FGV Projetos was mainly about the Nacala Fund they were presiding over and its connection with ProSAVANA’s master plan.

Although later on, the FGV’s direct involvement in a public programme (ProSAVANA) and private fund collecting investment around the world for large-scale commercial agricultural development would backfire on ProSAVANA, none of the three parties saw

¹⁴ Slide 14 <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/FGV2012JuneJICATokyo.pdf>

¹⁵ <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/12.PDF> How JICA tried to conceal these documents was described in the previous analysis paper: <http://farmlandgrab.org/25696>

¹⁶ List of participants and presentations for the seminar dated 5 June 2012. It took over a year and intervention of the Information Disclosure Examination Committee to obtain these documents.


¹⁷ <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/FGV2012JuneJICATokyo.pdf>

the problem of “conflict of interests” then. Thus, JICA, ABC and EMBRAPA (the *Brazilian Agriculture Research Corporation of Ministry of Agriculture*) became supporters of a launch event of the Nacala Fund (investment fund for agriculture development in the Nacala Corridor) held in Brasília on 4 of July 2012.¹⁸ A document disclosed by JICA reveals that the Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Agriculture, the Mozambican Prime Minister Aires Ali, Agriculture Minister, the Japanese Ambassador to Brazil and JICA representatives attended the signing ceremony between FGV and ABC for ProSAVANA (*ibid.*).

In the following month, 24 August 2012, FGV Projetos was again invited to a JICA seminar on ProSAVANA in Tokyo, and this time, JICA made a presentation on FGV’s behalf. JICA added two slides in Japanese to FGV’s powerpoint explaining the policy direction of the Japanese government regarding the Nacala Fund.¹⁹ The following is the policy:

- If the following conditions are assured in its design, we shall consider our participation and involvement as follows:
 1. Japanese companies can participate in the fund and can expect profits;
 2. The fund accords with the environmental considerations of Mozambique;
 3. It considers the concerns of small-scale farmers and contributes to poverty alleviation;
 4. It follows PRAI (*Principles for Responsible Agriculture Investment*). (JICA on behalf of FGV: Slide 29, 24 August 2012) *Authors’ translation.

JICA shared the timeline for the inauguration of the fund (September 2013) in the same presentation, and the period from August 2012 to April 2013 was allocated for discussion among the three countries (Brazil, Japan and Mozambique). “Finalised fund design and launching” were planned to take place in April 2013 (*ibid.*:Slide30). JICA’s plan was to be part of the “Social Board of Directors” of the Nacala Fund together with ABC and MINAG (*Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture*) (*ibid.*:Slide31).



¹⁸ <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/FGV2012June22ProSAVANA-FndoNacala.pdf>

¹⁹ <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/FGV2012AugJICA.pdf>

<p>The Nacala Fund Global fund launch event #1: Brasília, June 4th, 2012</p> 	<p>今後のスケジュールリング</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2012.6 キックオフミーティング 2012.7 ブラジル、モザンビークでの設立構想の発表 2012.8~ 三カ国での議論 2013.4 ファンドデザイン最終化・ローンチング 2013.9 事業への運用準備開始
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Slides extracted from the presentation
by JICA on behalf of FGV Projetos (August 2013)²⁰

1-1-3. ProSAVANA's Troubled Shift: Initial Confrontation with Protests

Even three years after the accord, no detailed information was shared with any of the civil society organisations of the three countries, let alone invitations to these events. With pieces of information coming out from media reports, strong concerns emerged among Mozambican, Brazilian and international civil society organisations. They set up several research projects and this resulted in the first civic statement against ProSAVANA being released by the largest peasants movement in Mozambique, UNAC (*National Peasants Union of Mozambique*) on 11 October 2012.²¹

JICA began to insist that ProSAVANA was for supporting local small-scale farmers and tried to erase the past records by changing statements, creating new documents and concealing initial documents.²² The independent-minded promoters of the three countries, however, continued with their original framework of promoting agribusiness investment in the Nacala Corridor through ProSAVANA, but in a more careful manner.

JICA organised an International High-level Seminar on ProSAVANA in Tokyo on 2 April 2013, inviting all the key promoters of ProSAVANA from Brazil (ABC, EMBRAPA and FGV) and Mozambique (MINAG and provincial governors) and tried to promote a new feature of ProSAVANA as “serving local poor peasants”.²³ This costly attempt did not last for long since right after this mission, the coordinator of FGV Projetos and Nacala Fund, Cleber Guarany, participated in a TV programme on a Brazilian agribusiness channel (*Canal Terraviva*) on 3 May 2013 explaining the close relationship between ProSAVANA and the Nacala Fund.²⁴

This TV programme coincided with the leak of the second report prepared for the master plan under ProSAVANA-PD and written by FGV Projetos.²⁵ From this report,

²⁰ <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/FGV2012AugJICA.pdf>

²¹ <http://www.unac.org.mz/index.php/7-blog/39-pronunciamento-da-unac-sobre-o-programa-prosavana>

²² This is discussed in the following paper:

<http://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp-content/uploads/Observador-Rural-12-English.pdf>

²³ Participatory observation.

²⁴ <http://farmlandgrab.org/23739>

²⁵ <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4703-leaked-prosavana-master-plan-confirms-worst-fears>

it became apparent that ProSAVANA was to make land available for international and domestic agribusiness, and if necessary, “*involuntary dislocation of the local population*” was going to occur (Report 2:4-6).²⁶ Although the Japanese government refused to recognise this report, saying “*it is just a paper*” (29 May 2013),²⁷ this did not help calm the growing local, national triangular and international protests of civil society.

1-2. Emergence and Nature of Protests of Three Civil Societies

1-2-1. Protests by Mozambican CS: Constitutional Rights

Right after the joint mission took place, UNAC began its research on ProSAVANA, gathered with local peasants from 14 target districts²⁸ in the three provinces in the north, and prepared the first official statement on ProSAVANA, *Pronúnciamento*, and released it on 11 October 2012. UNAC’s statement emphasises as follow:

- “*Ever since hearing about the ProSavana Programme, we have noticed a lack of information and transparency from the main stakeholders involved (the governments of Mozambique, Brazil and Japan)*...
- *We, peasant farmers, condemn the way in which the ProSavana programme was drafted and the way it is intended to be implemented in Mozambique, which has been characterised by reduced transparency and the exclusion of civil society organisations throughout the process, especially peasant organisations.*
- *Following a comprehensive analysis of ProSavana, we peasant farmers have concluded that: ProSavana is a result of a top-down policy, which does not take into consideration the demands, dreams and basic concerns of peasants....*” (UNAC, 11 October 2012)²⁹ * Authors’ emphasis.

The concerns over and condemnation of a lack of information and transparency and exclusion of civil society organisations and peasant’s organisations throughout the process did not improve. Then, the FGV’s leaked report of the master plan confirmed the fears of the local peasants and UNAC. The Mozambican CSOs and their global partners released the Joint Statement entitled “Leaked Copy of the Master Plan for the ProSAVANA Programme in Northern Mozambique Confirms the Worst” on 29 April 2013 and warned of a secretive plan that would pave the way for a massive land grab.³⁰

²⁶ The detailed analysis of the FGV’s report has been carried by several scholars. See the following sites: <http://www.bv.fapesp.br/en/pesquisador/237426/elizabeth-alice-clements/> <http://farmlandgrab.org/23962> http://www.iucn.org/backup_iucn/cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/temti_ep_01_2014_1.pdf <http://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp-content/uploads/Observador-Rural-12-English.pdf>

²⁷ How JICA and MoFA tried to deny the authenticity of the report is discussed in the following paper: <http://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp-content/uploads/Observador-Rural-12-English.pdf> <http://farmlandgrab.org/25696> <http://www.dlmarket.jp/products/detail/263029>

²⁸ Later 5 more districts away from the corridor were added by EMBRAPA on the grounds that these districts have “similar soil with the Brazilian Cerrado” (JICA [Oriental Consultants], 2010: S-24). The detailed analysis of this expansion is in the following paper:

http://www.iucn.org/backup_iucn/cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/temti_ep_01_2014_1.pdf <http://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp-content/uploads/Observador-Rural-12-English.pdf>

²⁹ <http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/21211>

³⁰ <http://www.grain.org/article/entries/4703-leaked-prosavana-master-plan-confirms-worst-fears>

Even with this exposure, the three governments did not take the claims of the civil society organisations seriously. The peasants and civil society organisations gathered again in Nampula, and formulated an open letter demanding an “urgent stop and reflection on ProSAVANA” (28 May 2013).³¹ It was signed by over 20 civil society organisations in Mozambique representing more than 2,825 peasants, community, self-help, religious, women, environmental, human rights and developmental organisations.³² The letter was released and submitted to the heads of states of the three countries in May 2013. The Open Letter emphasises the following points:

- *“ProSavana is already being implemented through its ‘Quick Impact Projects’ component, without the Environmental Impact Assessment Study ever having been carried out, publicly discussed and approved, one of the main and essential requirements of Mozambican legislation...”*
- *The breadth and grandeur of ProSavana contrast with the failure of the law and the total absence of a deep, broad, transparent and democratic public debate, preventing us, (small-scale farmers, families and the population), in this way, from exercising our constitutional right of access to information, consultation, participation and informed consent on a matter of great social, economic and environmental relevance with direct impact on our lives.*
- *We find that there are many discrepancies and contradictions in the sparse information and documents available, which are indications and evidence to confirm the existence of defects in the programme design; irregularities in the alleged process of public consultation and participation...*
- *We ...denounce and repudiate as a matter of urgency: the manipulation of information and intimidation of communities and civil society organisations who oppose ProSavana....”* (Open Letter, 28 May 2013³³) * Authors’ emphasis.

The goals and logic behind these demands can be summarised as follows:

1. The scale of ProSAVANA as a development programme is immense, thus the possible impacts on the lives of the affected people could be huge;
2. Yet, it was planned and carried out without providing information to or in consultation with local residents, peasants and civil society organisations;
3. Even with repeated requests and exposure of related documents, ProSAVANA continues to operate with opacity, secrecy and contradictions;
4. The Mozambican government has been intimidating those who oppose the programme;
5. Advancing some of the projects to create local beneficiaries worsens the democratic process and shatters the opportunity for re-establishing a just and adequate dialogue mechanism;
6. Thus, the signatories of the Letter demand ProSAVANA to suspend all projects as

³¹ <http://farmlandgrab.org/22150>

³² The Open Letter was also signed by 43 Brazilian, Japanese and international civil society organisations,

³³ <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/view/22150>

a first step;

7. Then, to establish a truly democratic and inclusive dialogue mechanism to review the programme and reflect the voices of the peasants and their organisations and other civil society organisations.

In short, they demanded that their constitutional rights (access to information and people's sovereignty) to be respected, that the Mozambican government follow the principles of democratic governance installed after the war, and that the Japanese and Brazilian governments follow the principles of FPIC (*Free, Prior and Informed Consent*).

Mozambican civil society has especially emphasised the following articles in the constitution:

- Article 2 [Sovereignty and Legality]
 - Sovereignty is vested in the people.
 - The Mozambican people shall exercise their sovereignty in the manner provided for in the Constitution.
 - The State is subordinate to the Constitution and is founded on legality.
 - Constitutional rules shall prevail over all other rules of the legal order.
- Article 3 [Democratic Rule of Law]

The Republic of Mozambique is a State governed by the rule of law, based on pluralism of expression and democratic political organisation and on the respect for and guarantee of fundamental human rights and freedoms.
- Article 11 [Fundamental Objectives]

The fundamental objectives of the Republic of Mozambique shall be:

 - . a) the defence of independence and sovereignty;
 - . b) the consolidation of national unity;
 - . c) the building of a society of social justice and the achievement of material and spiritual well being and quality of life for its citizens;
 - . d) the promotion of balanced economic, social and regional development in the country;
 - . e) the defence and promotion of human rights and of the equality of citizens before the law;
 - . f) the strengthening of democracy, freedom, social stability and social and individual harmony;
 - . g) the promotion of a society of pluralism, tolerance and a culture of peace;
 - . h) the development of the economy and scientific and technological progress...
- Article 15 [National Liberation, Defence of Sovereignty and Democracy]

The Republic of Mozambique shall acknowledge and esteem the sacrifices made by those who gave their lives to the national liberation struggle and to the defence of the country's sovereignty and democracy...
- Article 249 [Fundamental Principles]

1. The Public Administration shall serve the public interests and, in the discharge of its functions, shall respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens.
2. The offices and agents of the Public Administration shall owe obedience to the Constitution and the law, and shall act with respect for the principles of equality, of impartiality, of ethics and of justice. (The Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique) ³⁴

Despite these efforts, the Open Letter was left ignored for more than 1 year, the number of ProSAVANA's projects increased, and implementation projects in districts began. The intimidation and oppression towards those who were opposed to or questioned the programme increased, and the protection of human rights became a serious concern for the leaders of Mozambican civil society. Several statements published by UNAC, regional CS networks and other civil society organisations confirm these points. The most important statement is the "Nampula Declaration" that was released as the outcome of the national assembly of UNAC in May 2014. It explains the situation that the local peasants are confronting as follows:

- *"The Nampula Assembly take places in a time where the country is immersed in political and military tensions which have reached alarming and profoundly threatening proportions for national reconciliation and Peace consolidation, and the deepening of the democratic process. These tensions have severe impacts thousands of men and women peasants..."*
- *On the other hand, the marginalization and total exclusion of peasants from the definition and prioritization of national development policies, particularly those with an agrarian focus; the systematic violations of peasants' land rights by mining, hydrocarbons and agribusiness megaprojects and other private and public investments; the successive attempts by certain sectors of government and others of increasing profitability and privatization of land, represent to us peasants a national emergency, for which we are called to position ourselves and toughen our resistance and struggle agenda..."*
- *We, men and women peasants, denounce and repudiate the acts of persecution, intimidation, bribing and manipulations against individual man and woman peasants, and peasant leaderships in the districts affected by PROSAVANA and national leaderships, carried out by the PROSAVANA implementation team, district administrators, and high-level national leaders.*
- *The Nampula Assembly decided to communicate that UNAC will no longer tolerate these acts and promises to legally sue the promoters and protagonists of such actions, be them national or foreigner citizens in service by the Government."* (The Declaration of Nampula, 1 May 2014)³⁵

³⁴ Official Portuguese version:

http://www.presidencia.gov.mz/files/republica/constituicao_republica_moc.pdf English translation:
[http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Constitution_\(in_force_21_01_05\)\(English\)-Mozlegal.pdf](http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Constitution_(in_force_21_01_05)(English)-Mozlegal.pdf)

³⁵ <http://farmlandgrab.org/23474>

On 4 June 2014, “No to ProSAVANA Campaign” was set up by in Mozambique, composed of several civil society organizations, including UNAC, Liga dos Direitos Humanos (LDH), Associação de Apoio e Assistência Jurídica às Comunidades (AAAJC), Livaningo, Justiça Ambiental (JA), Acção Académica para o Desenvolvimento das Comunidades Rurais (ADECRU), Fórum Mulher, LIVANINGO, Kulima and others.³⁶ From the statement released by the campaign and read out by three female peasant leaders, one can find a notable shift in emphasis from the first statement of UNAC.³⁷ In spite of their emphasis being still on the fear of losing land rights and the negative changes brought about by the models and agribusiness investment promoted by ProSAVANA, the concerns and condemnations against intimidations and human rights abuses (violation of the constitutional rights of the people) were more apparent in the later statement (4 June 2014).

In order to respond to some of the claims of Mozambican civil society, JICA financed MASA to organise “rural meetings” (September – November 2013) and “public consultation/hearing meetings” (April – June 2015) for discussing the contents of ProSAVANA’s master plan. Instead of functioning as opportunities for meeting constitutional obligations, that is, responding to “the sovereignty vested in the people (Article 2)”, respecting “the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens (Article 3)”, and “acting with respect for the principles of equality, of impartiality, of ethics and of justice (Article 249)”, the manner in which MASA prepared and conducted these “dialogues” was against all of the principles written in the constitution. In the case of “public consultation/hearing” meetings carried out by MASA (ex-MINAG / *Ministry of Food Security and Agriculture*), the results were disastrous.³⁸

None of the seven principles for “public consultations” set by the Ministry of Agriculture under the ministerial decree 130/2006 (19 July 2006) was complied with from the viewpoint of the Mozambican civil society organisations participating in all the meetings across 19 districts.³⁹ The principles are: (1) maximum disclosure, (2) broad democratic participation, (3) availability and the access to adequate information, (4) representation, (5) independence, (6) functionality and (7) negotiation and responsibility.⁴⁰

This was considered not only a problem of international development assistance, but also a serious threat to the constitutional rights of the people of Mozambique and an

³⁶ <http://farmlandgrab.org/23758>

³⁷ <http://farmlandgrab.org/23577>

³⁸ Many civil society organisations in Mozambique have released several statements denouncing the process and the events. <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/24893> <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/24903> <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/25017> <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/25048> Statement released by Japanese NGOs: <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/24926> Presentations made by Japanese NGO representative participated in 10 of the meetings: http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/12kai_shiryo/ref9.pdf

³⁹ Archdiocesan Commission for Justice and Peace and ADECRU (12 May 2015)

<https://adecru.wordpress.com/2015/05/11/exigimos-a-suspensao-e-invalidacao-imediata-da-auscultacao-publica-do-plano-director-do-prosavana/>

⁴⁰ <http://farmlandgrab.org/25017>

obvious example of a governmental organ violating its constitutional and ministerial obligations, and thus unacceptable. After the release of 3 statements criticising ProSAVANA's "public hearing" process, UNAC and other Mozambican CSOs and Brazilian and Japanese CSOs signed the joint statement entitled "People's appeal for an immediate invalidation of the 'Public Hearing' of ProSAVANA's Master Plan."⁴¹ Here are the principle claims made by the statements:

1. The omission of the juridical and legal basis of the "public hearing"
2. Violation of constitutional principles by demanding the prior registration of all participants
3. Obstruction to the participation of peasant and civil society organizations
4. Bigger participation of previously selected public servants and ruling party representatives, to prevent the intervention of participants with doubts...
5. Previous backstage meetings were held to mobilise and manipulate local participants to backup ProSavana
6. Intimidation and oppression environment set by the presence of armed security forces. Threat and persecution of peasants who expressed doubts and concerns regarding ProSavana
7. Impossible consensus regarding the contents of the "Draft Zero" (204p.) due to the text's lack of availability, time and inappropriate and distorted explanation. (People's Appeal, 4 June 2015)

Based on these observations, the signatory organisations of the three countries and others numbering over 80 organisations made the following demands:

1. the immediate restitution of the human rights of the participants of the hearings;
2. the immediate invalidation of the public consultations or hearings...
3. that the three Governments take responsibility with the mandates delegated to them by the three Peoples, ensuring strict compliance with the law. (*ibid.*)

1-2-2. Brazilian and Japanese CS: Solidarity and Responsibility

(a) Brazil CS: international solidarity

The Brazilian civil society learned about ProSAVANA through the media coverage of the international seminars and the repeated missions of their agribusinesses to Mozambique from 2011 to 2012. The development of their activities on ProSAVANA is well documented in the recently prepared report ("The Memoirs of South-South Articulation of the peoples and its presupposition regarding "No to ProSAVANA Campaign") and it should be consulted.⁴² "The Memoirs" symbolises the commitment of the Brazilian civil society to "inter-Atlantic solidarity".

⁴¹ <http://farmlandgrab.org/25017>

⁴² The original title in Portuguese: "Memória da articulação Sul-Sul dos povos e seus pressupostos em torno da Campanha Não ao ProSavana".

Still, it should be noted that their joint activities with the Mozambican peasants' movements and civil society organisations are deeply rooted in two aspects: (1) their historical and on-going experience of social conflicts that emerged due to JICA's previous mega programme in the Cerrado (PRODECER) and social movements to fight against negative consequences and to transcend obstacles; and (2) their sense of solidarity as ex-colonised peoples of the south.

This could be surmised by the expression of "struggle (*luta*)" frequently used among the Mozambican and Brazilian movements. The Brazilian social and civil society organisations consider the activities related to ProSAVANA as a "joint struggle for the people's sovereignty" in the historical process of the people's aspiration for "true liberation". When they learned that their president (Lula) led this programme to be installed under the diplomatic principles of "South-South" and "international solidarity," the Brazilian social movements felt a responsibility to redress the mistakes. This could be observed in the title of their "Memoirs" and the expressions found in their statements, reports and discussions.⁴³

(b) Japanese CS: Responsibility of Donors and Consumers

The case for Japanese civil society is different. As ProSAVANA is a programme financed within the scheme of the Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA), the voices of the local peasants and their unions are taken as a problem of their aid and of national institutions (including JICA) in the initial phase. Since Japan has been a member country of OECD/DAC (*Development Aid Committee*) and plays an important role in the field of international cooperation as one of its traditional donors, its civil society has accumulated some experiences and developed several tools for policy advocacy.

One of them is a dialogue mechanism established between Japanese NGOs and MoFA (*Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*), called "Periodical Dialogue between NGOs and MoFA". Under this umbrella, there is "Dialogue for ODA Policy," and the two parties have held policy dialogue meetings three to four times a year since 2006. This mechanism was created after the Japanese ODA faced all sorts of scandals regarding corruptions and failures.⁴⁴ The public support for ODA drastically dropped, and the Japanese government and MoFA tried to regain the trust of taxpayers by setting up an ODA charter (2003), making some institutional changes and establishing a dialogue mechanism with NGOs. One of the scandals and failures they had to face during the period of the transition was the problems of pesticide aid (2KR/KRII) to Africa, especially to Mozambique.⁴⁵ Through these experiences, the Japanese citizens' sense

⁴³ http://fase.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Caderno_Pro savana_FASE.pdf
<http://farmlandgrab.org/25710>

⁴⁴ The details are in the following paper:
[http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/files/files/ProSavana%20Analysis%20based%20on%20Japanese%20source%20\(FUNADA2013\).pdf](http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/files/files/ProSavana%20Analysis%20based%20on%20Japanese%20source%20(FUNADA2013).pdf)

⁴⁵ This account is discussed in details during the workshop held in Maputo on 7 August 2014. The presentation is at the following site: <http://farmlandgrab.org/23838>

of responsibility as citizens of a donor country was developed. As Japanese civil society learns about what has happened and is still happening in the Brazilian Cerrado because of JICA's PRODECER, this sense of responsibility has become even stronger.

After reading the UNAC's first statement and receiving official requests for support in advocacy activities by UNAC and other Mozambican civil society organisations in October 2012, Japanese citizens and NGOs began collecting information and documents from JICA and established a dialogue platform together with MoFA and JICA to exchange information and views in order to overcome the problems in December 2012. As of July 2016, there have been 17 meetings between NGOs and MoFA/JICA held at MoFA.⁴⁶

From the beginning until now, what Japanese civil society was expected by Mozambique to collect information about ProSAVANA. This was because JICA has been playing a pivotal (often leading) role, planning, coordinating and financing the programme, and because Japan has a functioning Administrative Information Disclosure Law (Information Law, hereafter). A group of Japanese citizens have been carrying out this task for their Mozambican and Brazilian counterparts.

Another point is that, since the motivation behind Japan's plan, launch and promotion of ProSAVANA was for its own food security, especially the securing of soy, some of the Japanese civil society members felt responsible as consumers who are depending on cheap grain from abroad.⁴⁷ Thus, two kinds of responsibilities, one as a donor citizen and another as a consumer, have been the driving force of Japanese civil society, and most of the members of Japanese civil society engaging with the advocacy activities related to ProSAVANA are volunteers.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ The minutes of the meetings are disclosed at the following MoFA site:

http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shimin/oda_ngo/taiwa/prosavana/index.html The hand-outs by NGOs are posted at the following sites: http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/

⁴⁷ According to the Japan's Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 93% of the consumption of soy in Japan imported. http://www.maff.go.jp/j/zyukyu/zikyu_ritu/pdf/26suii.pdf

⁴⁸ The above points were shared and discussed at the international colloquial entitled "Global governance/politics, climate justice & agrarian/social justice held on 4-6 February 2016 in The Hague.

Chapter 2. ProSAVANA's "Social Communication Strategy"

2-1. Trilateral Agreement and JICA's Contracts with Local Agencies

2-1-1. Agreement at Joint Coordination Committee and JICA's contracts

On 3 December 2012, faced with sudden domestic and global protests against ProSAVANA, the three governments discussed how to deal with this "problem" at the third meeting of the ProSAVANA Joint Coordination Committee. The three countries agreed to formulate a "social communication strategy" in order "*to reach civil society as soon as possible*".⁴⁹ The parties also "*agreed to recommend ProSAVANA-HQ to start selecting and hiring specialized consultant or consultancy firm to elaborate this plan (sic.)*" (MoM:2).

Based on this accord, from December 2012 to August 2013, there have been four (publically known) contracts between JICA and three local consultancy agencies (CV&A, ITMZ and COLINAMAZ) signed.⁵⁰ The most important contract for this analysis is the second contract between JICA and CV&A (*Cunha e Vaz & Associados*) signed in Maputo on 1 August 2016.⁵¹ The project title is "Definition of Communication Strategy for ProSAVANA".

2-1-2. JICA's 2013 Contract with CV&A

(a) JICA's Contract and the Background of CV&A

Although it is not known when, JICA and the three governments agreed on the document entitled "Communication Strategy in the Framework of ProSAVANA" written in English. JICA attached this document to its second contract with CV&A together with detailed ToR (*Terms of Reference*).⁵² All of these documents were disclosed by JICA upon a request from Japanese citizens made in early 2015.⁵³

CV&A is a Portuguese consulting firm established in 2003 by a Portuguese businessman, António Cunha Vaz, and currently runs 12 offices around the world including Mozambique, Angola and Brazil.⁵⁴ According to the contract, it seems that JICA contracted its Mozambican branch, *CV&A-Consultores Sociedade Unipessoal*,

6. The disclosure of these minutes has been refused by JICA, but Japanese civil society managed to gain access on the following website, that of the international NGO, GRAIN.

<http://www.grain.org/article/entries/4703-leaked-prosavanaProSAVANA-master-plan-confirms-worst-fear> s The list of participants from the three countries in this meeting appears in the same document. On the side of JICA.

⁵⁰ "Preliminary analysis of JICA primary documents" (17 January 2016) In English

<http://www.farmlandgrab.org/25696> In Portuguese <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/25669>

⁵¹ http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/docs/101.pdf

⁵² http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/docs/102.pdf

⁵³ These documents are posted on a Japanese NGO's site:

http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/index_docs.html

⁵⁴ <http://www.cunhavaz.com/>

Lda., for “ProSAVANA’s Communication Strategy,” where the founder-president of the CV&A Group signed as an administrator of the Mozambican CV&A.⁵⁵

The contract duration is for four months (from August to November 2013) but it seems that it was extended until October 2014 since some monthly activity reports (July, August and October 2014) submitted by CV&A to JICA exist. Or JICA may have given CV&A the third contract.⁵⁶ Interestingly, the monthly activity report of September 2014, the document indicating the extension of the second contract or/and the third contract is not included in the group of disclosed documents. This sort of patchy disclosure came to be known as a common characteristic of the JICA’s disclosing methodology with regards to ProSAVANA related documents.⁵⁷

(b) JICA’s ToR to CV&A: Objective and Methodology

The objective of the second contract between JICA and CV&A is not written in the contract document but in the ToR (*“Termos de Referência Consultoria Projeto-ProSAVANA”*). As the project title indicates, the objective of the contract is very clear: to provide a defined communication strategy for ProSAVANA. In the ToR, JICA explains more detailed objectives of the project, yet in rather ambiguous expressions. The consultancy is to formulate:

- *“fixed contents for ProSAVANA’s website based on the contents published on ProSAVANA’s site, reference documents, and information made available by the project’s technical staff, institutions and coordinators of Japan, Brazil and Mozambique and other partners,*
- *one comprehensive and ample communication strategy toward the programme’s public targets, partners, civil society and international community in order to secure (*space in) the international and national dimensions regarding ProSAVANA.”* (ToR to CV&A:1) *Authors’ translation.

The “methodology in the area of Social Communications” in the ToR helps us more clearly understand the objective of the project. JICA instructs CV&A as follows:

- *“Establish a communication strategy for each target group in the programme, by revealing specifically: decision-making level, high-level members of each institution...*
- *Identify eventual mistakes of the programme’s actual communication strategy and propose recommendations for the solution,*
- *Analyse the actual structure of communication implementation of the programme, suggest the ideal structure for execution of activities and propose changes if necessary...*
- *(as expected results) intervention proposal and action plans for each identified*

⁵⁵ http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/docs/101.pdf The other contracts will be posted on internet on the following site: http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/index_docs.html

⁵⁶ These documents will be posted on the above site.

⁵⁷ For the details, see the previous analysis paper.

target group.” (ToR to CV&A:3-4) ⁵⁸ *Authors’ translation.

The target groups indicated by JICA are as follows:

- “Academic ⁵⁹ public. Specialists, scholars, researchers and technical body specialised in the areas of agriculture, environment, economics, social economics, among others,
- General public. Media in general, newspapers, specialised journals, TV, radio, community radio,
- Programme target group. Farmers located in the Nampula, Zambézia and Niassa provinces, firstly, agricultural advisors from the provincial and district agriculture directorates, IIAM (Agriculture Research Institute of Mozambique) employees, producers associations, cooperatives, NGOs, producers organisations, among others identified throughout the consultancy contract, national and international civil society organisations.” (ibid.:3) *Authors’ translation.

As is clear from the above descriptions, the “information” that JICA instructed CV&A to collect was not general. All the information was to feed the formulation of “intervention and action plans for each target group” (ibid.:4).

Under its “long-term communication strategy,” JICA gives the following conditions for the consultants to be hired by CV&A:

- “Who comprehend the following aspects”...(h) analysis of the result of the communication and possible change of course” for “definition and implementation of the communication strategy.” (ibid.:3-4)

For ProSAVANA and JICA, “social communication” meant “social intervention” and what they truly wanted was to establish an effective strategy to identify “current mistakes” for “changing course.” None of the ProSAVANA promoters or JICA had an intention of responding to the concerns, aspirations and demands formally submitted to the three governments. Their expectations and determinations were that through “research,” “analysis,” “establishment of a strategy,” “action plan,” and “intervention,” the civil societies would be calmed down.

In order to fulfil their tasks, CV&A was instructed to submit both a preliminary and final “Report of diagnostic of the situation with actions and recommendations (*Relatório de diagnóstico da situação contendo acções e recomendações*)” (ibid.:5).


⁵⁸ http://farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/Com_Strategy_for_ProSAVANA_%281%29.pdf

⁵⁹ Although this point will not be discussed here, according to several sources, the ProSAVANA promoters and JICA were approaching “neo-liberal economists” around the world (especially in Mozambique and Japan) for them to write favourable papers towards ProSAVANA (and PRODECER).

2-2. Formulation of “ProSAVANA’s Communication Strategy”

2-2-1. Discovery and Nature of “the Strategy” Report

In the ToR, JICA instructed that a preliminary report be submitted by the third week of August, and a final report by the third week of September 2013 (*ibid.*). CV&A followed these instructions and completed a 50 page-long report entitled “ProSAVANA: Communication Strategy (*Estratégia de Comunicação*)” written in Portuguese.⁶⁰ It should be understood that the disclosed “Estratégia” is not a document of CV&A but rather an officially endorsed ProSAVANA document, reflected in the facts that it carries the ProSAVANA logo on its front cover and on every page of the report and that the name of CV&A does not appear anywhere within.



Later on, it was learned that there was also an English version of the report, but the existence of this report was never explained thus not disclosed.⁶¹

Even the identification and disclosure of this report was not easy. It was time consuming and involved a large amount of guesswork. The existence of the accord led to knowledge of the contract and its appendices including the ToR. The ToR hinted at the existence of the final report, which then only the Portuguese version of was disclosed. Since the language of the reports was not determined in the ToR, until the exposure of other related documents in May 2016, it was impossible to

know that there was an English version. Thus, even today, most of the Japanese and international civil organisations do not know “ProSAVANA’s Communication Strategy,” which is still officially effective according to the representatives of JICA (The 15th dialogue, 19 February 2016).

This paper is the first analysis of ProSAVANA’s “Communication Strategy (*Estratégia de Comunicação*)” made in English. Due to the current concealment of the English version by JICA, some details in the report will be translated into English and shared in this chapter.

2-2-2. Pre-determined Directions Observed in “the Strategy” Report

(a) Overall and SWOT Analysis

On the first page of the report (in text), CV&A summarises the overall problem of the communication of ProSAVANA and its principle causes as follows:

- *“The absence of a planned, systematic and clear communication on the fundamental principles and guidelines of the program, and on their evolution,*

⁶⁰ The entire report is posted by a Japanese NGO on the following site:
http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/docs/104.pdf

⁶¹ This detail will be discussed in Chapter 3.

allowed the creation of many myths and ghosts, and it is essential to unravel them now.

- *This disinformation was essentially created on the basis of false interpretations of available information and its dissemination by national and international institutions (notably of Brazil and Japan) with the intention of following their economic and political agendas which are derived from the various interests of these countries with regards to Mozambique.” (Estratégia:5) ⁶² *Authors’ translation.*

The civil organisations of the three countries are blamed for being the essential cause of the problems that ProSAVANA promoters were facing.

Then, the following SWOT analysis of ProSAVANA is given:

<p>Strengths</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – The interest of Mozambique in improving its capacity of agricultural production; – Great experiences of coordinators; – Mozambique’s strong agricultural potentials; – A high level of sympathy from farmers (*farm owners) with the programme; – Being a programme in Mozambique coordinated by the Mozambican government. 	<p>Weaknesses</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – People not knowing what ProSAVANA is; – Bad experiences in the past have caused traumas; – Negative comparison with the Cerrado.
<p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Improvement of Food Security and socioeconomic conditions in the Nacala Corridor; – Improvement of conditions of agriculture production in Mozambique; – Integral infra-structure development in the Nacala Corridor; – Massive accessions of the population to the programme. 	<p>Threats</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Lack of accessions of local communities towards ProSAVANA; – Social convulsions orchestrated by Civil Society; – Struggle by international civil society gaining political traction; – Policy changes in any of the coordinating countries upsetting the programme.

Estratégia:6. *Authors’ translation.

Several points shown in this SWOT analysis should be noted here: (1) among four threats to ProSAVANA, three are related to (civil) society including the local communities; (2) the last threat is “policy change in any of the (three) countries”; (3) as a weakness, the “negative comparison with the Cerrado” is listed; (4) as an opportunity, “massive aspiration of the population” is given.

(b) “Peril” of ProSAVANA: Ignored Root Causes

In the above overall analysis, the results of the CV&A’s research are rather odd since

⁶² Any descriptions extracted from “the strategy” report by CV&A in this section were translated by the Authors.

the report is full of descriptions about numerous failures of the ProSAVANA promoters and related organisations. For instance:

- *“(1.5. External Communication) ProSAVANA has its own problems of external communication and image due to various reasons:*
 - *Only recently was there a definition of what ProSAVANA’s ‘aim’ is;*
 - *The process for defining what the programme is in real sense and what its real impacts are is still in progress;*
 - *Huge differences between its stakeholders;*
 - *Absence of external communication mechanism;*
 - *Strong public interests in the programme; necessary to keep confidentiality of documents and processes of study under progress; until its final version;*
 - *Interests groups that see economic and political gains from the outcome of ProSAVANA...*
- *Because of the reasons already identified, external communication regarding ProSAVANA has not functioned, but it is believed that with constant, proactive and positive communication informing stakeholders what ProSAVANA is will bring very positive results and create a better image of ProSAVANA both in national and international spheres.” (ibid.:8) *Authors’ translation and emphasis.*

From this description, it is clear that “this peril” of ProSAVANA (*ibid.*) stemmed from its own problems. Yet, these were not reflected in the SWOT analysis on page 6.

This report confirms that even by September 2013, the three governments and JICA had not defined “what ProSAVANA was” due to the “existence of economic and political interest groups.” Though these clearly identified what the root causes of the problems of ProSAVANA were, CV&A did not address these causes at all. All the problems were trivialised to “internal coordination” and “external communication” problems. The civil society organisations (especially of Brazil and Japan and globally) were made responsible for these problems and thus the chief culprit. The report concluded that with the establishment of a communication strategy and its faithful applications, the “peril” would be overcome (*ibid.*).

One should not forget, however, where such limitation in the prescription comes from. Their contract was for making proposals for a “Communication Strategy” and addressing the root causes was not instructed or written into the contract by their primary contractor, JICA.

The project was carried out using public money (from Japan) for a public development programme. Yet, the mere existence of the project related to “Communication Strategy” within the framework of ProSAVANA was totally unknown to the public. This information was never shared in the periodical dialogue meetings between Japanese NGOs and MoFA/JICA until its discovery by civil society at long last in 2015.

Thus, without knowing that “the strategy” was completed and approved by JICA and

others in the same month, the regional civil society platform (of Nampula Province) released a statement proclaiming that:

- “1. We reaffirm that the Open Letter on Halting and Deliberation of ProSavana, addressed to Heads of State and Government party to the programme, which calls for the cessation, deliberation and change in the approach to the support offered to the small-scale agricultural sector, and which is still awaiting for the response of the Government of Mozambique, is the basis of the PPOSC-N agenda”. (PPOSC-N, 30 September 2013)⁶³

The official reaffirmations of the Open Letter and requests for much waited response of the three governments were repeated by the organisations of the three countries even after this since the civil societies did not know the position that the government had already taken.

The final report reveals that the three governments and JICA did not have any intentions of “halting” and/or of “deliberating” on ProSAVANA in order to carry out what was requested by the signatory organisations of the letter. Those were: (a) opening all the information related to ProSAVANA; (b) establishing a truly democratic, transparent and inclusive dialogue process; (c) re-building confidence with stakeholders; (d) re-defining the objective of the programme together; (f) centralising the assistance to already existing local peasant efforts; and (g) and turning the negative past into something positive.

Instead of trying to respond or reply to these requests, JICA and the ProSAVANA promoters made a decision and were determined to plough ahead with the programme, without informing civil societies of this decision. After all, they all had “interest groups seeking economic and political gains” as CV&A discovered (Estratégia:8). Thus, effective “strategies” were urgently necessary but this would not be discovered by the civil societies.

In fact, there are no official ProSAVANA documents showing any information or traces related to this project (“Communication Strategy”). As explained previously, the discovery was made through tireless efforts and also somewhat accidental due to the first exposure of the documents which occurred in April 2013.⁶⁴

(c) “Myths” and “False Interpretations” by CS?

One of the central arguments of the CV&A about the cause of the problems was “false interpretations” and “myths” diffused by civil society organisations. These claims, however, are not supported by any information or sources in the report.

A week after (8 August 2013) the contract date between JICA and CV&A, the first “Triangular People’s Conference on ProSAVANA” was held in Maputo by UNAC and

⁶³ <http://farmlandgrab.org/22655>

⁶⁴ <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4703-leaked-prosavana-master-plan-confirms-worst-fears>

ORAM (a rural self-help organisation). Although a group of representatives from Agriculture Ministry (MINAG), including its Minister Pacheco, attended the conference, neither the Japanese nor the Brazilian governments (as JICA or ABC) did. From the civil society side, numerous representatives from the civil societies of the three countries, especially from the peasant leaders of ProSAVANA's target districts and provinces, as well as leaders of the signatory organisations of the Open Letter and over 100 peasants actively participated in the event, which lasted from 8:30 for 12 hours. After analysis of "the strategy," it is clear that the absence of the representatives of the Japanese and Brazilian governments was also an attempt to foment the "internalisation" of ProSAVANA. This will be discussed below.

Although it is not known if the consultants of CV&A participated in the conference, since MINAG filmed the entire conference, surely they had access to the video and know the contents of what and how the civil society representatives spoke.⁶⁵

The conference was composed of: (a) opening remarks; (b) several presentations on ProSAVANA by the Mozambican government; (c) watching a video made based on joint field research about the Cerrado by Mozambican and Brazilian civil society organisations;⁶⁶ (d) sharing of detailed research on ProSAVANA and its master plan reports by a Brazilian expert;⁶⁷ and (e) discussions. The presentations that were delivered and discussions by the representatives of the civil societies were all based on research, while those by the representatives of MINAG were about "plans" and "expectations," despite the fact that three years had already past since the original ProSAVANA accord.⁶⁸

During the discussions, MINAG's directors repeatedly denied both the programme's initial emphasis on the promotion of Agribusiness and the Cerrado-like agricultural development and on the "success" of PRODECER that had already materialised under ProSAVANA in the form of international seminars and public-private joint missions that took place in Brazil, Japan and Mozambique from 2011 to 2013.

After this conference, the denial of these facts, especially the ones related to the original aims, scope and plans of ProSAVANA, became central characteristics of the tactics used by the three governments in order to ward off the concerns and critiques of civil societies. One of the most notable examples was observed during the Second "International Peasants Conference on Land and Seeds" organised by UNAC on 15 and 16 October 2013. One of the main topics of the conference was on ProSAVANA.

⁶⁵ It should be noted that MINAG made each participant tell their names and affiliations and filmed each one of them without sharing their reasons for doing so.

⁶⁶ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jUKmyKf5E0k>

⁶⁷ The contents of the presentation were later published as a report, "Brazilian Cooperation and Investments in Africa: The Case of ProSAVANA in Mozambique" by Sergio Schlesinger, and are accessible at the following site: http://fase.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Caderno_Pro savana_FASE.pdf; http://www.iucn.org/backup_iucn/cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/temti_ep_01_2014_1.pdf

⁶⁸ Almost all the presentations were posted by Japanese NGOs at the following site: https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=prosavana

Several international and Mozambican academics gave presentations about ProSAVANA based on their literature and field research.⁶⁹

Although the representatives of the three governments were invited to the event, again only the Mozambican ones attended. The repeated denial of the facts about ProSAVANA by the MINAG directors caused huge reactions from the participants, and left negative impressions not only among Mozambican civil society but also in national and international media.⁷⁰ Later, an article written by one of the participating organisations was published in an independent national newspaper, and its title clearly shows the problems that had emerged: “ProSAVANA: Manipulations, Lies and Half Truth” (*Verdade*, 8 November 2013).⁷¹

Although it was quite obvious, it was only through the disclosure of “ProSAVANA: Estratégia de Comunicação,” or the CV&A’s Final Report, in January 2016 that it was discovered and confirmed that these tactics were actually part of the institutional strategy of ProSAVANA (Estratégia:35).

These incidents contradict the CV&A’s claims about the “myths” and “false interpretations” on the part of civil society organisations. Rather, they indicate an “institutional mythicisation” of the previous and current facts by the ProSAVANA promoters, and these points are strengthened by CV&A in its report (*ibid.*).

(d) Summary of ProSAVANA’s “Communication Strategy”

It seems that CV&A had a pre-determined direction for their “analysis” and for formulating a ProSAVANA communication strategy. Although “the strategy” report stretches to 50 pages in length, what CV&A drew up as the communication strategy could be summarised as follows:

1. Improving internal coordination by institutionalising communications and establishing some tools;
2. Drastically diminishing the information related to the Brazilian Cerrado and organising slanderous statements by Mozambican officials in order to discredit the claims made by civil society organisations;
3. Advancing visible projects that contribute to “agricultural production” and diffusing the outcomes in order to create beneficiaries and mobilise popular aspirations for ProSAVANA;
4. Establishing a functioning communication network at community level by creating local “collaborators” connected with the ProSAVANA-HQ through SDAE

⁶⁹ Isabela Nogueira and Ossi Ollinaho (2013) “From Rhetoric to Practice in South-South Development Cooperation: A case study of Brazilian interventions in the Nacala corridor development program.”

⁷⁰ <http://www.dw.de/camponeses-mo%C3%A7ambicanos-sentem-se-exclu%C3%ADdos-do-prosavana/a-17075860>
<http://www.dw.de/antepassado-brasileiro-do-prosavana-prejudicou-pequenos-agricultores-dizem-estudiosos/a-17067517>
<http://www.dw.de/projeto-brasileiro-que-inspirou-o-prosavana-teve-impactos-ambientais-graves/a-17054390> Reflexão
Prosavana <http://v2.videos.sapo.ao/bZCYMEPag3Ge3BacMASz>

<http://www.portugues.rfi.fr/africa/20130807-povos-de-mocambique-brasil-e-japao-face-ao-prosavana>

⁷¹<http://www.verdade.co.mz/ambiente/41572-prosavana-manipulacoes-me%20tiras-e-meias-verdades>

in order to control local communities and to devalue CSOs.

2-2-3. Principal Target of “the Strategy”: Local Communities

(a) Direct Contact with Communities “to Devalue the Associations”

The first target was determined by CV&A in “the strategy” report. That was, for “communities in Nacala Corridor:”

- *“ProSAVANA has large number of stakeholders with whom it must communicate.... By doing so, a number of criticisms and some disinformation about the programme will be drastically reduced.” (ibid.:10) *Authors’ translation.*

This is the official reason for selecting “local communities” as principle stakeholders of the programme. Later on, CV&A revealed that the reason for establishing “*direct contact with communities*” was “*to devalue these associations as spokespersons for these communities and farmers*” (ibid.:34).


It is clear that their true target for counter-activities was UNAC and its affiliate associations existing in all 19 ProSAVANA districts. Their real motivation seems to have been to disconnect the local population from UNAC member unions and to bring the local communities along the Nacala Corridor under the authority and control of ProSAVANA promoters. Here is how.

(b) Creation of Functioning Local structure through Régulos & SDAE

CV&A recommended the utilisation of the “*already existing structures and hierarchies*” and “official mechanisms” such as “Consultative Councils (*Conselhos Consultivos*) at the district and locality level” and “*traditional social leaders such as Régulos.*” ⁷²

Then, the importance of using SDAE (*District Service for Economic Activity*) was highlighted. The reports recommended channelling information and messages about ProSAVANA through this governmental organ (ibid.). The report even contained an image of this information flow to facilitate the understanding of non- Mozambican actors such as JICA and its consultants:

⁷² “Régulo (small king)” is a term created and used during the Portuguese colonial period. It has similar connotations and functions with “paramount chief,” but it should be carefully used especially in northern Mozambique. For a detailed discussion, see: Sayaka Funada Classen, *The Origins of War in Mozambique* (Cape Town: The African Minds), 2013.
<http://www.africanminds.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/The%20Origins%20of%20War%20in%20Mozambique.pdf>




Estratégia:11.

(c) Creation of a “Network of Collaborators” in Each of 19 Districts

CV&A also recommended that the Mozambican government instruct SDAE in each district to “*identify one person who could be ProSAVANA’s extension person to bridge ProSAVANA and district and local authorities*”(ibid.:23). It further strongly suggested that the government carry out this task “*immediately,*” and for “*the network of collaborators to be operational by the end of 2013*” (ibid.).

CV&A suggested that ProSAVANA offer bicycles with ProSAVANA’s logo on them to “*the collaborators*” and traditional leaders who would assist in the diffusion of information about the programme (ibid.:46). The following design was shared in the report.



Left: Estratégia:43; Right: Picture taken during one of the “public hearing” meetings by Japanese NGO. Active participation of the local régulos could be confirmed.

In fact, a clear shift in target by ProSAVANA promoters occurred in September 2013. When the “Concept Note” of ProSAVANA’s master plan was suddenly released by

MINAG,⁷³ it was announced that “rural meetings” would be held in all ProSAVANA’s three provinces and in some of their 19 districts.⁷⁴ Although ProSAVANA did try to use all the above local actors for its mobilisations and participations, it seems that it also faced certain limitations.⁷⁵ It was still DPAs and district administrators and their staff who were more actively engaging with and responsible in organising the events, and not SDAE.⁷⁶

The application of the above strategy became more obvious during the “public consultation/hearing” meetings on ProSAVANA’s master plan draft zero held in April 2015. The meetings were prepared by local SDAEs and principal participants were the actors indicated above as local “collaborators,” Consultative Council members, and traditional leaders including Régulos and Frelimo supporters.⁷⁷ There were some districts and localities where a meeting with those actors was held prior to formal “public hearing” meetings. In some cases, SDAE informed local unions affiliated to UNAC that only up to five representatives could attend the meetings.⁷⁸

After the first round of the “public hearing” meetings at the district level ended in May 2015, numerous Mozambican civil society organisations, including research institutes and religious organisations, criticised and condemned the process.⁷⁹ These statements pointed out that these meetings were not open, democratic, inclusive or adequate and contradicted the ministerial decree determining the “principles of the public consultation process”. Many claimed that the meetings were politically oriented and too politicised (locations of where these meetings took place) where armed policemen were present in some cases.⁸⁰ UNAC and other organisations

⁷³ The concept note is posted on the following site:

<https://www.prosavana.gov.mz/index.php?p=biblioteca&id=6> Japanese experts and citizens analysed of this note: http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/8kai_shiryo/ref9.pdf (in Japanese) <http://farmlandgrab.org/22964> (in English)

⁷⁴ In the case of the meetings for the “Concept Note,” the discussions began at the provincial level. Due to the unsatisfactory contents of the document, the civil society provincial platform of Nampula (PPOSC-N) rejected its cooperation in organising meetings at district level unless the revised Note would be provided. The Note was never revised, thus, no district meetings were organised in Nampula. Even this fact was twisted on the official briefing document prepared by MoFA for Japanese parliamentarians (15 June 2015).

⁷⁵ From the analysis of the JICA’s Japanese consultants monthly reports.

⁷⁶ Based on the disclosed monthly reports written by JICA’s consultants for ProSAVANA-PD. The observations were given by the participants of these meetings who belong to peasant and civil society organisations in Niassa Province.

⁷⁷ The utilisation of FRELIMIO’s local structure for creating a “network of collaborators” in each district was observed widely during the “public hearings/consultations”. Consult with the following presentations and statements: <http://farmlandgrab.org/24903> http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/12kai_shiryo/ref9.pdf

⁷⁸ Based on the result of the interview with local peasant unions and participatory observation of a Japanese NGO carried out during the period of the “public hearings/consultations”. This result was reflected in the following presentation and statement:

http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/12kai_shiryo/ref9.pdf <http://farmlandgrab.org/25017>

⁷⁹ <http://farmlandgrab.org/24903> <http://farmlandgrab.org/24926>

<https://adecru.wordpress.com/2015/05/11/exigimos-a-suspensao-e-invalidacao-imediata-da-auscultacao-publica-do-plano-director-do-prosavana/>

⁸⁰ See the above statements.

requested nullification of the meetings based on the participatory observations they conducted in all 19 districts.⁸¹ Brazilian and Japanese civil society organisations supported this together with 80 other organisations around the world.

When asked the reason why they had begun at the district level where adequate preparations are the most challenging, with very great haste, and without notifying and asking for help from national and regional organisations, JICA's answer was as follows:

- *“Because ProSAVANA considers the local communities to be the most important stakeholders... Also because this was what the Mozambican government wanted, and we are to support what the recipient government wants to do.”* (The 11th dialogue, 28 April 2015; study session organised by parliamentarians, 15 June 2015).

In order to prove this claim (emphasis on the ownership of the recipient government) visually and avoid any further direct criticism of JICA, the Japanese cooperation agency did not send any representatives to the “public hearing/consultation” meetings despite the fact that the master plan was formulated by JICA's Japanese consultants and that all the meetings were financed by JICA.⁸²

The truth was that by September 2013 ProSAVANA adapted “the strategy” recommended by CV&A to “internalise (domesticate)” ProSAVANA and to focus on the local communities (especially at the district level) and establish a “*network of local collaborators*” in order to “*devalue civil society organisations*” (Estratégia:23;34). JICA had no intention of disclosing this fact to Japanese parliamentarians, let alone to the Japanese NGOs and its public. Even today, the parliamentarians who belong to the ODA Special Committee and have been actively engaging in discussions about ProSAVANA do not have any knowledge about the existence of “ProSAVANA's Communication Strategy” and the related projects.

2-2-4. “Communication Strategy” towards CS

(a) “Dialogue Will Have Reduced Effects or No Results”

The tone of the summary appearing on page 5, which accuses civil society organisations of being the prime culprit in ProSAVANA's failures, continues throughout the report. The following claim is representative of this attitude:

- *“There is an attempt by some CSOs (Mozambican) to manipulate Mozambican society by informing communities with false data, which is diffused by the media later on to the rest of the people who have little information about what ProSAVANA is.”* (Estratégia:12) *Authors' translation and emphasis.

⁸¹ <http://farmlandgrab.org/25017>

⁸² The Mozambican government covered the transportation cost of the governmental officials, and the rest was covered by JICA. ABC did not pay anything according to a JICA brief submitted to Japanese parliamentarians (15 June 2015).

As seen in the above, the report does not list a single example (evidence) of this claim. Still, CV&A draws the following conclusions:

- *“Particularly in Mozambique, Civil Society, generally speaking, “took over” (the public space) with the opinion that ProSAVANA would have negative impacts on the local population...*
- *Some associations that criticise and fear ProSAVANA could be calmed down if they could obtain access to more complete and actual information about the programme. Since others have political and/or media-like objectives, dialogue (with CS) will only have reduced (effects) or no results.”* (ibid.:13) *Authors’ translation and emphasis.

The “strategy” report did not analyse the reason why the Mozambican civil society organisations were united and shared concerns about potential negative impacts of the programme, rather it blames these organisations by saying that they had “political motivations.” However, what these “political motivations” of Mozambican CSOs and “economic and political interests” of Brazilian and Japanese CSOs that are cited and blamed repeatedly in the final report are is never explained. The CV&A consultants did point out the political and economic interests of the ProSAVANA promoters, but this is not taken into consideration in their analysis.

The report devalued the importance of the dialogue with Mozambican civil society organisations since this would not produce the desired effects of “the strategy.” Any dialogues for such an international-national-regional programme should not be prepared and held in order to serve the purpose of the governments or the programme. Rather, “meaningful dialogue” is the right of the citizens and people protected by the constitutions of the three countries, and also a part of JICA’s guidelines. This understanding is not observed anywhere in the final report by CV&A. Their concerns are simply how to diminish the perceived negative impacts of civil society actors over ProSAVANA, which was the pre-determined direction given to them by JICA and ProSAVANA promoters as discussed above.

(b) “Dangers of International NGOs”

The “strategy” report describes *“the dangers of these (international) NGOs”* as stemming from the following three “general” factors:

- 1) being professionals who follow the interests of financiers and/or politicians with their own Cause, thus making it almost impossible to remove them from their struggle;*
- 2) having access to academics with the capacity for creating studies and formulating public opinions together in the national and international sphere;*
- 3) having the capacity to raise funds;*
- 4) having strong experience and an understanding of “struggle” that they have interests with and of influencing public opinion and that of their stakeholders in their respective countries, that is, in Japan and Brazil.* (Estratégia:13) *Authors’

translation.

CV&A even warned as such in the following conclusion, again without any basis:

- *“Journalists must understand that these international actors manipulate Mozambican citizens and take away their interests when they give voices to these actors” (ibid.:14). *Authors’ translation.*

(c) Tentative of Incorporation of Mozambican CSOs

CV&A recommended that “ProSAVANA organise and invite the Mozambican civil society to gather and debate the programme,” and “prepare a powerpoint presentation with a lot of objectives that reinforce the positive points about ProSAVANA” (*ibid.*:34).

It further lists conditions for these meetings, such as preparation of written minutes and recording (both video and audio) in order to “have unassailable evidences of who was in the meeting and what he/she said and which position he/she took” (*ibid.*). CV&A also describes four ways to “*minimise the forces of these organisations*,” the last of which is to “formalise the contacts to ask for meetings or information in order that ProSAVANA not to be accused of a lack of effort” (*ibid.*).

This remark is very important due to puzzling actions carried out by the ProSAVANA technical team on several occasions that occurred between Mozambican CSOs and the three governments since September 2013. The representatives of UNAC faced the sudden appearance of the ProSAVANA representatives of the three countries (ProSAVANA coordinator [then] Calisto Bias and staff from JICA and ABC) while they were holding a meeting on a different issue with high-ranking officials at Ministry of Agriculture (4 November 2013). These governmental representatives insisted that the UNAC delegate hold a meeting at the site. UNAC declined but suggested that they organise a meeting with other CSOs to discuss under what conditions a dialogue on ProSAVANA could be organised.⁸³

When the gathering occurred in Maputo, a list of attendants entitled “Dialogue for ProSAVANA” was circulated, and strong objections were given by CSO members. In Nampula, organisations which attended another meeting with ProSAVANA promoters including JICA were shocked to discover hidden video and audio recorders. The suspicion and distrust of Mozambican civil society organisations towards ProSAVANA promoters worsened, and they withdrew from any further meetings related to ProSAVANA.⁸⁴

These happenings were made known to Japanese civil society, and presented and criticised during their dialogue in Tokyo in November and December 2013, and again in 2014. Yet, the director of Country Assistance Planning Division III, International

⁸³ Even this occasion was included as “a dialogue meeting between UNAC and ProSAVANA” in a JICA official document used during its meetings with Japanese parliamentarians.

⁸⁴ The detailed analysis on these accounts were made by Japanese NGOs and presented during the dialogue meetings with MoFA and JICA. http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/9kai_shiryo/ref9.pdf

Cooperation Bureau of MoFA insisted that nothing was wrong with the process and said: “the fact is they did hold a meeting and we cannot deny this fact” (The 6th dialogue, 25 November 2013).⁸⁵ It was only in January 2016, long after these meetings were held in Maputo, Nampula and Tokyo, that the background of the attitude of the ProSAVANA promoters, “the strategy,” was revealed by the disclosure of “the strategy” report.

(d) Counter-actions against CS (Especially of Brazil and Japan)

Near the end of “the strategy” report, its tone becomes aggressive and one-sided with regards to civil society. For instance:

- *“Relatively speaking, the influence that the CSOs exercise over Mozambican media will be diminished if ProSAVANA maintains continuous communication with them...”*
- *By removing the importance of Mozambican CSOs, the strength of foreign NGOs to act in Mozambique will be taken away since these organisations will reduce their contact with media, and eventually their influence,*
- *Additionally, following this communication strategy and doing away with the connection between the Nacala Corridor and the Brazilian Cerrado will help devalue some of the principal argument points of these international NGOs”.* (Estratégia:34-35). *Authors’ translation and emphasis.

The above descriptions are disturbing enough, but the following advice is even more disturbing, in fact, shocking:

- *“If their influence continues despite these efforts, the following actions should be taken:*
 - *organise a reply and messages that respond, indirectly, to the concerns indicated by CSOs,*
 - *question or criticise the role of foreign organisations played in Mozambique (fomented by the critiques from the side of some Mozambican authority)”.* (ibid.:35) *Authors’ translation and emphasis.

It seems that CV&A not only planned but also suggested that the official response to the Open Letter not be given. CV&A recommended that “the reply” be used as a “trump card” for taming Mozambican, Brazilian and Japanese civil society organisations, but only if necessary and “indirectly.”

Despite all the suggestions, in reality, a much sought after “possible course change” written in JICA’s annex documents to their contract with CV&A, “Communication Strategy in the Framework of ProSAVANA,” did not occur. Thus, on 7 August 2014, MINAG reluctantly released “an official response” to “Mozambican social organisations” signed by Minister José Pacheco.

⁸⁵ JICA promised to check with “Mozambique,” but came back with other small details and did not confirm/deny the points raised in the text (The 7th and 8th dialogue, 18 December 2014 and 12 March 2015).

The “response” was nothing but a soliloquy that did not directly address the concerns and critiques raised by the signatory organisations, which exceeded 90 organisations around the world, and made no response to the request for “*halting the programme until a collective reflection be made.*” Although this response letter was supposedly signed on 28 May 2014,⁸⁶ none of the governmental representatives mentioned it at the second “Triangular People’s Conference on ProSAVANA” organised and held by the “No to ProSAVANA Campaign” composed of UNAC and eight other Mozambican CSOs on 24-25 July 2014 in Maputo where officers of the three governments and JICA personnel attended and gave presentations.⁸⁷ The “indirectness” is paramount.

The way the rest of “the strategy” report is written reveals the problematic nature of the ProSAVANA’s “Communication Strategy” well, and to a certain extent, it reflects the thinking and attitude of the ProSAVANA promoters. CV&A went further and recommended that the principal feature of ProSAVANA be “disconnected from the programme in order to invalidate the arguments of civil society organisations” (Estratégia:35).

Although Historical Revisionism is nowadays a favourite approach of authoritarian governments around the world, when it is promoted within a context of “international cooperation,” it is beyond imagination. Yet, ProSavana promoters including JICA did not hesitate to follow the suggestions of “the strategy” despite all the evidence of ProSAVANA’s relationship with the Cerrado/PRODECER and private investors.⁸⁸

Furthermore, “the strategy” report requested that the “Mozambican governmental authority” “*question and criticise the role of foreign organisations*” in order to silence the civil society organisations of Brazil and Japan.

As will be discussed in more detail in the case of MAJOL’s reports, JICA always intervenes in the writings (reports) of their subcontractors. JICA’s contract with CV&A confirms this (ToR to CV&A:5). The preliminary version of the text had to be approved by JICA, and “all the information produced under this ToR is the property of ProSAVANA” (*ibid.*). Thus, all the above descriptions were approved by JICA and owned by ProSAVANA.

These two suggestions from CV&A were also carried out. All three governments and JICA stopped referring to the Cerrado development programme (PRODECER). In

⁸⁶ The date was hand-written.

⁸⁷ At this time, JICA and ABC attended the conference. Prior to the conference, the Japanese and Brazilian civil society organisations had made formal requests for the attendance of these agencies in each country.

⁸⁸ The leaked accord is posted on the following site.

<https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4703-leaked-prosavana-master-plan-confirms-worst-fears> Much information about the importance of the experiences of the assistance for agricultural development in the Brazilian Cerrado for ProSAVANA is posted on JICA’s website:
<http://www.jica.go.jp/project/mozambique/001/activities/>
http://www.jica.go.jp/topics/person/20120824_01.html http://www.jica.go.jp/topics/2009/20090928_01.html
http://www.jica.go.jp/topics/2010/20101124_02.html

fact, the visibility of the Brazilian actors became very low after this period. FGV Projetos, a key figure in promoting Brazilian agribusiness and Cerrado-type “tropical agriculture” to Africa, ceased to be on the front line of the programme.⁸⁹ By mid August 2014, the campaign of the Mozambican authority against involvement of “foreign” organisations in monitoring ProSAVANA suddenly became active.

2-3. Active Implementation of “the Strategy” in the Provinces

2-3-1. “Devaluing” of CS by “Mozambican Authorities”

(a) “External Conspiracy Theory” by Minister and DPA Director

In fact, CV&A not only formulated a communications strategy, it seems that it also facilitated implementing some of the actions they recommended in their report. Since it was not their first contract with ProSAVANA, when they signed the second contract on 1 August 2013, they were fully aware of the situation, problems and promoters of the programme.

This could be observed in “the conspiracy theory” publically pronounced by Minister Pacheco during the interviews right after the first Triangular People’s Conference on ProSAVANA (7 August 2013). One of them is in the following article:

- *“It is a conspiracy to keep Mozambique dependent on imported food. Food that we can produce here. They distort the information so that we continue to eat boiled chicken coming from abroad. But in order for us to produce chicken cheaply, we have to produce soya, maize, to make feedstocks.” (Folha de São Paulo, 30 November 2013)⁹⁰ *Authors translation.*

In the same month, another article followed. The national newspaper, *Noticias*, released the article entitled “ProSavana says it will move forward despite the ‘misleading advertising’ that ‘comes from outside the country,” quoting the director of DPA (*Provincial Directorate of Agriculture*) of Nampula, Pedro Zucula. According to the DPA director, the chiefs of SDAE were gathered from all 10 districts and declared as follows:

- *“The ProSavana... will inevitably move forward, despite the subversion that is being induced from outside the country using some segments of civil society in order to derail efforts to gradually minimise the impact of poverty in Mozambique”,*
- *“We strongly believe that the fallacious propaganda that is being moved to discredit ProSavana comes from outside of the country. Their mentors use some national organizations that pose as spokesmen for civil society to discredit the*

⁸⁹ The analysis about the role of FGV Projetos and the Nacala Fund was carried out by a Brazilian civil society group(<http://farmlandgrab.org/24345>). There was a debate on the “conflict of interests” of FGV in the Japanese parliament. The discussion was carried out between a vice president of the largest opposition party (DPJ) and Prime Minister Abe on 29 January 2014.

http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/8kai_shiryo/ref7.pdf

⁹⁰<http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2013/11/1378733-ministro-mocambicano-ve-conspiracao-em-criticas-ao-plano-de-producao-de-alimentos.shtml>

*Triangular Initiative, shaking communities to revolt against the government and claiming that there is a high risk of usurpation of their land that does not actually exist.” (Notícias, 26 August 2014) *Authors’ translation and emphasis.*

Such a meeting between DPA and SDAE directors was also what was recommended by CV&A in their “strategy”.

(b) “Joint Actions with Media” and “Expense Offers” Despite Refusal

As discussed above, despite the absence of the disclosed documents, it seems CV&A was contracted to assure the implementation of their recommendations even after submission of “the strategy” report.

In CV&A’s “Implementation Situation Report” dated 7 August 2014, the following “joint actions with Mozambican media” are listed:

- “invitation of local correspondents of national media for covering one of the meetings in communities: TVM, STV, RM and Notícias”,
- “diffusion of press notes of meetings”,
- “identification of any other opportunities (for media work)”. (Implementation Situation:1)

It is quite likely that CV&A arranged this article with *Notícias* following “the strategy.” In “Communication Strategy in the Framework of ProSAVANA” given by JICA to CV&A, it says: “(d) Preparation of journalist articles, shows and TV and radio broadcasts on the Programme” and “(m) putting in place encounters between medias and ProSAVANA” are included (pp.3-4). And the JICA’s instructs CV&A for “(H)iring of consultant for establishing social communication of ProSAVANA who comprehends the following aspects: consultancy based on outputs: TV/radio, written articles” (ibid. 3).

Thus, the consultants were expected to submit newspaper articles and TV programmes as justifying their “consultancy” to JICA. “The strategy” report has more detailed strategy related to “working with media” for the promotion of ProSAVANA. For instance, the following areas of activities were determined:

- i. Paid campaigns with newspapers;
- ii. Off-the-record meetings with journalists;⁹¹
- iii. Press conferences, interviews, press-releases;
- iv. Debates on national TV;
- v. Press-trip to the Nacala Corridor for national and international Journalists covered by ProSAVANA);
- vi. Invitation to international media (Japanese and Brazilian journalists).

⁹¹ Notícias, O Pais/STV, Savana, TVM, Rádio de Moçambique (Estratégia:33).

(Estratégia:33-34)⁹²

It should be noted the following phrase was added:

- *“ProSAVANA must always offer to support the expenses (to the journalists) although most of international media do not accept this kind of offer”. (ibid.:34)*
*Authors’ translation.

The payment for the “expenses” of the media coverage to Mozambican media and journalists was frequently cited in “the strategy” report (*ibid.*:28;32-33).⁹³ And it seems that these actions were not refused by their principal contractor, JICA.

(c) “Domestic Conspiracy Theory” by DPA Director

The utilisation and diffusion of a “conspiracy theory” being authorised and promoted by the CV&A’s final report and being approved by JICA and the three countries, Director Zucula (DPA Nampula) escalated his talks. On 1 and 28 August 2014, two representatives of the Japanese CSOs accompanied by JICA and their consultants met with the director at his DPA office. It seems that he could not resist just following the recommendations given by CV&A, and talking about the Cerrado and even extended the “conspiracy theory” to domestic politics:

- *“The Cerrado region has a lot of experiences on this...The Cerrado experience is brought here by EMBRAPA...*
- *We have many problems with civil society...We face a lot of subversions against ProSAVANA...*
- *Now, we recognise that Mozambican politics is also involving with this. They use some people in the civil society. They are opposition people. They say that we must stop development because then people will go hungry, and blame it on the government, thus the opposition will be benefitting.” (1 August 2014)* *Interview made in English.

The meetings were blanketed in non-stop accusations against Mozambican and provincial civil society organisations by Director Zucula. Although representatives of JICA and Japanese consultants were present, they did not say a word but rather nodded, showing their sympathies. JICA’s contracts with local consultants for implementing the already formulated “communication strategy” were no longer needed. The spirit of the “the strategy” had been sowed deeply in the hearts and minds of Mozambican authorities and structures based on administrative and local hierarchies were prepared and began its functions. This is confirmed in the previously mentioned Notícias’ article. The article ends with the following citation:

⁹² The Guardian, Financial Times, New York Times, The Economist, Time, Der Spiegel, Al Jazeera. The correspondents of Reuters, Bloomberg, AFP. For the Japanese media, “Yomiuri, Asahi as they are the most influential newspapers” and Nikkei, NHK or NNN. For the Brazilian media, Folha de São Paulo, a Veja, Exame, Estado de São Paulo, Valor Economico, Globo (Estratégia: 33-34).

⁹³

- “...his (DPA Director Zucula’s) position was defended by SDAE (directors), which guaranteed to assume their role of accompanying the ProSavana’s campaign by removing possible obstacles.” (Notícias, 26 August 2014) *Authors’ translation.

2-3-2. Full Adaptation of “the Strategy”

(a) Intimidations from Top to Bottom

As guaranteed by SDAE directors, interventions did occur at the district level in Nampula Province. As determined in “the strategy” and its mobilisation promoted by Director Zucula, the SDAEs in ProSAVANA’s target districts played a central role in oppressing local peasants who were not in favour of ProSAVANA. One famous case is the intimidation made by the chief of SDAE in Malema District. Together with the district administrator, he repeatedly demanded that local peasants and their association leaders “accept ProSAVANA” and said that “the government will jail those who are against ProSAVANA” on 9 May 2015, right after the public hearing meeting took place in the district.⁹⁴

Not only peasants and peasant organisations but also civil society organisations were targeted by this strategy. Although the intimidation of civil society leaders by governmental officers has been repeatedly witnessed from the beginning of 2013, after August 2013 it worsened. The most notable case is the one introduced in the beginning of this analysis, a direct threat to the President of UNAC by Minister Pacheco: “Anyone who steps in my way will be made suffer” (8 August 2013, Maputo).

This was perceived as a serious threat by civil societies of the three countries since Minister Pacheco used to be an Interior Minister (2005-2009) and had been representing the Frelimo government in the negotiation with RENAMO, an ex-rebel (1977-1992) and currently the largest opposition party that has recommenced battles since April 2013.⁹⁵

In provinces where the sphere of lived experience is smaller the intimidations were more intense as introduced in Chapter 1. In Nampula, according to the report by Japanese civil society “ProSAVANA Civil Society Report 2013”⁹⁶ and the document

⁹⁴ The district administrator even ordered these peasant leaders to visit houses in the community one by one to tell the neighbours that they were now welcoming ProSAVANA and others should follow. This account was investigated by Japanese NGOs in August 2015. The research result was shared with MoFA/JICA and the Japanese public in December 2015. The documents and presentations are at the following sites: http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/13kai_shiryo/ref1.pdf
http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/14kai_shiryo/ref3.pdf
<http://www.ngo-jvc.net/jp/projects/advocacy/data/20151207-frontier-of-africa-3.pdf>
<https://adecru.wordpress.com/2015/05/11/governo-do-distrito-de-malema-persegue-e-ameaca-camponeses-que-rejeitaram-o-prosavana/#more-338>

⁹⁵ “Boletim sobre o processo politico em Moçambique” Número 57-18 de Fevereiro de 2015
http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/files/files/Mo%C3%A7ambique_Boletim_57_Quem_e_quem_no_governo.pdf

⁹⁶ English summary http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/9kai_shiryo/ref7.pdf Full paper (in

prepared by the Japanese civil society organisations,⁹⁷ direct intimidation (face-to-face threats) was observed during the meeting between the leaders of Nampula Provincial Civil Society Platform (PPOS-N) and Director Zucula and technical staff (Americo Wasiquete and Julio Carvalho) who worked at a focal point, ProSAVANA's technical office in Nampula, held on 13 August 2013 at the ProSAVANA office in Nampula. The governmental representatives threatened these leaders as follows:

- *“You cannot take your complains directly to Maputo or to Japan without consulting on matters here. ‘Your home’ is here in Nampula. If you have problems, you can come and tell us the problems. But you cannot take ‘domestic problems’ outside of the country.”*
- *“Don’t say ‘no’ to what the governments do, but say ‘yes.’”*
- *“As you know, those who were against the Top could be assassinated in the past (in Mozambique). If the boss said ‘do it,’ our job was to carry it out.”*
(13 August 2013, at ProSAVANA office in Nampula)

Then, one of the staff members pointed at the CS leaders with his fingers making a pistol-like gesture.

(b) “JICA’s Ambiguous and Nebulous role”

There were two of JICA’s Japanese consultants present, but they did not intervene or make comments on this. Director Zucula even said that his spiritual and practical mentor was JICA’s senior advisor who was “a father of PRODECER and ProSAVANA” and who was visiting three of ProSAVANA’s provinces (including Nampula) at the time. These human rights abuses and the involvement of this JICA senior advisor was officially criticised in the statement of Nampula Provincial CS Platform (PPOSC-N) released in the end of September 2014.⁹⁸

- *“PPOSC-N deplores the manipulative and intimidating actions carried out by proponents of ProSavana, as expressed in their attempts to divide, compartmentalise and weaken Mozambican civil society.*
- *In the same vein as the previous point, PPOSC-N deplores the attitude of JICA (Japanese Cooperation), which plays an ambiguous and nebulous role, as expert staff, as diplomats and as advisers, since according to what we observe – they play a leading role in the relationship with, on the one hand, the ProSavana national team, but on the other hand, with senior advisers that seek to remain discreet at crucial moments of the discussion.*” (PPOSC-N, 30 September 2014)

This statement also points out the false statement that the platform was already working with ProSAVANA made by the Mozambican governmental officers (Director

Japanese) <http://www.dlmarket.jp/products/detail/263029>

⁹⁷ “Follow-up document on the meeting between the Japanese CSOs and the Mozambican governmental delegation (1 September 2015)” submitted to MoFA and JICA on 26 October 2015.

http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/13kai_shiryo/ref1.pdf

⁹⁸ <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/22655>

Zucula and provincial focal points) at the provincial level on the government TV channel (TVM) on 17 September 2013. The “*preparation of TV programmes*” was one of the expected tasks by JICA to CV&A, and as seen above, CV&A admitted to working on it in their report.

It could be observed that these four governmental organs in Nampula, that is, DPA, SDAE, district administrations and the ProSAVANA technical office were chosen to play the central role in the “Communication Strategy” prepared and driven by CV&A, who was contracted and financed by JICA since December 2012. After all, one of the important missions that CV&A had was to establish functioning internal relations among the Mozambican governmental offices and staff (ToR to CV&A:3-4; Estratégia:9).

(c) Incorporation of Local Entities into a “Collaborators Network”

Until JICA’s contract with CV&A begin in August 2013, even after the submission of the Open Letter, the relationship between Mozambican peasants and civil society organisations and national and local governments was under some tensions, but not hostile ones. That relationship rapidly deteriorated from August 2013 onward. The leaders of peasant and civil society organisations began to be treated as “adversaries” by local governmental officers who were not directly involved with ProSAVANA.

Thanks to the disclosure of “the strategy” report (ProSAVANA: Estratégia Comunicação), it is now clear why and how this happened. The report suggests “*communication actions*” in Chapter 4. Beyond the creation of the “*district network of collaborators*” discussed previously, the following entities and measures were targeted for incorporation into the web of collaborators for ProSAVANA:

- A) Campaign to clarify what ProSAVANA is through community radio;
- B) ProSAVANA meetings with DPAs and provincial governors;
- C) Presentations about ProSAVANA to Consultative Councils (but if the collaborators’ network functions well, it is not necessary);
- D) Meetings with religious entities (later on, they could be contact points for the collaborators’ network);
- E) Public sessions for clarification with maximum amount of attendance;
- F) Organisations of educative theatre plays (using dances, local language and a comical approach);
- G) Actions at schools (children of 10 to 13 years old to make presentations about ProSAVANA using the information prepared in leaflets made by CV&A at one or two schools in each district);
- H) Utilisation of space at agriculture markets;
- I) Diffusion of messages via social networking. (Estratégia:23-28)

From the official records, especially those of JICA and its Japanese consultants, it is confirmed that most of these actions were carried out especially during the process of “rural meetings” organised by ProSAVANA from September to October 2013 in Niassa

and Zambézia Provinces.⁹⁹

The incorporation of these government actors and entities into the “*network of collaborators*” for the diffusion of propaganda and the promotion of the programme was, in reality, to create a hostile network against those who questioned and/or criticised the programme in Mozambican society. Obviously, one can argue both the ethical and socio-political questions but also the “cost” of these actions.

(d) Boosting Projects for Recapturing Communication Space

“The strategy” report suggests that the occasions of inaugurations of projects related to ProSAVANA be utilised to maximum force by ensuring the presence of the Mozambican President or Prime Minister and the Agriculture Minister together with all the authorities of ProSAVANA related provinces and local traditional leaders such as Régulos. The events “*must be covered by media by inviting journalists from Maputo*” (Estratégia:28).

As summarised in the beginning of this chapter, as CV&A were not instructed to consider concerns and requests from civil society organisations to “halt and reflect on ProSAVANA” by JICA and ProSAVANA promoters, rather the projects and their inaugurations were considered as tools and “opportunities” for propaganda. From their points of view, pushing forward with the related projects was a necessary tactic for the sake of recapturing the communication space from civil society.

For this to be achieved, “developing actions together with the Mozambican society” is emphasised and the following entities and actions were determined (the media will be dealt with later):

- B) Actions at universities and institutes (development of sensitisation works, direct formation of professional actors for the ProSAVANA’s projects and internships);
- C) Communications with the “political class” (the President, Ministers, and Parliamentary Commissions). (*ibid*:29-30;35-36)

The promotion of the involvements of the people at the highest levels of the political hierarchy of Mozambique shown in the above B) and other measures show the intention of transforming ProSAVANA into a national political project. This increased the risk of attracting political oppression of and further damages to the civil rights of the protesters. These kinds of concerns are, however, not found anywhere in the report. Rather, all the recommendations are for directing the formulation of the “*network of collaborators*” for ProSAVANA from local to top levels in Mozambique against national and international civil society organisations.

⁹⁹ Monthly reports by JICA’s consultants for ProSAVANA-PD. The problems of concealment of majority of pages are discussed in the previous analysis.

2-3-3. Aftermath of Implementation of “the Strategy”: Forced Silence

Despite the efforts by local, national and international CSOs to stop and prevent intimidation and manipulation, this was not the end. Both peasants and civil society leaders continue to receive open and hidden intimidations and pressures especially in Nampula Province. By the beginning of 2015, those working in civil society organisations supporting the local peasants’ activities in Nampula Province were suddenly expelled from their organisations, and lost their jobs and positions. The local peasants lost their protectors.

The concerns and problems that local peasants had to face under ProSAVANA were no longer limited to questions about land, models, soybeans, and external investments but also extended to human rights abuses from at the hands of governmental officers. This situation, however, should be contextualised within the historical, socio-political and military circumstances of Mozambique. This will be dealt with in the Conclusion.

Chapter 3. Background of “Stakeholder Engagement Project”

3-1. Background of Contract with MAJOL

3-1-1. From CV&A to MAJOL: Objective and Conditions

(a) Continuation and Difference

In November 2014, before its third (or extension of the second) contract expired, CV&A declared their “*success*” since “*the impact of the attacks against ProSAVANA considerably diminished*” (Balance Report:8). The report, however, ended with recommendations for ProSAVANA “*to identify one internal or subcontracted entity to continue dedicating to the tasks defined in the Communication Strategy*” (*ibid.*).

It is not known if this recommendation was taken right away. Since there were presidential and national elections in Mozambique in November 2014, the new presidency caused many personnel changes in the administration. One thing to be noted is that although all the ministers from the Guebuza administration (2005-2014) were removed, the ministers directly involving with ProSAVANA, the Agriculture and Foreign Ministers, remained in their positions. Thus, what had been developed within the Mozambican government and between the governmental agencies for ProSAVANA in accordance with JICA’s contract with CV&A could continue without much interruption.¹⁰⁰

Another subcontractor was charged with implementing components of “the strategy” that CV&A was not mandated to do, that is, to carry out “intervention action plans” directly towards the Mozambican civil society. As discussed in the previous chapter, CV&A was expected to intervene and work with national media hoping that this would help weaken civil society, but not directly. The intervention of CV&A in Mozambican civil society was through local governmental organs and officials, local community leaders and national media (as far as the open documents indicate). In the case of the new contract, direct intervention in civil society matters was the central task of the subcontractors.

(b) JICA’s Contract with MAJOL: Objective

JICA requested proposals for the new project, which were submitted to three Mozambican agencies. According to JICA, these three agencies were chosen based on “a shortlist.”¹⁰¹ One of them was MAJOL (*Majol Consultoria e Serviços Lda.*), which was ultimately awarded the contract. In the “Request for Proposal – Consultant for

¹⁰⁰ Although during the 14th meeting, (8 December 2015), the JICA Director of the Rural Development Department at first denied the alignment of their contract with the “Communication Strategy”, by the 15th meeting (19 February 2016), the same director admitted that “the strategy” was not abandoned and thus still activate for ProSAVANA. As will be shown later on, “the Strategy” report was one of the documents by MAJOL that was consulted.

¹⁰¹ 28 January 2016, JICA’s explanation to a Japanese parliamentarian.

Stakeholder Engagement” dated 7 October 2015, JICA describes the background of the project as follows:

- *“In the first semester of 2015, MASA organised a series of public hearing meetings based on the first draft of the Master Plan (Draft Zero) in 19 districts. 3 provincial capitals and Maputo in order to collect stakeholders’ opinions and reflect them in the following versions of draft Master Plan. However, some civil society organisations are criticizing the process and way of conduction of those meetings.*
- *Under such circumstances, efforts should be made in order to improve the stakeholder engagement for facilitating the consultation process of ProSAVANA-PD including next round of public hearings through establishment of a platform of stakeholder engagement”. (Request for Proposal:1) ¹⁰²*

It listed the objectives for the assignment of the subcontractor as:

- *“A platform of stakeholder engagement for ProSAVANA is established with the involvement of key stakeholders related to the agriculture sector,*
- *Recommendations for the ProSAVANA-PD consultation process, including the second round of public hearings, are made by the stakeholders in the platform”. (ibid.)*

These descriptions are exactly the same in the actual ToR given by JICA to MAJOL. As the ToR goes into more detail, we see that the real motivation and the characteristics indicated in the “Communication Strategy” began to make an appearance.

(c) Direct Intervention in CS as a Mission

For this new project, JICA did not hesitate to include direct interventional actions in Mozambican civil society. JICA’s ToR determines that the following four tasks be completed:

- 1) Conduct individual consultations with stakeholders and interviews with relevant government departments...*
- 2) Organize and conduct preliminary meetings with stakeholders where it is expected that the establishment of a dialogue platform is agreed.*
- 3) Facilitate discussions in the first meeting of the dialogue platform where ToR and functioning of the platform are expected to be agreed.*
- 4) Facilitate discussion in subsequent meetings of the dialogue platform where it is expected that recommendations for the consultation process of ProSAVANA-PD be formulated... (ToR to MAJOL:2)*

From these tasks and how they are contextualised and phrased, the intention of the contract is rather obvious. JICA and the relevant governments intended to intervene in Mozambican civil society by collecting unofficial and internal information and carry

¹⁰² http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/docs/121.pdf

out individual consulting and to establish a platform of “the dialogue” that would be under their control. Also, these tasks indicate that MAJOL was expected to function as if it was a part of Mozambican civil society or an independent third party.

(d) Calling Subcontractors “Independent” and “Third Party”

When Japanese NGOs pointed out that this project aimed to conduct governmental intervention in civil society matters via subcontractors, the Deputy Director General of Rural Development Department of JICA defended the approach by saying:

- *“Since UNAC representatives and others complained about the behaviours of governmental officers, and there should be a third and independent party who could bridge the two parties, we thought of this project...”*
- *MAJOL is a third and independent actor. We let them work freely.”* (The 15th dialogue, 19 February 2016)

Although it is not known if this view is coming from “naiveness” or is a pre-determined institutional defensive response, what JICA wrote in their contract form and ToR is precisely opposite to the above claim. According to the contract, JICA’s subcontractors had the following obligations:

- *“The mutual rights and obligations of the Client and the Consultant shall be as set forth in the Contract, in particular:*
 - A) *the Consultant shall carry out the Services in accordance with the provisions of the Contract;*
 - B) *the Client shall make payments to the Consultant in accordance with the provisions of the Contract.”* (Form of Contract:1)

JICA also added the following paragraph at the end of its ToR to MAJOL under the category of “Others:”

- *“Upon successful completion of the assignment, the Consultant may be invited to another assignment with separate contract, for moderating and facilitating the second round of public hearings.”* (ToR to MAJOL:5)

Calling their subcontractor an “independent third party” is beyond any logical and normative justification, but this approach was fortified even within the conditions that were given by JICA.

3-1-2. JICA’s Discovery of MAJOL and its Expectations

(a) Hiring Consultants with Mozambican CS Background

JICA went further to include a condition stipulating that they would hire people that had a background of working with Mozambican civil society (at least for five years) as consultants (*ibid*:3). As JICA did not list such a condition in the ToR to CV&A, it is more than probable that JICA wanted to contract local consultants who had connections with and could directly intervene in Mozambican civil society.

JICA's contract and ToR identifies the "composition and qualification requirements" of the consultants as follows:

1. *One team leader, with at least 10 years of experience in stakeholder engagement with particular emphasis on:*
 - 1) *leading and managing stakeholder engagement in at least one international project that involves small-scale farmers, preferably in Northern Mozambique,*
 - 2) *conducting at least five stakeholder meetings as a moderator or a facilitator preferably in Northern Mozambique,*
2. *One communication specialist, with at least 5 years of experience in public relations that involves civil society organizations in Mozambique is preferable,*
3. *Two civil society specialists, with at least 5 years of experience in stakeholder consultation that involves civil society in Mozambique. (ToR to MAJOL:3)*

The consultants MAJOL engaged with were the exactly what JICA wanted and ProSAVANA needed because MAJOL was established by a Mozambican (and others) who used to work for an international NGO (ActionAid Mozambique).¹⁰³

According to the statement released by Mozambican CSOs, the team leader had past experience of working in the director position of an international environmental NGO, the WWF (*World Wildlife Foundation*), and had dealt with issues of sustainable development projects in northern Mozambique (7 March 2016).¹⁰⁴ According to his bio posted on his LinkedIn profile, MAJOL's team leader is an ex-US Peace Corps, ex-staff at WWF Mozambique and currently a consultant and a director of a company specialising in sustainable development.¹⁰⁵ The page shares his background as:

- *"He ... bought a farm, and eventually acquired Mozambican nationality...*
 - *a founder of three large national Parks/ Reserves (*all in northern Mozambique)*
 - *a founder of the CARE/WWF Alliance, a formal worldwide alliance between two developmental giants to work at the resource health/human well-being nexus".*
- *Authors' insertion.

Obviously, he fulfilled all the requirements stipulated by JICA. He is not only a farm owner but also engaged with tourist businesses where he founded national parks/reserves in northern Mozambique.¹⁰⁶

It is not known how this background influenced the consultancy for JICA and ProSAVANA. The important thing is that the consultants had worked with national, regional and local organisations as high-ranking civil society representatives in the past (especially from donors' positions many times), kept and activated the connections through their consultancy works, and these connections could be used right away after

¹⁰³ From the profile of the manager of the company.

¹⁰⁴ **Denunciation of the partnership between WWF and ProSavana**
<http://farmlandgrab.org/25864>

¹⁰⁵ <https://www.linkedin.com/>

¹⁰⁶ <http://clarke.dickinson.edu/devel-mozambique/>

the completion of the contract with JICA.

At least for JICA, it seems that they did not know any consulting agencies more adequate than MAJOL for this sensitive contract to be carried out. JICA really needed some consultants who could act as if they were independent and friends of the Mozambican civil society but carry out tasks on its behalf. This was also a recommendation given by CV&A in their last monthly activity report (October 2014).

However, if consulted, JICA and UNAC and other CSOs could have agreed to appoint a truly independent and third part organisation to intermediate and create a common space for the governments and civil society organisations to be able enter into discussion. As JICA admitted, this was what UNAC requested during the visit of the Director General of Rural Development of JICA (19 June 2015) and what JICA tried to do (The 15th dialogue, 19 February 2016).

When the delegation of MASA met Japanese NGOs in Tokyo on 1 September 2015, they agreed to consult with UNAC and other civil society organisations on how to hold further “public hearings/consultations” in order to realise “meaningful dialogue.”¹⁰⁷ Yet, what JICA did was to hire MAJOL consultants. This fact, however, was not first consulted with, informed to or known by the civil societies of the three countries.

(b) Raising Questions about a Conflict of Interests

JICA’s encounter with MAJOL occurred in the following circumstances. MAJOL and the same consultants were under another contract with another institution researching the problems of dialogue related to ProSAVANA a few months before this contract began.¹⁰⁸ The exact same MAJOL consultants were conducting interviews with JICA, MASA and the ProSAVANA related actors and in the ProSAVANA target areas some weeks before JICA sent its “Request for Proposals” to MAJOL.

For this other consultant contract, MAJOL was a third party since its client did not have any direct relationship with ProSAVANA. It was an independent research group. But, this was not the case for JICA’s contract since JICA was a principle actor of ProSAVANA. Being an independent researcher and being a subcontractor of the programme they are investigating contradict each other and raise questions about a “conflict of interests.” The issues of the JICA’s responsibility for sending the request and for offering the contract to MAJOL and the MAJOL’s accountability for accepting the “Request for Proposals” and its contract with JICA remain. Neither institution can deny a possible violation of compliance with each institution’s code of conduct.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ The minutes of this meeting were prepared by Japanese NGOs and shared with MoFA/JICA on 27 October 2015 during the 13th dialogue and with the public at the following site:

http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/13kai_shiryo/ref1.pdf

¹⁰⁸ Several sources. Names withheld by requests.

¹⁰⁹ We shall follow up on this issue in future analysis.

3-2. JICA's Concealment and Denial of "Stakeholder Engagement Project"

3-2-1. JICA's False Explanation

(a) "MASA is discussing how...JICA is not in the position"

It was twenty days after sending "Request of Proposals" to MAJOL when the 13th dialogue meeting on ProSAVANA with NGOs was held at MoFA. Yet, the special advisor (*Sanyo*) to Africa Department of JICA explained the situation as follows:

- *JICA: At the moment, MASA is discussing how to proceed in dialogue with civil society. Within a few days, the ministry will make contacts (with CSOs).*
- *JICA: JICA is not in the position of answering about it.*
(NGO's previous questions: Will there be prior consultations with UNAC and Mozambican CSOs about the methodology of the dialogue in Mozambique?)
- *JICA: (to answer the NGOs questions) As MASA promised that to you, we are making the utmost efforts to realise it".* (The 13th meeting, 27 October 2015) ¹¹⁰

From the official documents, it was not MASA discussing how, but it was JICA who was sending out "Requests of Proposals" with a pre-determined contract form and ToR. Five days after the meeting, JICA signed the contract with MAJOL. At the time of the 13th meeting, JICA knew exactly what the process was going to be since the contents of the ToR had not changed from how they were written in the "Requests of Proposals" (except the deadlines of the submission of outcomes). JICA was well in the position of explaining this because it was the principal contractor, it is a Japanese public organ required to be accountable especially to the Japanese people, and the money it was using was that of Japanese taxpayers. The formal periodical dialogue meeting between NGOs and MoFA/JICA was set up for the purpose of improving accountability and transparency of the Japanese involvement in ProSAVANA based on a mutual agreement in December 2012. Still, JICA's disingenuousness did not end with this.

(b) "Not much change" and not Japan's Money

One and a half months later, the 14th dialogue meeting was held. The Japanese NGOs requested follow-up information from the same special advisor. He explained as follows:

- *"About consultation with peasants and CS organisations towards the (new) public hearing process...the situation has not changed much.*
- *We cannot tell how things are going...since MASA promised that they were going to handle things."* (The 14th dialogue, 8 December 2015)

JICA continued to conceal their involvement and contract with MAJOL that had been signed already a month earlier (on 2 November 2015). This time the Japanese NGOs had some more information but still did not know the whole picture, the name of the

¹¹⁰ The problem of JICA's explanations regarding the "Stakeholder Engagement Project" is on the NGO's presentation for the 15th meeting.

http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/15kai_shiryo/ref8.pdf

project (or even the fact that there was a new project), or the contracted tasks. What they did know was that MAJOL's consultants were visiting Mozambican CSOs one by one and it seemed that they had been contracted by JICA. The following exchange took place between Japanese NGOs and JICA (the special advisor [sa] and the director [d] of Rural Development Department) on this regard:

- *NGO: We heard that consultants of a company called MAJOL are visiting Mozambican organisation one by one....*
- *JICA (all): ...*
- *NGO: Are they carrying out these activities under the framework of the Japanese aid?*
- *JICA(d): No...Not a contract with those consultants who have/had been engaging with ProSAVANA¹¹¹*
- *NGO: Do you mean, the money is not coming from the Japanese government?*
- *JICA(sa): ...Let us talk when the time comes.*
- *NGO: But the local organisations understand that they are JICA's consultants.*
- *JICA(sa): We want to talk about this when things could be summarised. (The 14th dialogue, 8 December 2015)¹¹²*

The above responses by two JICA representatives indicate that the concealment was institutional. As will be discussed later, by the time of the meeting, JICA had not only signed the contract with MAJOL but had also received and approved MAJOL's first consultancy output (Inception Report). Those who attended the meeting confirmed the "surprise" of JICA's representatives when the NGOs mentioned the name of MAJOL. It seems that their intention was to conceal entirely the information and activities of the project and JICA's involvement in the project from the eyes of Japanese civil society.

3-2-2. Delayed and Denied Disclosure

(a) Delayed Disclosure of JICA's Contract with MAJOL

Due to the institutional concealment of JICA, the Japanese NGOs formally filed a request for disclosure of the related documents of JICA's contract with MAJOL on 14 December 2015. Despite the fact that the Information Law permits only a month for complying with disclosure, JICA extended the deadline for another month on the ground of "busyness" for the 6 page-long contract documents (including the ToR).

In early December, a Japanese parliamentarian also requested some explanations and related documents from JICA; this was also postponed. It was only on 4 February 2016 that JICA disclosed its contract with MAJOL and its ToR. It took a further two months for JICA to disclose the official version of the inception report, which was

¹¹¹ The explanation given by the director does not make sense even in Japanese. The important thing is that he first denied, then added some non-relevant information without confirming that the contract had been carried out by the Japanese ODA of JICA's budget.

¹¹² http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/15kai_shiryō/ref8.pdf

disclosed on 8 April 2016, whilst other reports remain closed.

(b) Required Outcomes and Items from JICA to MAJOL

JICA's contract obligates MAJOL to submit the following three reports as the outcome of the consultancy to JICA (ToR to MAJOL: 4): ¹¹³

1. Inception report (by 26 November 2015)
2. Stakeholder engagement report¹¹⁴ (by 15 December 2015)
3. Final report (by 21 March 2016)

For fulfilling the tasks determined in the ToR, the following items were to be created and submitted by MAJOL to JICA and the rest of ProSAVANA agents by the deadlines determined below:

- a) ToR and functioning of the dialogue platform drafted (by 7 December 2015)
- b) Stakeholder Engagement Platform established & functioned (by 20 January 2016)
- c) Roadmap of the consultation process (by 22 February 2016).

Prior to each task, the following items were to be approved by JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ (headquarters: consisted of the coordinators of the three governments, Japan, Mozambique and Brazil¹¹⁵):

- d) the format for individual consultations;
- e) a tentative schedule for individual consultations;
- f) a plan for the preliminary meetings with date, venue, list of organizations (*sic.*)/ individuals to be invited and meeting agenda;
- g) draft terms of ToR and functioning for the dialogue platform together with a facilitation plan. (ToR to MAJOL: 2-3)

(c) Denial of Disclosure: Contravention of JICA's Guidelines

Among the three reports mentioned above, only the inception report was disclosed. The disclosure of the "Stakeholder Engagement Report", a sort of mid-term report, and the "Final Report" were refused for the following reason:

- “ *We (JICA and MoFA) consulted with the Mozambican government. But it told us that they have no intentions (policies) to disclose the reports since these could affect the trust with the related organisations and dialogue. As a result of this, we decided not to offer you these reports*”. (Message from MoFA, 28 May 2016)
*Authors' translation and emphasis.

Using the refusal of the Mozambican government as an excuse for the denial of the disclosure of the reports made by JICA's contractors is technically questionable in and

¹¹³ http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/docs/122.pdf

¹¹⁴ Later re-named "mapping."

¹¹⁵ The staff hired by JICA, MASA and ABC.

of itself. Yet, the problem is beyond that of a technicality.

This claim, in fact, contravenes not only JICA's Mission¹¹⁶ (on governance) but also JICA's Guidelines for Environmental and Social Considerations established in 2010. These Guidelines begin with sharing "the principles:"

- *"Democratic decision-making is indispensable for environmental and social considerations. It is important to ensure stakeholder participation, information transparency, accountability..."*
- *...human rights and in view of the principles of democratic governance, the measures for environmental and social considerations are implemented by ensuring a wide range of meaningful stakeholder participation and transparency of decision-making, as well as by working for information disclosure...*
- *Governments bear the responsibility for accountability..."* (JICA's Guidelines for Environmental and Social Considerations: 9)¹¹⁷ *Authors' emphasis.

The Guidelines also define JICA's responsibility to "facilitate the achievement of these objectives" (*ibid.*). The above claim by JICA clearly indicates their abandonment of the responsibility expressed in their own guidelines.¹¹⁸

(d) Negligence of JICA's Guidelines by JICA and MASA

It may be important to underline the collective negligence of and distanced position from the guidelines observed of JICA regarding ProSAVANA since the beginning of the discussions about the programme. It seems that this has been affecting the lack of understanding of the recipient government and their officers who have been involved with ProSAVANA.

Even as of 1 September 2015, six years after the ProSAVANA accord, the delegation of MASA led by ex-vice minister of Agriculture and current ProSAVANA coordinator, António Limbau, and the Mozambican ambassador to Japan did not confirm knowledge of JICA's guidelines. During the meeting with the delegation, the representatives of Japanese NGOs repeatedly asked if they knew about JICA's guidelines and the necessity of complying with them as the recipient government, and the ProSAVANA coordinator insisted that "*Japan has its own rule and Mozambique has its own*" (1 September 2015).¹¹⁹

JICA¹²⁰ explained that once the master plan is fixed and projects are determined, they check if the projects are in compliance with the guidelines or not. This has been the repeated answer since April 2013 (the 3rd dialogue), and constitutes clear evidence of

¹¹⁶ JICA's mission 3 is dedicated to "improving governance."

¹¹⁷ <http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/mission/index.html>

¹¹⁸ http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/social_environmental/guideline/pdf/guideline100326.pdf

¹¹⁹ The special advisor (*Sanji*) of Africa Division of JICA repeatedly showed his non-understanding of these guidelines during the meetings with Japanese NGOs, and the facilitator of the meetings who committed to the formulation of the guidelines had to intervene (The 12th dialogue, 24 July 2015).

¹²⁰ http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/13kai_shiryo/ref1.pdf

¹²⁰ The director of Arid and Semi-arid Farming Area Division of Rural Development Department.

the negligence of its own guidelines. Yet, this seems to be an institutional approach in the context of ProSAVANA.

(e) Inexistence of a Portuguese Version of JICA's Guidelines

Since April 2013, Japanese NGOs have submitted requests from Mozambican CSOs for JICA to prepare a Portuguese version of its guidelines, which are only 42 pages in English.¹²¹ The guidelines were collectively formulated with the active participation of Japanese NGOs after repeated scandals and problems related to Japanese official assistance. The guidelines open the path for local stakeholders to enable filing complaints about JICA's assistance to an independent committee, the "Advisory Committee for Environmental and Social Considerations."¹²²

Although Mozambican peasants and citizens have been willing to file complaints about ProSAVANA as a case for long time, due to non-existence of the related documents in their official language (Portuguese), it has been impossible. Despite Japanese NGOs' requests for JICA to organise an event where the local stakeholders could have the contents and details of the procedures written in the guidelines explained to them, this has still never taken place.

Although there is a Spanish version of the guidelines¹²³ which could be easily used for Portuguese translation and is short, would be much less costly to translate, and is socio-environmentally important and has been requested, JICA prioritised translating the entire draft zero of the ProSAVANA's master plan (204 page-long) to a language no one requested, Japanese. The continued inexistence of the Portuguese version of the guidelines confirms an unwillingness of full application of JICA's guidelines to ProSAVANA and other Japanese assistance to Mozambique.

After the discovery of the negligence of the Mozambican governments concerning the contents of JICA's guidelines, Japanese NGOs requested that JICA prepare a Portuguese version and include an opportunity for explaining its contents to the Mozambican authority who is involving with ProSAVANA during the 13th and 14th dialogue meeting (27 October 2015 and 8 December 2015).¹²⁴ The requests have still not been responded to. This oddness is even clearer if one considers that Mozambique has been one of the most important destinations of Japanese official assistance both in grants and loans.¹²⁵

(f) Independent Exposure of the Related Documents

Despite the continued institutional, collective and personal neglectfulness of the importance of transparency and accountability among the ProSAVANA promoters, it

¹²¹ http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/social_environmental/guideline/pdf/guideline100326.pdf

¹²² http://www.jica.go.jp/environment/guideline/ku57pq000005boli-att/guideline_basic.pdf

¹²³ http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/social_environmental/guideline/pdf/guideline_spanish.pdf

¹²⁴ Also written request was submitted on 26 October 2015.

http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/13kai_shiryo/ref1.pdf

¹²⁵ <http://www.mofaj.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/000142266.pdf>

seems that some have thought this unacceptable and unconscionable.

On 25 May 2016, collections of ProSAVANA documents including the denied MAJOL reports were posted on an internet site run by NGOs working on land issues.¹²⁶ Through careful examinations, especially through cross-examination of the officially disclosed inception report, the authenticity of the documents was obvious. During the meeting between NGOs and MoFA/JICA, NGOs handed out some parts of these reports obtained from the above site, JICA did not negate their authenticity, and rather confirmed that the documents were “leaked” (The 17th dialogue, 21 July 2016).

3-3. Background of MAJOL’s Reports for Analysis


3-3-1. Nature of MAJOL’s Reports

(a) List of Examined Reports

Thanks to the exposure, there are four reports that were prepared and submitted to JICA available for public eyes and ready for examination. These are:

1. MAJOL’s draft of the inception report (*possibly written without JICA’s intervention),
2. Officially disclosed inception report (*approved by JICA),
3. Semi-draft of the stakeholder mapping (*re-submitted to JICA after initial interventions),
4. Draft of the final report (*possibly written without JICA’s interventions).

In the above list, the status of the reports and whether these reports have received some intervention from JICA and/or ProSAVANA-HQ or not is included based on the analysis of these reports and customary practices in the past.



(b) Existence of Two Different Inception Reports

There are two inception reports. One is the leaked report, and another the officially disclosed report. It can be assumed that the first one was MAJOL’s original draft report submitted to JICA and the latter one is a revised report submitted after

¹²⁶ <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/view/26158-prosavana-files>

receiving comments from JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ.

The importance of examining both of the inception reports is because the differences between of two can tell many things. Though this will be examined in detail later, it may be useful to point out that 40% of the pages in the MAJOL's initial draft (47p.) were cut in the disclosed inception report (29p.). Numerous phrases, names and attached documents that appeared in the draft were omitted. Although this enormous omission itself proves almost endless secretism and manipulation of the facts by JICA and ProSAVANA promoters, by analysing what has been deleted, it has become clear what sort of information JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ wanted to conceal.

3-3-2. JICA's Customary Treatment of Reports

(a) JICA's Intervention in Subcontractors' Reports

Also, it should be noted that JICA always had two opportunities for their interventions before the disclosure: once when the drafts were submitted by its subcontractors; and a second when they prepared the documents for disclosure. The first interventions could occur not only once but several times until JICA was satisfied.¹²⁷ The second interventions are comprised of blacking out descriptions in the documents.¹²⁸ With MAJOL's reports, both occurred, and this aspect (what was blacked out) will be also examined.

(b) Characteristics of JICA's Inception Reports

Almost all of JICA's projects require submission of inception reports from their subcontractors. Any inception reports must follow the instructions that appear in the ToRs. It is JICA's job to scrutinise the understandings of the ToRs and activity plans of their subcontractors. If some problems are recognised in the drafts, JICA requests submission of revised reports. Once the revised versions are accepted by JICA, the projects proceed as written in the inception reports. The scrutiny of inception reports by JICA is usually tight because of another reason. These reports together with final reports can be requested for disclosure. Especially, with this project, it is more than probable that JICA had foreseen this possibility.

Usually, JICA gives only a few weeks (less than a month) to their subcontractors to complete inception reports. Priority is given to meetings and discussions with JICA and its counterparts and literature review and not field research for the preparation of inception reports. There are two reasons for this. One is because the details of the budget for conducting field activities needs to be calculated based on the plans and proposals written on the inception reports. Another is because JICA usually think it possesses enough understanding of local realities (background and needs), scopes and outcomes of projects at the point of ToR writing and before making bid announcements.

This was the case in the ProSAVANA related projects. As is well known by now, since

¹²⁷ Information given by some consultants who have worked under contracts with JICA.

¹²⁸ This was already discussed in the previous analysis paper.

JICA's assumptions were written down in its ToRs and the reality was unacceptably huge,¹²⁹ many problems emerged as the programme moved forward.

3-4. Differences Between MAJOL's Draft and JICA's Disclosed Document

3-4-1. Eliminations of Pages and Appendices

While the inception report submitted by MAJOL to JICA contains 48 pages and 8 appendices, the disclosed report only contains 29 pages and 6 appendices. The deleted appendices are the following documents:

- Appendix 6: "Land Grabbers in the Nacala Corridor" (GRAIN),
- Appendix 7: "MAJOL Comments on the document (DMP_ver1_Excerpt_Land_Use_DUT_Land Issues)".

Appendix 6 (p.30) is composed of the introductory text copied from the homepage of an international NGO, GRAIN, about their report and list prepared together with UNAC entitled "Land Grabbers in the Nacala Corridor" and the comments made by MAJOL.¹³⁰ It should be noted that MAJOL dropped the name of UNAC despite the fact that this peasant organisation is a co-author and carried out research for the report.

The following is the text MAJOL left on their draft that was completely taken out from JICA's disclosed document:

- *"These companies, typically structured through offshore tax havens and often connected to Mozambican political elites, have been grabbing lands and extracting wealth in ways reminiscent of the country's colonial days"* (GRAIN's site),
- *"A list of companies cited in the article as land grabbers is found in the chart below. In many cases, and in the opinions of the consultant team, many of the land transactions did not comply with standards of "fee and informed prior consent", and with the various clauses of Mozambican Land Law."* (MAJOL's draft; 30) Authors' emphasis.

The attached list contained information on 35 companies that are reported to obtain or plan to obtain land titles (over 1,000 ha) along the Nacala Corridor. The complete list was eliminated too.

It is a rather odd intervention since in the last two years MoFA and JICA have been claiming that "ProSAVANA's master plan is to protect the land rights of local peasants" (The 11th dialogue, 28 April 2015). Although even the MAJOL consultants thought it important to have the above explanation and table for this project, it seems that JICA and/or ProSAVANA promoters did not like the information and wanted to delete all

¹²⁹[http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/files/files/ProSavana%20Analysis%20based%20on%20Japanese%20source%20\(FUNADA2013\).pdf](http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/files/files/ProSavana%20Analysis%20based%20on%20Japanese%20source%20(FUNADA2013).pdf)
<http://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp-content/uploads/Observador-Rural-12-English.pdf>

¹³⁰ The same list can be found on the following site:

<https://www.grain.org/article/entries/5137-the-land-grabbers-of-the-nacala-corridor>

traces of it from the report.¹³¹

Unlike the fate of the report by GRAIN and UNAC, JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ did leave a report written by another international NGO, CARE Mozambique, in the location of Appendix 6.¹³² The exclusion of Appendix 7 will be dealt with in the next section.

3-4-2. Elimination of References

Elimination of references did not end with these two documents. The following items were also excluded from the list of “consulted documents” which MAJOL indicated as references (MAJOL’s draft: 6):

- 1) MASA (2015) Master Plan for the Nacala Corridor, Draft version 1, 254pp.
- 2) ProSAVANA (2013) Communication strategy September 2013, Version 2, English. 50pp.

It is important to note that all three references (including Appendix 7) are documents prepared by ProSAVANA-PD (*Project for Formulation of Master Plan*), written in English, that had been requested for disclosure, but their existence had been either concealed or was unknown.

First of all, the existence of “Draft version1” of the master plan in any language was not known in public. “Draft version 0” was released at the end of March 2015 and used for the “public hearing/consultation” (April-June 2015), but UNAC and many others requested “nullification” of the draft (June-July 2015).¹³³ UNAC even sent a delegation to Japan in order to directly submit their joint statements about the master plan and the “public hearings/consultations” and to persuade JICA and MoFA in July 2015. During the official visit of UNAC to JICA and MoFA, they did not respond to the requests (nullification of the master plan and “public hearing”) on the grounds of “the statements being ‘new’” and that they “did not have enough time and ‘acknowledgement of the contents’ to respond”, and they did not mention that there was already a revised version of the master plan.¹³⁴ But it is now clear that there has been a draft version 1 since sometime before November 2015. This fact was not known until very recently. This small piece of information was caught since it was taken out of MAJOL’s draft.

¹³¹ It should be noted that the MAJOL’s consultants did try to raise discussions about the current on-going landgrabbing and the importance of governance of the Mozambican government and monitoring activities of civil society in their draft inception report based on the GRAIN-UNAC report and the claims given by other civil society organisations.

¹³² CARE Mozambique (2013) “Land delimitation and demarcation: preparing communities for investment” http://www.care.org.mz/content/images/civil_landdelimitation.pdf

¹³³ <http://farmlandgrab.org/25017> All the other statements are posted on the following site: <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/cat/show/827>

¹³⁴ A month prior to the meeting, on 4 June 2015, Japanese NGOs have submitted the Japanese translation of the same statements to the President of JICA and the Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as furnishing copies to all the representatives who attended the meeting with the delegation of UNAC.

Secondly, despite the official request for the disclosure of all the reports made by JICA's subcontractors under the "Communication Strategy," JICA only disclosed the Portuguese version without mentioning the existence of an English one. Since both versions (Portuguese and English) were completed in September 2013 and are exactly the same length (50p.), it is more than natural to consider that these two documents are identical. Yet, JICA withheld the English version from disclosure, not even mentioning its existence and their reason for making that decision.

Thirdly, appendix 7 seems to be the document that the Japanese NGOs have been requesting. The document was included as one of the expected reports for the ProSAVANA-PD's Japanese consultants and it is said that the report was submitted to MASA in the master plan draft version zero. In spite of this information, JICA continued denying the existence of the document, but clearly it did exist.

Since there are only 9 references (7 listed as consulted documents and 3 in appendices), it can be assumed that these three references were important for MAJOL to understand what ProSAVANA is about and what the concerns of the local peasants are. Instead of sharing this information, however, JICA and/or ProSAVANA-HQ wanted to eliminate not only the contents but also the entire titles of these references.

The fact is that MAJOL did consult with these documents in order to understand ProSAVANA and their tasks, and certainly it was JICA and/or ProSAVANA-HQ who provided these documents. Still, JICA (or ProSAVANA-HQ) wanted to intervene even in this detail in order to make sure their stories agreed by concealing even more.

3-4-3. Elimination of Contents

Reduction of the total volume of the report (from 48 to 29 pages) is the result of intensive interventions of JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ in the form of giving "comments." Some samples of elimination will be shared here:

1. *"We acknowledge that JICA was talking about a committee to finalise the draft zero and lead the second round of consultations, but Civil Society sees itself as playing an ongoing role"*, (MAJOL's draft: 5)
2. *"Essentially, ProSAVANA must establish project policies (and mechanisms to enforce them) that go above and beyond the Mozambican legal framework, and that guarantee that"*, (ibid.)
3. *"Its brief will be expanded to include strategic input during the implementation phase of ProSAVANA, as well as participation in Monitoring and Evaluation. It is expected that the Committee will work for an initial period of 6 years, which can be extended iteratively during the lifespan of the ProSAVANA programme"*, (Draft ToR of ProSAVANA Advisory Committee in MAJOL's draft: 24)
4. *"8. Monitoring and evaluation (M and E), including the selection of appropriate indicators and means of verification, as well as the definition of moments and*

methods for civil society participation in M and E activities". (ibid.: 25) Authors' emphasis.

These erased phrases indicate a clear tendency of arbitrary interventions: (1) motivation to erase the name of JICA, (2) unwillingness of ProSAVANA-HQ to establish project policies and an enforcing mechanism, (3) civil society to participate actively in Monitoring and Evaluation through the committee.

Chapter 4. Analysis of “Stakeholder Engagement” Inception Reports

4-1. Analysis of Objective and Methodology

The officially proclaimed objective of the “Stakeholder Engagement Project” was introduced in Chapter 3 (3-1-1). It, however, becomes clear what the real objective of this JICA project was as one proceeds reading the inception report (whether MAJOL’s draft or the officially disclosed report). The following is the analysis of the text in the inception reports.

4-1-1. Unmasked Real Objective of the Project

(a) “Developing Alliance” with ProSAVANA

Appendix 4 “Provisional Stakeholder Map (*Stakeholder Analysis and Mapping, ProSAVANA*)” is composed of 6 page-long description and table. Its objective is “*to describe the identification and characterization (sic.) of individuals and groups of people that impact on or might be impacted by a planned or proposed project*” (Disclosed inception report:18). Five focus points are determined for analysis. The following three points express the objectives and spirit behind this project:

- “*Identification of concerns, opportunities, expectations, and potential conflicts or conflicts of interest between the project and particular groups or between the groups themselves,*
- *Identify and characterize relationships between the stakeholders that may promote or impede the development of alliances and consensus, or alternatively conflict,*
- *Identification of key groups and individuals who need to be the subject of targeted engagements.*” (ibid.) *Authors’ emphasis.

The above focuses clearly indicate the real objectives and approach of JICA’s “Stakeholder Engagement Project,” achieved through conducting “*individual consultations and interviews*” and “*analysis and mapping*” of the result (Inception Reports:18).

What these descriptions reveal is the clear intention of MAJOL consultants under the guidance of JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ to collect enough information to formulate a strategy that aimed to cultivate weakness in civil society groups and maximise opportunities to create allies (key groups) for promotion of ProSAVANA.

Also, discovering “*potential conflicts*” within civil society groups and possible risks that would “*impede the development of alliances*” is cited as the focus. The objective of these focuses are described as follows:

- “It also attempts to understand and describe the relationships between stakeholders, and, in doing so allows for the creation of management systems, moments, and methods for engagement.” (*ibid.*) *Authors’ emphasis.

It is important to note MAJOL used wording such as “management systems” for “engagement.” In fact, although these exact wordings are not used in JICA’s ToR to MAJOL (p.2), they clearly indicate that was what JICA wanted for MAJOL to work on, that is, the creation of (governmentally) controllable systems for civil society’s engagement towards ProSAVANA.

(b) “Achieving Buy-in from Civil Society”

The above conclusion can be confirmed from the following paragraph in “7. Recommendations so far and next steps” written by MAJOL:

- “From the interview, it is clear that land concerns and communication style are major stumbling blocks to achieving buy-in from civil society. Both of these must be addressed.” (Disclosed inception report:5) *Authors’ emphasis.

From this it can be concluded that “*achieving buy-in from civil society*” was the agreed objective of this JICA project. This echoes with the same spirit of ProSAVANA’s “Social Communication Strategy”, shown in the section entitled “actions to develop together with the civil society” (Estratégia:34-35).

(c) “Rebranding of ProSAVANA”

After signing the contract on 2 November 2015, JICA and MAJOL seem to have agreed to make some modifications regarding “work plans” (Inception Reports:7).¹³⁵ These modifications are about the activities related to “rebranding” and the “advisory committee.”

According to the work plan, the first meeting was held on 4 November 2015 between JICA and MAJOL, and the discussion on the “*agreement on messaging / partial ‘rebranding’*” was made (*ibid.*:7).¹³⁶ The fact that this was the very first point of discussion for JICA’s “Stakeholder Engagement Project” is rather odd since the term “*rebranding*” of ProSAVANA or such a concept was not in the contract nor in the ToR signed two days earlier.¹³⁷ Another source present at the meeting confirms JICA explaining to MAJOL that the objective of the project was “*to overcome negative image created by the civil society,*” “*rebrand ProSAVANA,*” and “*obtain the participation of civil society in the programme.*”¹³⁸

This attempt of listing “*rebranding*” ProSAVANA as one of the first tasks included in MAJOL’s work plan ceased “after discussions with ProSAVANA project staff” (*ibid.*).

¹³⁵ The official inception report is posted at http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/docs/123.pdf

¹³⁶ All the MAJOL consultants attended the meeting.

¹³⁷ 3 November is a Japanese national holiday, thus, JICA Mozambique was closed.

¹³⁸ The name of the source is withheld by request.

However, this did not mean that the intentions behind the initial attempt and related activities were completely removed from the project. This aspect will be discussed later.

(d) “ProSAVANA Advisory Committee”

Another major modification observed in the work plan is the sudden appearance of the term “advisory committee” instead of “*a platform of stakeholder engagement*” as it is written in the ToR. The original justification of JICA for the establishment of the project was improving the process of the second round of public hearing, and what the ToR indicates as a goal is the establishment of “*a dialogue platform*” (p.3).

JICA’s contract instructs MAJOL to draft a “*ToR and functioning dialogue platform*” by 7 December in its appendix, but the work plan shortened its deadline to 13 November, and the title of the document to be submitted changed to “ToR of the ProSAVANA Advisory Committee” (*ibid.*:24). MAJOL had only nine days to fulfil this task. According to the inception report, by this deadline, MAJOL managed to submit such a draft after meeting with only four organisations (telephone interviews with seven others) in Maputo and without traveling to the north, the target region of ProSAVANA. And, by 13 November, MAJOL renamed the one-time “advisory committee” to “working committee” on the basis of “*the comments given by some CSOs*” (*ibid.*:5).

The expression “ProSAVANA Advisory Committee” clearly shows a different objective, which is, as the intentions of JICA and the relevant governments to: (a) institutionalise diverse civil society organisations into one authorised body under ProSAVANA and (b) incorporate civil society. This point will be dealt with in detail later as well.

4-1-2. Methodology and Initial Results: Reconfirmed Real Objective

(a) Methodology: Rating Influence and Interest

As we have reviewed, both the draft and the disclosed inception reports revealed that the objective of JICA’s contract with MAJOL was to “*promote the development of alliances (with ProSAVANA)*” and “*achieve buy-in from civil society*” (*ibid.*:18;5). In order to accomplish this objective, JICA gave its subcontractors the following tasks: (a) collecting information about “stakeholders;” (b) consulting them individually; (c) analysing and mapping their characteristics and positions (ToR to MAJOL: 2-3).

For completing these tasks (mapping stakeholders), MAJOL came up with a methodology to categorise and evaluate “the stakeholders” into the following three categorisations: (1) “primary/secondary;” (2) “high/low influence;” and (3) “high/low interest” (on ProSAVANA).

MAJOL’s draft inception report shares its preliminary evaluation of seven types of stakeholders in Appendix 4, “Provisional Stakeholder Map.” (a) national governmental bodies; (b) provincial government; (c) district government; (d) provincial and district business community; (e) political parties; (f) local NGOs; and (g) international NGOs and CSOs (*ibid.*:19-21). Besides the “*influence and interest rating*,” MAJOL included

“profile and status,” “project issues,” “project expectations” and “potential influence on project” in the table.

Relevant Stakeholder	Profile and Status	Project Issues	Project Expectations	Potential Influence on Project	Influence and Interest Rating

The disclosed inception report by JICA (p.22)

(b) Preliminary Results and Reconfirmed Real Objective

Although JICA covered all the descriptions and ratings of each organisation in black (as seen in above), MAJOL’s draft reveals that it evaluated and ranked eleven international, national and regional civil society organisations. Some of the results are following:

Name of org.	Influence	Interest	Potential influence on ProSAVANA
ActionAid	high	medium (*if dialogue can be created, high; if not, couldn’t care less.)	Opinion leader and <u>can sway others to cooperate</u> . If conditions are not met, he is quite willing to let ProSAVANA die and many will follow.
ADECRU	High	medium on local pop. / low on other CSOs (*too leftist)	Its <u>interest is high as current philosophy of the programme runs counter to ADECRU</u> .
CESC	High	high (*through network)	Working with local NGOs. Want to be involved.
CTA (Con. of Economic Activities)	High	High	<u>Key to private sector involvement</u> .
CTV (Centro Terra Viva)	high (*through envir. Studies)	moderate (* <u>but can become high</u>)	Large network of village paralegals (>600!)
Oxfam Mozambique	high (*int’l reach)	medium	Financing campaign for land rights.
Solidariedade	high (position in the PPOSC-N)	moderate (* <u>but only with changes</u>)	
PPSC-N (Nampula Provincial Civil Society Platform)	high (large membership)	Moderate	

Made by the authors based on the MAJOL’s draft.¹³⁹

These descriptions confirmed that the real objective of JICA’s project was interview, analysis and mapping and subsequent approval of ProSAVANA promoters. It was to find out who were potential candidates for effective “*allies*” and who were capable adversaries for (“*impede*”) the formation of “*alliances*” as described in “Provisional Stakeholder Map” (Inception Reports:18). Without being able to examine the information JICA blacked out, it was impossible to prove this fact.

As discussed previously, the role of inception reports for JICA is to scrutinise

¹³⁹ See pp.21-23 of the following document. <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/Incept.pdf>

understanding of the contract and JICA's projects, framework and plans for activities of the subcontractors. As the above information (expressions) remains in the JICA's disclosed inception report, it can be concluded that JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ accepted and thought this objective and methodology was aligned with the client's intentions and adequate for the "Stakeholder Engagement Project." The fact that they completely blacked out the 3 page-long results shows that they do admit the problems of the survey and were unwilling for the results to be known by civil society organisations and the public.

4-2. Analysis of Overall Results and Approach

4-2-1. MAJOL's Overall Results and their Problems

(a) Overall Results and Imprudent Writings

By using the above methodology and approach, MAJOL carried out initial "*individual consultations*" with Mozambican civil society organisations (from 2 to 13 November 2015). As the result of this preliminary survey, MAJOL describes its narrative about how the current situation (negation of the Mozambican CSOs) was reached:

- *"Overall, the CSOs felt that they were not being listened to, were not given information, and were generally treated in an arrogant and obstinate way by the Government.*
- *Two specific occasions were cited: a meeting organised by CSOs which was attended by the three provincial directors from the ProSAVANA area, and the public consultation in Maputo presided over by the Minister.*
- *In both cases, in the opinion of the CSOs a genuine discussion was not held, and the attitude of Government parties was hostile and arrogant.*
- *When in Maputo CSOs were told that those who were not given a chance to speak could submit in writing, many of them decided to abandon the process because of the way it was being held.*
- *The fight hardened.*" (ibid.:4) *Authors emphasis.

Based on participatory observation, this narrative could be confirmed as the reality of ProSAVANA since 2012. This analysis paper has already examined why and how this happened focusing on the ProSAVANA's "Communication Strategy" (in Chapter 2 and 3).

However, the paragraphs and sentences given after the above narrative that wrap up the description of this section ("5. Results") show serious problems, and they indicate the arbitrary frame of this survey and this report:

- *"The fight hardened. Some leaders left, and were replaced by more hard-line people. This finally resulted in the CSOs breaking into two groups."* (ibid.)

This description is not supported by any facts, neither by the information written in its draft nor by the reality. From the end of the "public hearing" meetings (June 2015) to

the point of the inception report (13 November 2015), there have been no activities among and/or within Mozambican civil society organisations regarding ProSAVANA. This period could be considered as the calmest period for advocacy activities on ProSAVANA in Mozambique.

Similarly, the claim that “*some leaders left and were replaced by more hard-line people*” is not supported by any information appearing in the inception reports. In fact, what has happened was the opposite. As we have seen in the previous section, by the beginning of 2015, some leaders among the regional civil society organisations/networks were expelled and replaced by others (in Chapter2). The most contradictory reality of MAJOL’s “(survey) result” is that the president of UNAC who had been committed to advocacy activities related to ProSAVANA and had a solid position on the project passed away in early August 2015.

(b) Contradictory Fact: Sudden Death of UNAC’s President

President Augusto Mafigo, who was elected in 2006 to lead the largest peasant movement, suffered continuous direct intimidations from Mozambican authorities, including the Minister of Agriculture, as noted previously. UNAC released the following statement on his death on 5 August 2015:

- “*...The incident occurred in the city of Quelimane, Zambézia Province... Mafigo, who did not show serious signs of illness days before leaving for Zambézia, was attacked by strong convulsions and other abnormalities early on Wednesday, and was taken to the provincial hospital in Quelimane, where he died...*
- “*...He gave himself body and soul for the noble cause of peasants. He will be remembered forever in the fight against injustice and in favour of human rights. A leader, an activist, a real man of full humility and courage. We cannot repair this loss, but we shall raise on his legacy,” praised Luis Muchanga, executive coordinator of UNAC.*
- *According to the former Executive Coordinator of UNAC, Diamantino Nhampossa, Mafigo “selflessly devoted himself to deliver for decades. He could have followed other paths, perhaps the easiest and pleasant, but he chose this winding path to fight tirelessly for the cause of Mozambican peasants”.¹⁴⁰ (The authors’ translation.)*

The reason for his visits (twice in two weeks) to Zambézia Province from Tete Province where he lived was due to ProSAVANA. Three days after his death, a Japanese researcher and an NGO staff member who were carrying out field research in Nampula Province hurried to Zambézia to find out what was happening there.¹⁴¹ The following account is based on their field research, collection of information from provincial and

¹⁴⁰ <http://www.unac.org.mz/index.php/7-blog/125-falece-o-presidente-da-uniao-nacional-de-camponeses-augusto-mafigo>

¹⁴¹ The result of this research is presented in the statement released on 10 August 2015 <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/view/26016-stop-divide-rule-local-peasants-under-prosavana> and at the 14th dialogue and at public symposium held in Tokyo on 7 December 2015. <http://www.ngo-jvc.net/jp/event/event2015/12/20151207-frontier-of-africa.html>

local peasant unions before and after the research, the documents of UNAC and what happened to another province under a similar kind of circumstances.

Several months earlier, the ProSAVANA team composed of JICA's consultants and local governmental officials from SDAE (*District Service for Economic Activities*) had been pushing a district union in Zambézia Province affiliated to UNAC to accept a mill machine (but on loan) under the implementation project of ProSAVANA (ProSAVANA-PEM).¹⁴²

The same kind of (but stronger) pressure was exerted on another district union in Nampula Province. As the union in Nampula refused to the acceptance of another mill (February 2015), the leaders were harassed and threatened by governmental officers at the district and provincial level. Although this case was raised at discussions during several dialogue meetings in Tokyo, JICA refused to admit the claims.¹⁴³ When one of the peasant leaders who was harassed and a received a direct threat visited Japan in early July 2015, he took this case in front of the representatives of JICA during an official visit to JICA on 8 July 2015.¹⁴⁴ Still, JICA did not admit the case or show any interest on addressing the violation of his rights.¹⁴⁵

In case of Zambézia Province, the ProSAVANA-PEM (project for implementation) technical team was working with the president of the district union, who is a member of the leading party, and requested that he formulate a new cooperative for receiving the mill. He and another person who later became the president of the new cooperative gathered 15 peasants to establish "a cooperative for ProSAVANA", COPEPAMO. One day, the mill was installed inside the storage area of the district union without any consultation with the union's member associations.

This brought a lot of confusion within the union, between unions and among peasant

¹⁴² The intimidation occurring in the ProSAVANA target districts in Zambézia Province was recorded in the Declaration of Nampula formulated during the General Assembly of UNAC in April 2014. <http://farmlandgrab.org/23474>

¹⁴³ The details of information from the government and the local peasant unions were examined and included in the NGO's presentation material from the 13th dialogue (http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/). While the NGOs claims were supported by documents, JICA did not share any written evidence and depended only on the information sent by their consultants, claiming that their explanation was credible since it was constituent. Also, they insisted that since they cannot speak Portuguese, it would be impossible for them to threaten the leaders. Who threatened the leaders were Mozambican governmental officials and they did so in Portuguese. JICA refused to arrange a fact-finding research by a third party on the grounds of their trust with their consultants and counterparts (the 12th dialogue, 24 July 2015).

¹⁴⁴ Eiji Inui (Director General of Africa Department of JICA), Makoto Kitanaka (Director General of Rural Development Department of JICA), Shinjiro Amameishi (Director of Arid and Semi-arid Farming Area Division of JICA), and Toshiharu Tarui (Assistant Director of Country Assistance Planning Division III, International Cooperation Bureau of MoFA) attended the official visit meeting, and received 2 statements by UNAC and other organisations.

¹⁴⁵ On 8 July 2015, the delegation of UNAC officially visited JICA and MoFA in Tokyo in order to submit their statements regarding the problems of "public hearing" meetings. Before visiting Japan, the delegates held a meeting with UNAC's leadership to formulate a united voice on ProSAVANA. They re-affirmed two statements released under the "No to ProSAVANA Campaign."

leaders, but even more confusion was raised when it was found out that MASA and JICA were picking up the district union president, who was collaborating with ProSAVANA-PEM, to be sent as a representative of Mozambican peasants in the governmental delegation to Japan for promoting ProSAVANA. It was right after the return of UNAC's delegates from Japan (18 July 2015). MASA was directly working to issuing a passport for this district union president.

The leaders of UNAC urgently gathered and discussed this matter, and decided to send President Mafigo to find out what was happening and to convince the district union president not to go to Japan because it would create division (and a globally manifested division) and further confusion to UNAC. The president of UNAC visited the district union together with vice president and provincial union representatives, where they gathered and talked but this person kept his will to go to Japan because all his personal official documents were already taken by MASA (for issuing his passport), and he would be in trouble if he did not go.

During the meeting, since some of the member associations of the union complained about this person "bringing ProSAVANA" to the district and creating confusion. The UNAC leaders, together with provincial leaders, asked the district union to tell all the member associations to hold meetings to discuss what kind of positions they should take towards ProSAVANA and the already installed mill. At this point, some members also complained that the president of this district union was leasing the storage space for merchants without any consultations and clarifications with other members.

They agreed to meet again with the leaders of all the member groups of the district union two weeks later. This was the reason President Mafigo had to visit Zambézia Province twice. Even on the second visit, the union president refused to give up on his visit to Japan. During the meeting with local leaders, President Mafigo felt ill, and never returned to life.¹⁴⁶

In the following week on 18 August 2015, all the leaders of the associations belonging to the district union gathered, mourned, discussed and confirmed the following points:

1. Temporary closure of the storage facility in order to find out who was giving permission to its usage (occupancy) and how;
2. Establishment of an independent committee under the provincial union in order to study the situation related to the management of the storage space and improve harmony and transparency within the union;
3. Reaffirmation of the district union leader aligning with the "No to ProSAVANA Campaign";
4. Immediate removal of the ProSAVANA mill from the union storage;
5. Assurance of transparency in decision-making as a peasant union;

¹⁴⁶ This narrative is based on field interviews with several individuals in the district.

6. Analysis of the situation of the Code of Conduct of Provincial Federation.¹⁴⁷

The representative of the local SDAE and ProSAVANA's technical supporters were present in the meeting, and they were requested to take these messages to the government and ProSAVANA. The president of "ProSAVANA's cooperative (COPEPAMO)" declared his resignation from his position and withdrawal from the cooperative. He emphasised: "never sign any contracts without understanding fully."

Even after these collective efforts to re-establish internal harmony damaged by the repeated interventions by local, national and international ProSAVANA promoters, ProSAVANA could not stop carrying out its "Communication Strategy." A week later, the ProSAVANA-PEM team re-appeared at the union's storage in order to film a video about "ProSAVANA offering the maize mill to local peasants and the locals are pleased."¹⁴⁸ This film was to be shown in Japan. As local peasants have repeatedly summarised, "ProSAVANA cannot respect (sovereignty of) peasants."¹⁴⁹

After the sudden death of President Mafigo, in August 2015, UNAC and their affiliated 2,400 associations entered into a mourning period. They suddenly lost the leader who was capable of confronting challenges by creating harmony and unity among the people. He became a president of more than 100,000 peasants when the Mozambican government began leasing huge amounts of land to foreign capitals.¹⁵⁰ GRAIN listed Mozambique as one of the top target countries for land deals in their report in 2008 and in 2012,¹⁵¹ and still it remains so according to the latest Land Matrix figure.¹⁵²

Being a veteran of the liberation struggle against Portuguese colonialism to "liberate people and land," President Mafigo still stood in frontline and tried to protect the rights of his people. Contrary to the understanding and belief of some ProSAVANA promoters, President Mafigo was a leader who followed "bottom-up" leadership that "associativism" nails down, and was "a listener" rather than "a decision-maker" or "a speaker."¹⁵³ This episode is important because it is the opposite of what ProSAVANA promoters have been trying to impose on UNAC and also reflects the total lack of respect and understanding of the unionism and associativism that UNAC has been practicing in MAJOL's final report (pp.18-19).

¹⁴⁷ More detailed information is given in the following document.

http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/

¹⁴⁸ The budget for ProSAVANA-PEM is predominantly covered by JICA. Especially all the operations and equipment of these projects were paid for solely by the Japanese government according to the JICA's documents related to ProSAVANA-PEM.

¹⁴⁹ Naoko Watanabe, "The Difference between 'Results' and 'Outcomes' of Assistance," in *Trial&Error* No. 318/2015. http://www.ngo-jvc.net/jp/participate/trialerror/article/data/TE318_prosavana12.pdf

¹⁵⁰ He was selected as a president in 2006. UNAC has been committed to land issues since the beginning of this phenomenon together with JA! (Justiça Ambiental) and other organisations.

<http://www.unac.org.mz/index.php/publicacoes/35-os-senhores-da-terra-analise-preliminar-do-fenomeno-d-e-usurpacao-de-terra-em-mocambique>

¹⁵¹ <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/93-seized-the-2008-landgrab-for-food-and-financial-security>
<https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4479-grain-releases-data-set-with-over-400-global-land-grabs>

¹⁵² <http://www.landmatrix.org/en/>

¹⁵³ UNAC's video captures his personality very well. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c1HNaroAgSE>

It was only by the end of November 2015 that UNAC elected a new president. And even now, they have not been able to re-establish the leadership that was firmly established in this huge and complex movement. Later on, being a woman and in Nampula, the new president became “a target” of ProSAVANA promoters (Final Report:19). This will be dealt with at Chapter 5.

4-2-2. Framed Approach

(a) JICA’s Secretist Approach: “Individual Consultations”

Under JICA’s ToR, the MAJOL consultants were to conduct “*consultations with stakeholders* (civil society organisations)” and “*interviews with relevant governmental departments*” (ToR to MAJOL:2). The distinction of the two terms, that is, “consultations” and “interviews,” is consistent throughout the ToR. Also, the “*consultations with Mozambican civil society*” had to be carried out “*individually*” according to the ToR.

This approach (wanting closed meetings for *individual consultations*) certainly raised strong suspicions among the Mozambican CSOs. Although some organisations requested collective interviews, they were rejected. Also, the way of appointments were made (sudden telephone calls a day before the requested meeting dates) made internal arrangement among different organisations to gather difficult.¹⁵⁴

The resentment to this approach is confirmed in MAJOL’s draft inception report. It described the response of Forum Mulher (Women’s Forum) as follows:

- “*Opposed to ProSAVANA but won’t talk in absence of other campaign members.*” (MAJOL’s draft:23)

Yet, even after the problems of its instructions being pointed out by Japanese NGOs, JICA defended itself by saying that “*many organisations are timid to speak out when others are also present. This instruction is for them to speak freely.*”¹⁵⁵ JICA did not answer the reason of non-application of the word “*interviews*” instead of “*consultations*” for the civil society organisations, and did not explain what MAJOL’s consultants were supposed to consult about “*individually*” without the presence of others (The 15th dialogue, 19 February 2016).

Another point is that although MAJOL consultants did mention that they were working for JICA, they did not share any overall information of their contract. Because of rising suspicions, during the Nampula workshop (11 January 2016) they presented the title of the contract, four tasks given by JICA, and the definition of “stakeholders,” but that was all they shared and it was AFTER the completion of all the “*consultations*.”

¹⁵⁴ Based on correspondences with these organisations.

¹⁵⁵ The explanation given by the vice director general of Rural Development Department and the director of Arid and Semi-arid Farming Area Division of the same department of JICA at the 15th dialogue (19 February 2016) and the 16th dialogue (9 March 2016).

Therefore, even today, most of the Mozambican peasant and civil society organisations are not familiar with the details of the contract and JICA's instructions. The inception report was disclosed in May 2016, a half year after its completion, only upon the request of a Japanese parliamentarian. Even with this disclosure, it is difficult to obtain a full scope of the project, especially the real objectives, if one only depends on the officially disclosed version. Naturally, none of the Mozambican civil society and peasant organisations have complete understanding of JICA's "Stakeholder Engagement Project" which has been influencing and bringing so much confusion to them. For JICA, MASA and the ProSAVANA promoters, that is how it should have remained.

(b) Discovering Cleavage among Civil Society

After holding several meetings with the representatives of JICA and MASA, MAJOL's consultants determined several items for their survey:

- *"identification of... potential conflicts or conflicts of interest between the groups themselves,*
- *identify and characterise the relationships between the stakeholders that may promote or impede the development of alliances and consensus, or alternatively conflict."* (Inception Reports:18) Authors' emphasis.

As the framework presented in MAJOL's draft was not modified in the official inception report, it can be concluded that the above items were approved both by JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ.

These are, however, rather odd descriptions for a survey carried out in the framework of "*international cooperation*." Their approach does not seem to be in accordance with the official ultimate aim of the project. That is to "*improve the stakeholder engagement for facilitating the consultation process of ProSAVANA-PD including next round of public hearings*" (ToR to MAJOL:1). Seeking identification of "*potential conflicts / conflict of interest*" among Mozambican civil society groups as one of the objectives of the survey raises a number of questions.

It should be noted that the phrase "*identification of key groups and individuals who need to be the subject of targeted engagements*" follows after these explanations (Inception Reports:18). This sequence of research subjects clearly indicates one aim, that is, "Divide & Rule." As this analysis proceeds, this assumption will be proven to be a reality. What should be dealt with here is the following point.

MAJOL shared the result of the research on "*conflicts between the groups themselves*" in the beginning of the inception report as follows:

- *"This (replacement by more hard-line people) finally resulted in the CSOs breaking into two groups."* (Inception Reports:4)

MAJOL, JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ thought they found what they were looking for,

the “*potential conflict*.”

(c) Invention of “Conflicts” and Denomination of “Hardliners”

The following paragraphs about the “two groups” continues right after the above description:

- A) *“the hardline ‘No to ProSAVANA’ campaign (a.o. UNAC, ADECRU, JA, CESC),*
- B) *and a group of CSOs that are not against the programme as such, but wanted to see it changed in a number of key issues, foremost of which is the forced resettlement aspect (including a.o. OXFAM, ActionAid, CTA, GMD).*
 - *Some of these are united in ASCUTE (Alliance of Civil Society against Usurpation of Land: ActionAid, OXFAM, Forum Mulher, CARE, Lutheran Federation, CONCERN, Forum of Rural Women) which deals with land rights and land grabbing in general.”* (MAJOL’s draft:4)

Interestingly, this “result” does not correspond to what was listed as the outcome of their “*individual consultations*” shown in the MAJOL’s draft (pp.21-23). Some of the organisations listed in B) are also against ProSAVANA even according to the table given by MAJOL.

The obvious example is Forum Mulher, the largest women’s network in Mozambique. Even though MAJOL confirmed their affiliation with the “No to ProSAVANA Campaign” and their position clearly manifested as “*opposed to ProSAVANA*” and “*want to close it down*” (p.23), MAJOL still wanted to exclude the organisation from the campaign but include it in another group in the overall results (p.4). There is no description explaining this contradiction, and this is repeated in the “Mapping report” submitted in January 2016.

At the point the inception report was written, there were nine organisations belonging to the campaign, but they only listed four. MAJOL excluded not only Forum Mulher and their sister organisation (Marcha Mundial das Mulheres: World Women’s March) but also Human Rights League (LDH-Mocambique), LIVANINGO (an environmental organisation) and AAAJC (a legal assistance organisation). Their names are everywhere on internet sites if one searches for “No Campaign.”¹⁵⁶

Of these campaign organisations, they only made “*individual consultations*” with four organisations, JA!, ADECRU, CESC and Forum Mulher (Mapping report:28-32). The detailed analysis on this will be shared later, but here the possible explanations of this shortfall will be listed, that is, MAJOL: (1) wanted to “diminish” the number of the organisations under the campaign in order to claim that they are “marginalised”; (2) wanted to separate the rest of the organisations from the “four hardliners”; (3) did not do enough research to come up with the other names.

¹⁵⁶ <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/cat/show/827>

4-2-3. JICA's Concealment of Names and its Background

(a) Concealed Names of the Non-“hardliners”

The possible concealment of the rest of the campaign organisations by MAJOL is even buttressed by JICA's redactions upon the disclosure of the inception report. The elimination of 40% of MAJOL's draft was not enough for JICA. During the meeting with NGOs, JICA admitted that this was carried out by JICA (The 17th dialogue, 21 July 2016). JICA blacked out the names of all the organisations except of the “No to ProSAVANA” organisations, which were categorised as “hardliners.” The following are the images of the concerned section appearing in the two reports (p.4).

Disclosed Inception Report by JICA
The fight hardened. Some leaders left, and were replaced by more hard-line people. This finally resulted in the CSOs breaking into two groups: the hardline “No to ProSAVANA” campaign (a.o. UNAC, ADECRU, J.A., CESC), and a group of CSOs that are not against the programme as such, but want to see it changed in a number of key issues, foremost of which is the forced resettlement aspect (including a.o. [REDACTED]). Some of these are united in ASCUTE (Alliance of Civil Society against Usurpation of Land: [REDACTED]), which deals with land rights and land grabbing in general. Their basic principle is empowerment through prior informed consent and free will.
MAJOL's draft Inception Report
The fight hardened. Some leaders left, and were replaced by more hard-line people. This finally resulted in the CSOs breaking into two groups: the hardline “No to ProSAVANA” campaign (a.o. UNAC, ADECRU, J.A., CESC), and a group of CSOs that are not against the programme as such, but want to see it changed in a number of key issues, foremost of which is the forced resettlement aspect (including a.o. OXFAM, ActionAid, CTA, GMD). Some of these are united in ASCUTE (Alliance of Civil Society against Usurpation of Land: ActionAid, OXFAM, Forum Mulher, CARE, Lutheran Federation, CONCERN, Forum of Rural Women), which deals with land rights and land grabbing in general. Their basic principle is empowerment through prior informed consent and free will.

The way they blacked out or showed the names of organisations within the same paragraph draws attention. When asked the motivation behind these two different treatments of disclosure of Mozambican organisations, JICA¹⁵⁷ made the following excuse:

- “We checked the Internet and found these names for the campaign, thus concluded that it was alright to disclose them.” (The 17th dialogue, 21 July 2016).

Surly, this excuse does not have any grounds. ASCUTE (*Alliance of Civil Society against Usurpation of Land/Land Usurpation/Land Grabbing*) has been carrying out several activities for some years, and the names of the member organisations do appear on the Internet.¹⁵⁸ Also, if it is a public coalition of civil society organisations, there is

¹⁵⁷ The assistant director (*chosayaku*) to Group 2 Team 4 of Rural Development Department of Rural Development Department.


¹⁵⁸ Just one such example:

<https://www.care.dk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/16-04-01-PACT-mid-term-review-report.pdf>

no need to hide their names. Especially, when four out of the seven organisations that JICA attempted to conceal were international NGOs such as OXFAM, ActionAid, CARE and CONCERN, and there is no need to withhold their names since coordinating and participating in local civil society networks is a public matter and these organisations do care about transparency.

This sort of selective disclosure and the denial of obviously public information has become a customary action or tradition of JICA, especially for ProSAVANA related departments (Africa Department and Rural Development Department) and their staff. This contravenes not only JICA's Guidelines for Environmental Social Considerations but also the constitutional rights of the Japanese people, the Information Law and international law (Article 19).

Already on 4 September 2015, the Information Disclosure Examination Committee ordered JICA to stop arbitrary adaptation of the Information Law and improve their compliance in order to serve "*sovereignty of the people*" as determined by the law.¹⁵⁹ The following is the image of the actual verdict from the committee, and it clearly mentions that JICA violated not only the Information Law but also the Administrative Procedure Law.¹⁶⁰



Upon receiving this verdict, JICA reluctantly disclosed the documents that they had previously claimed were "non-existent" (the documents related to the Nacala Fund) and the redacted portions of an enormous amount of documents related to ProSAVANA. Still, they did not end their secrecy. They blacked out almost 60% of the monthly activity report submitted by JICA's Japanese consultants for ProSAVANA-PD.¹⁶¹ JICA seems ready to again violate the law and the people's rights and receive more verdicts for the sake of concealing their activities related to ProSAVANA.

Judging from the above past and present experiences, the reasoning behind this concealment cannot be casual. As JICA consistently does it, this activity was thought through and consulted on internally. In case of information disclosure, this is an institutional matter since the president of JICA is who applications for disclosure are

¹⁵⁹ Article 1: "*The purpose of this Law is, in accordance with the principle of sovereignty of the people, and by providing for the right to request the disclosure of administrative documents, etc., to endeavour towards greater disclosure of information held by administrative organs thereby ensuring to achieve accountability of the Government to the citizens for its various activities, and to contribute to the promotion of a fair and democratic administration that is subject to the citizens' appropriate understanding and criticism.*" (Administrative Information Disclosure Law) <http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H11/H11HO042.html>

¹⁶⁰ This document was shared by the applicant of the information disclosure to JICA.

¹⁶¹ Other cases were introduced in the previous analysis paper. <http://farmlandgrab.org/25696>

filed to and the recipient of the complaints and verdicts of the committee. The reasoning behind this concealment, therefore, must be put together through careful examination of other details.

(b) Concealed Organisations: OXFAM and ActionAid

Among the listed organisations, the names of OXFAM and ActionAid appear twice in MAJOL's draft where JICA had blacked out text (Inception Reports:4). The reason for the popularity of these two organisations for MAJOL and disclosure by JICA for MAJOL may be found in another blacked out part of the inception report, that is, in the entire table with the results from the "*individual consultations*" with civil society organisations (MAJOL's draft:21-23).

As previously cited above, OXFAM and ActionAid were two of the first organisations the MAJOL consultants visited for "*individual consultations*" and rated as "high influence (cial)." In case of OXFAM, the following background of the organisation attracted MAJOL's attention: (a) their partnership with 62 Mozambican organisations; (b) being a co-founder of ASCUTE; and (c) financing a campaign for land rights (*ibid.*:23). OXFAM Mozambique was invited by MAJOL and participated in the Nampula workshop held in January 2016.

In case of ActionAid, where one of MAJOL's consultants used to work, the description is very detailed, but its conclusion in the survey is very simple and clear:

- "*(ActionAid) is an opinion leader and can sway others to cooperate if conditions are not met, he is quite willing to let ProSAVANA die and many will follow.*" (*ibid.*: 21)

(c) CTV: the Best Rated Organisation

Another name concealed by JICA was CTV (*The Confederation of Economic/Business Associations of Mozambique*). MAJOL explains the objective and activities of the organisation as: "*aiming to promote good business environment with Governmental, non-profit, non-partisan organisations*"; "*studies and research to influence public policy and business environment*" (*ibid.*:22). It was ranked as a "highly influential" organisation with "high interests (in ProSAVANA)."

MAJOL emphasised the importance of this organisation to ProSAVANA since "*CTA is key to private sector involvement*" and their expectation towards ProSAVANA is noted as follows:

- "*to be implemented in partnership with private sector. Will create opportunities for new companies and economic development in north Mozambique.*" (*ibid.*)

Despite the enthusiasm of MAJOL and CTA, since this information contradicts with the shift in the explanation about the focus of ProSAVANA being for supporting local small-scale farmers since 2013, it seems to be problematic for JICA.

(d) CARE: JICA's Promotion and Exclusion from Survey

Another international NGO listed by MAJOL but concealed by JICA was CARE. One may recall the story about JICA's willingness to promote CARE's report (*"Land Delimitation & Demarcation: Preparing Communities for Investment"*) instead of the report by UNAC and GRAIN. JICA not only wanted to leave this report as Appendix 6 in the inception report, but even copied the entire report (71 page-long) to submit to the Japanese parliamentarian who requested MAJOL's reports. Needless to say that the entire CARE report is online.¹⁶²

As seen previously, MAJOL's team leader confirmed that it had facilitated the establishment of an "alliance" between WWF and CARE in the past. The relationship of the team leader with CARE seems to be continuing since he is the co-author of the above mentioned report (CARE Mozambique:iv). The report covers the study about land delimitations and demarcations in the northern three provinces that ProSAVANA is also targeting and was completed in January 2013. The objective of the report is clearly indicated in the subtitle: to *"prepare community investment."* Since the contents and descriptions indicate that the MAJOL's team leader worked together with regional and local civil society organisations in order to complete the survey for the report, it was not the first time for him to work with the leaders of civil society organisations in the North.

CARE, an American born international NGO, was one of the first organisations that brought soy production to the region.¹⁶³ Some former staff of CARE who used to work in the region are now working in the private sector, especially in the field of agribusiness in Nampula Province. One famous case is the president of the ORUWERA company, which was established by a former CARE staff member who gained access to the first round of ProSAVANA's Development Initiative Fund (DIF).¹⁶⁴

ORUWERA is a favourite company of JICA as its closest ProSAVANA partner, and their site is where JICA always directs Japanese or others who want to visit ProSAVANA's site or to do research about ProSAVANA. The problems of their operation (some conflicts with contracted farmers) and JICA's assistance in these visits including false translations or non-translations of complaints from local peasants and women have been reported based on field research in 2013, 2014 and 2015.¹⁶⁵

Despite personal connection and obvious affirmation of this international NGO of the ProSAVANA promoters, MAJOL did not list any information about CARE in any of the

¹⁶² http://www.care.org.mz/contentimages/civil_landdelimitation.pdf

¹⁶³ The central role was played by CLUSA, another American organisation established by members of Peace Corps. There are many interactions between these organisations.

¹⁶⁴ This fund was launched as PDIF, proudly with ProSAVANA's stamp. Later, it suddenly ceased to have "ProSAVANA" in its name.

¹⁶⁵ ProSAVANA Civil Society Report 2013 <http://www.dlmarket.jp/products/detail/263029>
<http://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp-content/uploads/Observador-Rural-12-English.pdf> Presentation by Japanese NGOs at the 13th dialogue meeting in Tokyo (27 October 2015)
http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/14kai_shiryo/ref3.pdf

three reports they wrote. What appears instead is an “*opinion leader*” who is “*a former member of CARE*” and listed as “*support of ProSAVANA*” (Mapping report:31). CARE (as an organisation) participated in the Nampula Workshop.

(e) Non-entry of WWF Despite its Active Role

Another international NGO not listed thus not probably surveyed but that has a close connection with MAJOL’s team leader is WWF Mozambique. Despite the active role which WWF Mozambique has been playing for MAJOL in this project (“Stakeholder Engagement”), the name of this NGO does not appear anywhere in MAJOL’s four documents including their draft. At least, their counterparts in provinces such as RADEZA (Zambézia) and ROADS (Niassa) appear (*Ibid.*:30-32).

WWF Mozambique, however, suddenly emerged as a key role player connecting civil society actors not only with MAJOL but also with the Mozambican government and JICA. This raises the questions of how MAJOL contacted them and for what purpose they met with WWF, and why this fact is not reported anywhere.

From the recordings of the Nampula workshop, it is apparent that the WWF staff in charge of “communications” and the representative of the “Alliance of the Platforms of the Civil Society Organisations working in the Natural Resource Management” founded and coordinated by WWF were playing active roles. One of them even took a facilitation role from MAJOL’s team leader (ex-WWF) when the accusations of MAJOL’s involvements reached a critical point during the workshop.¹⁶⁶

According to the recordings of the workshop, on the second day when some participants suggested to end the workshop since there were not any more things to discuss due to the opacity of the motivations and framework of the workshop, the WWF staff intervened and tried to convince the participants to continue on the grounds that: “*JICA would pay for the newspaper announcement to publish the statement of this workshop.*”¹⁶⁷

According to several sources, it is confirmed that WWF Mozambique arranged several meetings between MASA/JICA and some civil society actors in liaison with MAJOL.¹⁶⁸ The travel costs for the selected civil society actors to go to meetings were paid for by the Alliance of the Platform, WWF Mozambique.¹⁶⁹

Observing the obscure but active role of WWF Mozambique, the “No to ProSAVANA Campaign” released a statement on 7 March 2016.

- “*...Without ever having been engaged in advocacy for ProSavana..., in only two months WWF strangely provided funds for the establishment of the ProSavana*

¹⁶⁶ From the recordings of two day-long workshop and an independent minutes based on the recordings.

¹⁶⁷ From the recordings. According to JICA, it never promised this (The 15th dialogue, 19 February 2016).

¹⁶⁸ Names are withheld by request.

¹⁶⁹ Several sources confirmed this, but the funding may not have come directly from WWF Mozambique but others.

dialogue architecture. Further, Mr. Bechtel established questionable alliances with some of the representatives on the platforms, and became the coordinator of the dialogue mechanism—completely ignoring the work of national organisations involved in challenging ProSavana...

- *Over the last few years, we have been following the ambiguous and disguised actions of WWF in Mozambique...WWF has been imposing processes and the co-opting discussion spaces...more recently, the Alliance of Platforms, as well as the Dialogue Mechanism for ProSavana...*
- *WWF is an international organisation that both implements its own projects and acts as a donor. It co-opts spaces for debate, using its power and influence to manipulate discussion processes related to national concerns, such as ProSavana. As a result, it creates division among national organisations”. (Denouncement of Partnership between WWF and ProSAVANA, 7 March 2016) ¹⁷⁰*

Even today, how and why WWF came to serve the auxiliary role for MAJOL and in ProSAVANA is not publicly explained by any of the parties, WWF, MAJOL, JICA, or ProSAVANAVA-HQ.

4-2-4. Will to Conceal “Alliance” and Will to Show “Hardliners”

(a) WeEffect: “The most strategic partner to be cultivated”

From the above analysis, one conclusion can be inferred. JICA and MAJOL were fully resolved to conceal their actual and/or potential partners of “*alliance*” from public eyes, possibly in order to avoid interventions and complaints from these organisations being leaked.

Although it was not mentioned in the inception report, there is another international NGO that MAJOL held “individual consultations” and listed in the mapping report by MAJOL, but that information had remained closed until now. That organisation is WeEffect.

WeEffect is a Swedish Cooperative Centre working in 25 countries (seven in Africa) according to its homepage.¹⁷¹ It is the only international NGO categorised as “*Supportive of ProSAVANA*” (Mapping report:29). MAJOL enthusiastically describes this organisation as follows:

- *“As a financier and opinion leader, WeEffect has an extremely high influence.*
- *WeEffect finances other NGOs such as UNAC, OMR, AENA. Has been involved in the campaign against ProSAVANA since 2009, but now thinks that the time has come to dialogue...*
- *high interest, high influence. One of the most strategic partners. Needs to be cultivated...” (Mapping report:20) *Authors’ emphasis.*

¹⁷⁰ <http://farmlandgrab.org/25963>

¹⁷¹ <http://www.weeffect.org/>

MAJOL brings up the name of this NGO again in the section of “Discussions and Recommendations.” Under “Key result”, MAJOL emphasises this group as follows:

- *“There is the possibility of a very strong partnership to be developed with WeEffect. WeEffect even has institutional financing available specifically for the creation of a positive dialogue for the improvement of the ProSAVANA programme....” (ibid.:34) *Authors’ emphasis.*

It is not known if MAJOL and ProSAVANA did manage to “cultivate” the organisation for making “financing available” the creation of a dialogue on ProSAVANA. These descriptions are, however, good examples for learning what MAJOL, JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ were after through this survey, that is, the “development of (potential) alliances” determined in the inception report (p.18).

(b) Will to Show “Hardliners”: Collective Hostility

Contrary to this, MAJOL and JICA did not hesitate to show their negative denomination and evaluation of the selected organisations of the “No Campaign” as “hardliners.” Such humiliating denomination is rather odd for a supposedly “independent” and “third party” actor. By not intervening in and not concealing this denomination, JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ revealed that they shared a unified understanding and attitude towards these four organisations with MAJOL, and were ready to label them with derogatory terms.

Who they willingly denominated as “hardliners” are those who have been risking their positions and lives in order to protect the rights and lives of the people on the ground and well respected for their determined commitment and courage. In case of UNAC, it is constituted of the type of the farmers (small-scale farmers) that JICA and MASA say they want to support with ProSAVANA (at least officially).

These organisations do not only engage in advocacy activities regarding ProSAVANA and land issues, but have been committed to the issues of peace, democratic governance, human rights, women’s rights, mining, social and environmental justice for a long time. They were the first to discover the landgrabbing phenomenon in Mozambique and their reports are well read and received to this day.¹⁷²

As the peace, democracy and governance situation deteriorates in Mozambique, actively committing to these issues brings a number of difficulties, risks and dangers. Already those who have made critical statements have been facing dreadful fates: a professor and a journalist were assassinated, a professor and five journalists were prosecuted, an assistant professor was recently abducted and severely injured.¹⁷³ The

¹⁷² For instance, UNAC and JA! (2011) “Os Senhores da Terra”

http://www.unac.org.mz/images/pdf_publicacoes/senhoresdaterra.pdf

¹⁷³ In March 2015, Prof. Gilles Cistac of Eduardo Mondlane University who was an expert in constitutions (and a lawyer) was assassinated.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mozambique/11455866/Prominent-Mozambique-rights-lawyer-gunned-down-in-Maputo.html> Another assassination case followed to this. A

New York Post expressed the atmosphere in which Mozambican society began to live with:

- “*Machava’s murder created ‘a climate of fear, compromising press freedom,’ the Media Institute of Southern Africa said in a statement. ‘This is once more a way of trying to silence journalists in our country,’ said the chair of the Mozambique’s National Union of Journalists.*” (New York Post, 29 August 2015)¹⁷⁴

These organisations that have been derogatorily named “*the hardliners*” by MAJOL, JICA, MASA and ProSAVANA-HQ are the organisations that have not given up on contributing to a better and more just Mozambican society while others have become more and more silent due to fear.

Naming them “*hardliners*” and marginalising them from the rest not only ignores this background and diminishes their social contributions, but also promotes hostility towards them and separates from other organisations. This paves the way for oppression. Also, listing only four groups rather than the entire nine as the campaign organisations strengthens the claims such as “*minority enough*” (Mapping report:33) to ignore or oppress.¹⁷⁵

(c) Only those “who demonstrate willingness to engage” to be Invited

Although this point will be dealt with using reports and actual consequences later, it is important to point out that these organisations were not invited to preparatory meetings and the first meeting for the establishment of “*a dialogue platform*.” JICA’s ToR instructs MAJOL to submit the list of the organisations invited to “preliminary meetings” which would be approved by JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ (ToR to MAJOL:2). According to the same ToR, the invited organisations had to be those:

- “*who demonstrate willingness to engage in dialogue on ProSAVANA.*” (*ibid.*)

This was to be determined by “*individual consultations*.” Thus, despite the fact that the organisations listed as “*hardliners*” had allocated time to hold “*individual consultations*”

founder and editor-in-chief of an independent newspaper who founded a Mozambique delegation of the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), Paulo Machava, was killed in August 2015. He was involved in a campaign supporting an economist, Nuno Castel-Branco, and two reporters - Fernando Veloso and Fernando Banze - who are facing national security and defamation charges: for Prof. Castel-Branco by criticising the President Armando Guebuza (then) on Facebook and the two journalists for printing the text on their newspapers. Japanese NGOs shared these accounts at the dialogue meeting on ODA Policy at MoFA on 26 November 2015.

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/000169511.pdf>

¹⁷⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2015/aug/31/mozambique-journalist-is-shot-dead-while-jogging>
<http://nypost.com/2015/08/29/mozambican-journalist-shot-dead-in-street/>

¹⁷⁵ This word “*marginal*” was used by one of the MAJOL consultant to UNAC staff during the Nampula workshop on 11 January 2016. The detailed account is in the following statements:

<http://www.unac.org.mz/index.php/artigos/internacional/139-ativistas-da-unac-escapam-de-tentativa-de-espancamento-protagonizada-por-um-dos-consultores-da-jica-durante-a-sessao-de-consulta-as-organizacoes-sobre-prosavana>
<http://farmlandgrab.org/25710>

with MAJOL hoping to share their opinions on ProSAVANA, none of these organisations were not only invited to but not informed about these meetings.¹⁷⁶

On the contrary, despite not appearing among the contact list of 20 organisations (Mapping report), the staff of WWF Mozambique and the representative of the Alliance of the Platforms were invited and played indispensable roles (including interventions on discussions) for MAJOL from the side of civil society.

¹⁷⁶ Interviews with UNAC, JA! and ADECRU.

Chapter 5. Analysis of Stakeholder Mapping Report

5-1. Stakeholder Mapping: Nature, Approach, Results & Methodology

5-1-1. Nature and Approach of Stakeholder Mapping

(a) Nature of Stakeholder Mapping Report

“ProSAVANA Master Plan, Stakeholder Mapping” is the second report after the inception report that JICA instructed MAJOL to submit (ToR to MAJOL:3). The deadline was 15 December 2013 (*ibid.*), thus it functioned as a sort of mid-term report. As discussed in Chapter 3, MAJOL’s activities were carried out in accordance with the objective, methodology and initial results that appeared in the inception report with the approval of JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ.

The final version of the mapping report is one of the reports that the Mozambican government refused to disclose because “*it may harm the trust and dialogue process*” (JICA, 28 May 2016). What is used here is a “semi-final draft” of MAJOL submitted to JICA in January 2016 that was independently leaked. More than likely this report is the revised version of the original draft based on interventions from JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ.¹⁷⁷

The mapping report is composed of: (a) introduction, (b) analysis (outcome of *individual consultations* and interviews), (c) and discussion & recommendations. The highlight is certainly the result of 39 interviews (including consultations) of ProSAVANA’s “*stakeholders*,” including governmental officials.¹⁷⁸

Unlike the slightly more distanced and ambiguous descriptions of the inception report, the expressions in the mapping report are rather direct, straight forward and arrogant in some ways.¹⁷⁹

(b) Approach: Governmental Indication of the “Subject of Target”

This report no longer tries to conceal what they are after. The “mapping” survey was to identify and categorise the survey objects into: (a) prompt allies; (b) potential allies (two types); and (c) adversaries, and collect details (especially internal relationships) related to each organisation for using in formulating a strategy of interventions. As discussed in the previous chapter, its ultimate goal was to establish an (sole) “advisory /working committee” for JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ. This process was carried out step by step.

In the report, MAJOL reveals how they obtained the “initial list of names and contacts:”

¹⁷⁷ <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/view/26158-prosavana-files>

¹⁷⁸ <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/Map.2.pdf>

¹⁷⁹ One should check with its own eyes: <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/view/26158-prosavana-files>

- “3.4. Mapping methodology: The first step was the identification of potential stakeholders. This was accomplished through an initial consultation with JICA and government authorities...” (Mapping report:14)

From this description, the initial objects (their names and contacts) seem to have been indicated and given by the relevant governmental officers and JICA staffs. It, therefore, indicates the strong possibility that it was the instruction of JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ to drop several organisations within the “No Campaign” from “consultation”.

One should also recall that the approach of the ProSAVANA’s “communication strategy” was to bypass the national organisations gathering in Maputo and try to establish “direct communications” with the targets.

5-1-2. Outcomes: Who “Promote/Impede Development of Alliance”

(a) Violation of Non-interference: Targeting Individuals

Already in the inception report, the names of two Nampula-based organisations appear as objects of “individual consultations” (MAJOL’s draft:23). This was before MAJOL’s departure for the North (including Nampula), but still the results of the “*individual consultations*” are thorough. The mapping report reveals the reason. The MAJOL consultants carried out “*consultations*” with these two by telephone (Mapping report:31).

The following are the names of the organisations and descriptions made by MAJOL:

- Solidaridad Nampula (<Mr. X > vice president of Nampula platform): “*not against ProSAVANA. Influence high because of position in platform... interest moderate, but only with changes.*”
- PPOSCN (<Mr. Y and Mr. Z >): “*Large membership of CSOs/ Not against of ProSAVANA. Submitted comments and waiting for reaction / high influence because of large membership. Interest moderate.*” (MAJOL’s draft:23) *The individual names are substituted by the authors.

It should be noted that the descriptions of these two organisations are more individualised compared to those of other organisations. In the case of Solidaridade, the personal “*position*” (of Mr. X) within the provincial platform resulted in his having the best score in the “influence rating” (Mapping report:31).

In case of PPOSC-N, Mr. Z, who is listed as the second contact person, reappears as an “*opinion leader*” and is counted as if he was an organisation (*ibid.*). MAJOL summarised his “*position with respect to ProSAVANA*” as follows:

- “*Not against ProSAVANA, but against the current method of implementation. He suggests to use the Agriculture & Natural Resources Network to organise the dialogue, as it is working better than platform.*” (*ibid.*)

The “*individual consultation*” with Mr. Z was carried out by a “*face-to-face*” meeting (*ibid.*). It is not known if that was the second time that MAJOL consulted with Mr. Z (first by phone, second in person). It should be noted, however, that Mr. X and Z are two of the people who happened to be taking leading roles within the Civil Society Provincial Platform of Nampula (PPOSC-N) by the time of the of MAJOL’s contacts as pointed out in the report (*ibid.*:24;31).

And according to the categorisation of MAJOL, Solidariedade, PPOSC-N and the “*opinion leader*” Mr. Z were coloured in “green” as “*Supportive of ProSAVANA*” (*ibid.*:28;31). How this affected the reality is not known. Later on, Mr. X became the coordinator of the dialogue platform (“ProSAVANA working committee”), which came to name itself as the “Mechanism of Civil Society for Development of Nacala Corridor (MCSC).”

This personalised approach towards civil society by MAJOL, the subcontractor of governmental institutions working on behalf of governments is against the principles of non-interference and a violation of mutual respect between the government and civil society. In the history of ProSAVANA, this approach was taken several times by the director of DPA and JICA’s senior advisor and staff (June – August 2013), and caused strong objections, mistrust and suspicions among Mozambican civil society that led to deteriorations of the relationship between ProSAVANA promoters and the leaders of regional and national civil society organisations.¹⁸⁰ Still, the same approach seems to have been repeated, but this time, by the consultants who used to be part of Mozambican civil society, only this time they are working on behalf of governments with a predetermined outcome that was set by JICA and ProSAVANA promoters.

How the limited and personalised initial consultations may have affected the situation can be recognised in the “ToR” of the meeting and in the “Road Map” formulated by MAJOL and attached to the invitation letter for the Nampula workshop. One may recall that according to JICA’s ToR to MAJOL, “a roadmap” is one of the items that MAJOL had to submit and receive approval from JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ (p.3). The attached roadmap confirms that preparations and discussions for the establishment of a dialogue platform (“ProSAVANA advisory/working committee”) began from 17 December 2015 exclusively between MAJOL and some leaders of PPOSC-N.¹⁸¹

¹⁸⁰ Numerous leaders of peasant and civil society organisations suffered direct contacts to their mobile phones by the Mozambican authority and “meeting/dinner” appointments. One famous case took place at one of the most expensive restaurant in Nampula, Hotel Girassol, in June 2013. JICA and the Director of DPA invited a few leaders of the provincial platform of Nampula to dinner, and they were asked to agree with the draft of the minutes of the meeting between CSOs and ProSAVANA that was planned to be held the following morning. JICA paid the bill. The details are in the Japanese NGOs’ document submitted to MoFA and JICA at the 9th dialogue meeting (20 May 2014). http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/9kai_shiryo/ref9.pdf

¹⁸¹ MAJOL sent two attached files together with the invitation letter: one for ToR of the workshop and

(b) Red for “Hardline”/Green for “Supportive of ProSAVANA”

Compared with more subtle descriptions of the detailed results of 32 interviews (with organisations and opinion leaders) shown from page 16 to 27 of the mapping report, the “Summary of Results” (pp.28-32) is rather bold. MAJOL divided these into four categories using colours and shared the following result:

- Red: No to ProSAVANA, unwilling to dialogue.
 - 4 institutions hardline against ProSAVANA: (3 national NGOs and 1 provincial farmers union).
- Purple: Will dialogue if certain conditions are met.
 - 7 institutions strongly against, but will talk if dialogue conditions are met: (4 national NGOs, 2 international NGOs, 1 provincial farmers union).
- Yellow: No clear institutional position taken on ProSAVANA.
 - 1 national NGO, 1 provincial delegation of national NGO.
- Green: Supportive of ProSAVANA.
 - 19 favour of ProSAVANA, but with some changes: (2 opinion leaders, 12 national NGOs, 1 international NGO, 2 provincial NGO forums, 1 district farmer union, 1 farmers association). (Mapping report:28-32)

Result Totals
4 Institutions hardline against ProSAVANA (3 National NGOs and one Provincial Farmers Union)
7 Institutions strongly against, but will talk if dialogue conditions are met (4 National NGO's, 2 International NGO's, one Provincial Farmers' Union)
2 Institutions with no clear position (one National NGO, one Provincial Delegation of National NGO)
19 in favour of ProSAVANA, but with some changes (2 Opinion Leaders, 12 national NGO's, one international NGO, 2 provincial NGO forums, Farmer' Union, one Farmer's Association)

Mapping report:32

It should be noted that the number of “red” institutions was reduced by not selecting several “No Campaign” organisations including UNAC as survey objects and “green” ones were increased by including “opinion leaders” as discussed previously. Though there are some other problems in these categorisations that will be dealt with later, for now, the caution given by MAJOL about the organisations categorised “green” is important:

- *“Note that every institution coloured ‘green’ as in favour of ProSAVANA also noted the need for it to change before they could endorse it fully. Not one ‘green’ organization (sic.) was prepared to accept ProSAVANA as it is.” (ibid.:28)*
*Authors’ emphasis.

5-1-3. Analysis of Methodology of “Stakeholder Mapping”

Although MAJOL insists that they established the survey methodology based on another study on civil society (*ibid.*:14), there seem to be numerous problems in its

another for the draft ToR for “ProSAVANA working committee.” The “roadmap” is included in the first.

formulation and adaptation. Recently, it has become quite common to use methodology of social research in the field of development projects. The quality of research data and results must be, however, examined carefully. Such examinations are usually done by checking: (a) design of questionnaires; (b) selection of subjects; (c) environment of interviews; and (d) treatment of raw data for summarisation. These four aspects of the “Stakeholder Mapping” will be examined.

(a) Design of Questionnaires

The questionnaire prepared by MAJOL is included in the inception reports (pp.10-17). There are no differences between MAJOL’s draft and the disclosed document, thus it could be concluded that they were approved by JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ. The questionnaire to Mozambican civil society consisted of 22 questions (pp.10-14), and the important questions related to the above summary are the following:

- 17. Overall, what is your organisation’s position on the current state of the programme?
 - *We are opposed to it in total and will actively advocate against its implementation;*
 - *We are opposed to its current form and wish to see it changed significantly;*
 - *We agree to the format, but think some operational changes are needed;*
 - *We would like to see a number of smaller adjustments;*
 - *We think that the programme is fine as it stands.*
- 19. Would you be willing to enter into a formal dialogue process with ProSAVANA with the aim of improving the programme to better serve the interests of rural Mozambican families and farmers?
 - *Yes; No; Unsure* (Inception Reports:13)

MAJOL does not indicate any guidelines for their methodology for analysis (summarisation) of the survey outcomes. It seems that the organisation that selected “*we are opposed to its current form and wish to see it changed significantly*” to Question 17 were categorised as group “purple.” “Purple” corresponds to the group of organisations that “*will dialogue if certain conditions are met,*” according to MAJOL (Mapping report:28).

Question 19 (and its summarisation) is designed to support Question 17. The way that Question 19 is phrased, however, is obviously leading. It is basically designed to elicit the answer “*yes to enter into a formal dialogue*” (Inception Reports:13) since the consulted organisations are all working in the field of supporting rural farmers or farmer organisations.

It should be noted, however, in this questionnaire, there are no explanations about “what sort of a formal dialogue” was presumed by the investigator. Nor is their ultimate goal, the establishment of the “advisory/ working committee,” mentioned anywhere. Despite the lack of this detail from the questionnaire, the inception report manifests as follows:

- “(ToR for Advisory Committee) *Due to Civil Society comments so far we have changed the name of this committee into the ‘Working Committee.’*” (ibid.:5)

MAJOL already had ToR ready for the “advisory/working committee” by 13 November 2015, but this was not included in the questionnaire either. This means that although the survey subjects had information about what they meant by “a formal dialogue” they withheld that information, which would be crucial for the objects for their judgements. The investigators added leading information to guide the answers of the objects.

There are other problematic questions, such as Questions 21 and 22:

- Question 21: “On a scale from 1 to 5, can you indicate if you are now better informed about ProSAVANA,”
- Question22: “What is your position now towards ProSAVANA?” (Ibid.: 13-14)

From these two questions, it is clear that this questionnaire does not represent anything close to an “independent social survey.” Through interactions between investigators and objects, the objects are guided to be “better informed about ProSAVANA” and expected to change their “position towards ProSAVANA.”¹⁸²

From the examination of the questionnaire, it is clear that the MAJOL consultants were expected to diffuse somewhat positive information and image of ProSAVANA as if they were “third party like” researchers. The team leader and his assistant being not Mozambican-born, not Japanese or Brazilian, but “westerners” helped this “independent and third party” image.¹⁸³ This point is confirmed in the MAJOL’s report.

- “*Many interviewees praised the concept of a third-party intermediary, and noted that ongoing dialogue should continue to be mediated by third parties.*” (Mapping report: 35)

Some survey objects did assume that MAJOL was “a third party,” though this was not the case in reality.

Although “rebranding of ProSAVANA” among civil society organisations was taken out from the original work plan, the core spirit of it remained. This is clearly manifested in several cases during its “*individual consultations*” and the Nampula workshop. It will be dealt with later.

(b) Selection of Objects: Exclusion of UNAC

As introduced above, the initial survey objects were selected by JICA and government authorities (Mapping report:14). In the mapping report, MAJOL explained that these initial objects were “*potential stakeholders.*” MAJOL then added that “*following this,*

¹⁸² According to their Survey Monkey, no one answered these two questions, thus it is probable that they saw the problems with these questions, too.

¹⁸³ According to those who were at present in the meetings.

civil society stakeholders were contacted, generally through the provincial and national civil society platforms and forums” (ibid.).

Interestingly, despite the name of UNAC listed in the inception reports (as a “hardliner” and a part of the “No Campaign”) and being the largest peasant movement and representing the provincial and district peasants unions that MAJOL visited at the national level, UNAC was not included as a survey object. Despite the promise made by JICA and MASA delegates to Japan (1 September 2015)¹⁸⁴ and JICA’s repeated claims that “UNAC was not excluded” until the leak,¹⁸⁵ the existence of UNAC was not only excluded from the “consultations,” it was ignored completely until the Nampula workshop in January 2016.

Here raises a serious question: if it was because of UNAC’s claims that JICA thought of this project (“Stakeholder Engagement”) in the first place, as the representatives of JICA proclaimed (The 15th & 16th dialogue, 19 February and 9 March 2016), why then was UNAC excluded and ignored? Obviously, this could not have been MAJOL’s decision. As written in the report, it was JICA and the Mozambican authorities who indicated the organisations (and thus determined those which were not indicated) for the initial consultations, especially in Maputo. This also served to reduce the number of “red” organisations.

Despite the exclusion of their national union and the existence of more than several hundreds peasant associations and unions in ProSAVANA’s target area, only three were selected to answer these questions. They were: Lussanhando Associacao 25 de Setembro, Forum Distrital de Camponeses Mutuali (*sic.*), and UNAC Alto Molocue (Mapping report:30-31).¹⁸⁶ Interestingly, all of these peasant organisations are the beneficiaries (or promoted to be) of the projects (ProSAVANA-PEM). The first two are categorised “green” and the last one positioned as “yellow.”¹⁸⁷

Considering the distance of where these peasant organisations are from provincial or district centres and the number of peasant organisations existing in these areas, it is only natural to conclude that these organisations were “picked up” by JICA and the Mozambican government as survey objects and targeted for “*individual consultations.*” The motivation behind this may have been to increase the number of “green” peasant organisations in order to be able to justify that there are peasant associations affiliated with UNAC but in support of ProSAVANA.¹⁸⁸ It may also be to negotiate with these

¹⁸⁴ http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/13kai_shiryo/ref1.pdf JICA’s confirmation on this point was given during the 11th dialogue meeting (27 October 2015).

¹⁸⁵ The vice director general of Rural Development Department and the director of Arid and Semi-arid Farming Area Division of the same department of JICA (The 15th and 16th dialogue).

¹⁸⁶ These are wrong name.

¹⁸⁷ Oddly, the details of last two organisations such as name of the consulted, its contact and detailed answers are not presented in the report.

¹⁸⁸ This kind of approach was observed many times in the past four years and is explored in the following report and presentation: http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/14kai_shiryo/ref3.pdf
<http://www.ngo-jvc.net/jp/projects/advocacy-statement/data/proposal%20final.pdf>
Japanese NGOs (10 August 2015) http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/activities/ps20150810statement.html

organisations so that they will attend meetings as representatives of peasants.

(c) Survey Environment

From the recordings of the some of the “*individual consultations*” of MAJOL, it can be confirmed that the survey data were collected under a framed environment. The following is how MAJOL’s consultants, the team leader, introduced their motivations for the research:¹⁸⁹

- “*JICA said that it would stop ProSAVANA and leave for somewhere else if it was impossible to work with civil society...*”
- *JICA wants to know if it should advance ProSAVANA or not. They want to know the errors they made. They also want to hear from those who oppose to the programme. Then, JICA will decide if it should advance ProSAVANA or close it...*
- *Don’t you want to participate in the dialogue?*” (November 2015) *The translation from the Japanese translation of the recording originally spoken in Portuguese.

This is a minute from one of the “*individual consultations*” carried out to one of the “No Campaign” organisations in November still in Maputo. It is probable that the same kind of explanations and phrasings were used repeatedly to the rest of the organisations.

The Japanese NGOs asked MoFA and JICA about the veracity of the information, if the Mozambican civil society does not want ProSAVANA, it will be stopped and JICA will leave (The urgent meeting at MoFA, 18 January 2016). The answer from the director of MoFA¹⁹⁰ was “NO.” After being formally requested by the Japanese NGOs to check with MAJOL about how and what they were telling these organisations in the Open Questions addressed to JICA’s President (25 January 2015),¹⁹¹ JICA came back saying that it wanted MAJOL to “act as freely as possible” since it is an “independent organ,” and did not answer (The 15th dialogue, 19 February 2016).

The Japanese NGOs pointed out JICA’s responsibility as a contract giver and requested that JICA check the recordings of the consultations, to which the vice director general of JICA¹⁹² responded as follows:

- “*We checked with MAJOL, but they told us they didn’t have recordings...and they did not say anything like that.*” (The 16th dialogue, 9 March 2016)

The visited organisations did witness MAJOL recording the conversations, and their reports indicate the usage of recordings. It is also unimaginable to consider a consultant agency not possessing recorders or not recording any of their interviews

¹⁸⁹ http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/activities/ps20160125.html

¹⁹⁰ Country Assistance Planning Division III, International Cooperation Bureau

¹⁹¹ http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/activities/ps20160125.html

¹⁹² Rural Development Department

that had to be reflected on their reports. It can be strongly suspected that not only MAJOL but also JICA gave false replies since they knew what MAJOL's consultants told Mozambican civil society were prevarications, thus would lead further problems.

(d) Treatment of the Raw Data: Cultivating Narrow Deference

From the above examination, the quality of MAJOL's survey and involvements is clearly questionable. The treatment of the raw data is also problematic.

As mentioned in previous chapters, some of the categorisations of "green" (supportive of ProSAVANA) organisations could be contested.¹⁹³ The case regarding Forum Mulher is an obvious example. Another example is evinced in the treatment of two provincial peasant unions.

Instead of visiting, hearing from and consulting with UNAC, MAJOL visited two provincial unions in Niassa and Nampula affiliated with UNAC. Later, the peasant union of Niassa was categorised as "purple". Their answer was noted as follows:

- *"No to ProSAVANA. If some things are clarified, then perhaps yes. More openness to dialogue and change needed."* (Mapping report:30)

The provincial union of Nampula was, however, categorised as "red" but answered:

- *"No to ProSAVANA. Want to co-operate and give input. But the process must start from scratch."* (ibid.)

From these descriptions, the difference between the positions of the two provincial unions is small, but it seems that MAJOL wanted to differentiate the two out from under the same national united movements and the "No Campaign" they were part of. Also, it seems that the narrow difference expressed in the response from the provincial union of Niassa was a very meaningful discovery for MAJOL and the ProSAVANA promoters.¹⁹⁴ This is confirmed in the following comment by MAJOL:

- *"(Potential influence on Programme) Can still be a big force pro or contra"*. (Mapping report:26)

The above detailed analysis indicates questionable summarisation of the results of the raw data. It is quite likely that the MAJOL consultants used different parameters not determined and described in the survey framework, possibly based on personal impressions/will and the result of "consultations" or "negotiations" that occurred at the time of the survey or afterwards.

(e) Violation of Code of Ethical Practice in Social Survey

The detailed examination of the framework and actual conduct of the survey raises

¹⁹³ individual communications.

¹⁹⁴ How ProSavana promoters tried to use a coordinator of the provincial union of Niassa was recorded in the following report: <http://www.dlmarket.jp/products/detail/263029> Also in the following paper: <http://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp-content/uploads/Observador-Rural-12-English.pdf>

ethical questions. For instance: (a) did the survey objects know the motivations behind of this survey; (b) did they also know they were going to be categorised in this manner; and (c) were they informed of these results? The answers to these questions are “NO,” and JICA and the governments had and still have no intention of disclosing the research results to their objects. In conclusion, this was a secret survey not for public use, but exclusively to be used by MAJOL, JICA, ProSAVANA-HQ and the three governments.

Also, many of the objects were not shown the questionnaire or/and not explained that they were asking questions in accordance with a questionnaire. To their surprise, by just talking with MAJOL, their “answers” were quietly interpreted and inserted by MAJOL consultants into the survey monkey without their being informed.

There is no need to refer to JICA’s guidelines to confirm the obvious responsibility of any information collectors and researchers. Most institutions recognised in the world have guidelines and/or a code of conduct regarding on the responsibility (accountability) of survey/research subjects. For instance, the Japanese Society of Cultural Anthropology established the following Code of Ethical Practice in 2008.

- Article 4: We must clearly mention to subjects of research and the people of the research area that we shall assume accountability for all matters related to the research including its objective, methodology and publication of the outcome upon our conduct of research.
- Article 5: We must not damage the life, security and property of the subjects of research. And we must prepare and establish a sure means in order to avoid direct and indirect danger and negative consequences over these people. (Code of Ethical Practice of JASCA, 2008¹⁹⁵) *Authors’ translation and emphasis.

None of these codes were complied with or respected during the survey (in “*individual consultations*”) conducted by MAJOL under JICA’s project. JICA does have the “Internal Control” established in 2013, and “2. Compliance” describes its responsibility as follows:

- *“JICA carries out its projects in compliance not only with laws and regulations but also with its internal rules and contracts, being aware of its responsibilities to fulfill the expectations of Japanese citizens and international society.”* (Internal Control: 1) ¹⁹⁶

In case of MAJOL, the company proudly stressed that it uses the approach of a “Social License to Operate.”¹⁹⁷ As detailed analysis revealed, the approach and practices of MAJOL on this project were far from what the SLO defines. An interesting description that appears in the company’s homepage should be also noted:

¹⁹⁵ <http://www.jasca.org/> The authors’ translation.

¹⁹⁶ http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/organization/c8h0vm000000ks38-att/internal_control.pdf

¹⁹⁷ <http://sociallicense.com/definition.html>

- *“The values of MAJOL are centralised in ethics and respect towards clients and collaborators, competence, knowledge, understanding and quality.”*¹⁹⁸ *Authors’ translation.

This explains the attitude of some of MAJOL’s consultants well. Who they care the most about are “clients”, then “collaborators,” and not those who are not “(potential) collaborators”. Despite the shortfall of MAJOL, these should not be attributed to “MAJOL’s problems.” As already discussed in previous chapters, how ProSAVANA has been conducted and how JICA framed this project contributed greatly to MAJOL’s attitude.

5-2. Utilisation of Results into Action

5-2-1. Utilisation of Results into Action

(a) “Small Enough to be Disregarded in Terms of Negotiations”

The above analysis of MAJOL’s reports and data teach us that for MAJOL, JICA and ProSAVANA promoters, the prudence, independency and accuracy of the survey were not their priority. What they sought through the project was to obtain general numbers and first-hand information about: (a) how many are “pro. & contra.” towards ProSAVANA ; (b) how many could be made “pro.”; (c) who could serve as “allies”; and (d) what are the relationship between “pro. & contra.” organisations/individuals after the manipulative “consultations” and persuasion of MAJOL. These desires are expressed well but sporadically in the mapping report.

MAJOL summarised the results and made their “strategic” suggestions to separate the “red” group from the rest. They describe this strategy as follows:

- *“Since these (red) represent only four of the 32 CSO’s and NGOs interviewed, these can be considered a minority that is small enough to be essentially disregarded in terms of negotiations.*
- *The ProSAVANA team should instead focus on the nearly unified demands of the other 32.”* (Mapping report:33) *Authors’ emphasis.

MAJOL suggested that JICA move on and let them make an agreeable roadmap with civil society organisations but without including the “red” organisations because once it is done, *“these four institutions may well join the ProSAVANA dialogue process”* (ibid.).

Their claim of “only four” was already contested in the previous sections. What should be pointed out here is that by 15 December 2015, the deadline of the first draft of the mapping report, and before the Nampula workshop took place, JICA’s subcontractor determined and suggested the exclusion of organisations categorised as “red” from the “negotiations,” the process of the establishment of “a (sole) dialogue platform” or “ProSAVANA advisory/working committee.” And by marginalising them from the rest, it expected to create “peer pressure” on the “red” organisations.

¹⁹⁸ <http://www.majol.co.mz/>

Despite the repeated past promises, JICA and MASA no longer cared about UNAC and their supporters. Symbolically, the directors of JICA¹⁹⁹ insisted as follows:

- “...If they (the campaign organisations²⁰⁰) have different opinions (from those led the process), they should discuss among themselves (using the ‘mechanism’).” (The 15th dialogue, 19 February 2016)
- “There is already such a framework, thus we would like UNAC to participate in it...although it maybe outside of UNAC, the reality is that there is a framework and activities promoting a dialogue...” (The 16th dialogue, 9 March 2016)

(b) “First Founders”: Provincial and Environmental Networks

Together with the mapping report (or around at the same timing), MAJOL was supposed to submit the list of participants of “the First Founder Meeting (preliminary meetings in the ToR)” for the approval of JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ.

In the report, MAJOL left some traces of how it identified the organisations it wanted as “first founders.” In the “summary of results,” MAJOL wrote that FONGZA (*Forum of NGOs of Zambézia Province*):

- “Agreed to participate in the founding meeting and coordinate the Zambézia NGOs” (Mapping report:32).

FONGZA was coloured in “green” and rated as “influence moderate to high and interest high” (*ibid*:26). It is known that the rest of the “first founders” were also provincial civil society networks like FONGZA, that is, PPOSC-N (Nampula), FONAGNI (Niassa) and another Zambézia related network NGO but specialising in environmental issues, RADEZA (*Network of Organisations for Environment and Sustainable Community Development in Zambézia*). These are the organisations that let MAJOL use their names and logos on the invitation letter for the meeting of “Working Committee for ProSAVANA” prepared and sent by MAJOL.²⁰¹

How MAJOL targeted PPOSC-N and their two leaders was already examined. Additionally, it should be noted that FONAGNI is not listed in the survey results but was chosen as a “first founders.” Since June 2013, ProSAVANA-HQ targeted provincial NGO networks to incorporate them as their tools.²⁰² This occurred especially during the “rural meetings” carried out from September to October 2013.²⁰³ Because of the objection of PPOSC-N to the process, its participation was halted, but the incorporation efforts were later revived. Thus, it was more than natural for the NGO

¹⁹⁹ First remark by the director of Arid and Semi-arid Farming Area Division and the second by the vice director general of Rural Development Department.

²⁰⁰ https://issuu.com/justicaambiental/docs/comunicado_de_imprensa_prosavana_ma_6483ef0d3100cc

²⁰¹ The invitation letter is in the Japanese NGO's presentation (page 8) during the 15th meeting (19 February 2016). http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/15kai_shiryō/ref8.pdf

²⁰² ProSAVANA's official sites are full of this information. <http://prosavana.gov.mz/>

²⁰³ <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/view/22655>

provincial network, FONAGNI, to be selected as a “*first founders*,” but there seems to be another reason for this.

According to the mapping report, instead of FONAGNI, MAJOL listed RODAS. MAJOL’s consultants met with a member of the organisation that is also the vice president of FONAGNI. RODAS is categorised as a “green” organisation (Mapping report:29). From the report, the enthusiasm of the vice president is very clear:

- “*Any investment welcome, including ProSAVANA. Could be a big boost for development. But when?...Those who are anti-ProSAVANA and anti-development, what do they want?*” (ibid.:25)

Coincidentally or not, ROADS is another network organisation working in the field of environmental issues just like its counterpart, RADEZA. Despite its founding objective of commitment to the environment and sustainable development, the way it welcomes “*any investments*” raises eyebrows.

In fact, ROADS seems to have staff (wanting to) involved with some businesses willing to reach JICA for the assistance. In early 2015, the following message was sent from the official e-mail address of ROADS to a Japanese civil society organisation:

- “*I heard that JICA is helping business...I have a pig project for rearing pigs and purchase of cattle in Malawi. It is to produce meat and process sausages to sell them in the city of Lichinga. The (funds necessary for this) project is estimated at 1.500.000,00MZN. I would like you to help negotiating with JICA...*” (Sent by ROADS, early 2015)

(c) Promoting Non-inclusive Decision-making Among CS

Despite the fact that these are network/umbrella organisations, none of them held member/public meetings before making the decision to be “*first founders*” of the “advisory/working committee for ProSAVANA”. No public debates were organised to discuss this in any of the three provinces.

The exclusion of the provincial peasant unions from consultations and decision-making within the provincial networks that they had been working closely together with caused serious damage to the democratic and inclusive management of these civil organisations. Also, given the fact that they are the ones who would receive the impact of the programme (not those who are salaried organisational staff), this exclusion is against the norms and values of any civil society organisation and network.

The tentative exclusion of UNAC and the UNAC affiliated organisations from the Nampula workshop was also observed. This is particularly so with the provincial peasants union of Nampula being categorised as a “red” organisation. Despite being the largest peasant movement in the province where ProSAVANA’s target districts are concentrating and where the preliminary meetings were taking place, the provincial union was excluded from meetings and the information-sharing channel. In the past,

this had never happened. The provincial platform of Nampula had always respected and worked with the union as “principal partners” of their activities.

(d) JICA’s Plan for Negotiations with the Selected Organisations

JICA has defended itself by calling MAJOL an “*independent institution*” that is “*working freely*,” and expressing that the dialogue mechanism was set up “*by the initiatives of Mozambican civil society organisations*” (The 15th dialogue, 19 February 2016). Further, since the establishment of the “Communication Strategy,” all the actors are repeating that “*ProSAVANA is a programme of the Mozambican government*” and trying to follow that directive. This claim can be easily proven to be a “facade” from MAJOL’s “*Discussions and Recommendations*” in the mapping report (pp.33-37). All the suggestions MAJOL made were towards JICA and not MASA or ABC.²⁰⁴

The following descriptions back up the above argument:

- “*...the release another version of the Master Plan...would be seen as further marginalisation of civil society. This opinion may be conflict with the JICA desire to release Draft One...,based on comments received in the first round of consultations, in the near future.*
- *All felt that the co-creation process was a much more in-depth, detailed, and time-consuming process than current JICA plans allow for Civil society in general believes that the document must be re-created from the very beginning...where civil society demands and JICA expectations may be in conflict.*
- *The April timeline was mentioned by several organisations as unrealistic. ...may not all harmonise well with JICA desires to complete the second round of public consultations...by April 2016. JICA should start to think...* (Mapping report: 34)

Even after directly engaging with ProSAVANA for more than a month and completing interviews with seven governmental entities of Mozambique (MASA), MAJOL is making these recommendations not to MASA or ProSAVANA-HQ but only to JICA.

From the above description, it is clear that MAJOL was visiting the selected organisations with JICA’s plan for negotiations during the “*individual consultations*.” The content of the plan seems to be: (1) objective of the dialogue, (2) existence of Master Plan Draft 1, and (3) timeline. These points were not shared with every organisation, but only some, probably those in “green.”

All the above indicate that MAJOL used the occasion of “*individual consultations*” to: (1) diffuse (any) information about ProSAVANA that could be used for softening and persuading Mozambican civil society organisations; (2) collect data for knowing their

²⁰⁴ In fact, there is no trace of Brazilian actors in any of the reports written by MAJOL. The absence of the Brazilian counterpart of ProSAVANA, whether that is ABC or EMBRAPA, is rather odd (since it is a triangular cooperation) but real.

positions regarding ProSAVANA and categorise members of the “No Campaign” adversary group for ProSAVANA into four groups; and (3) negotiate some of the organisations and “opinion leaders” to participate in the “founding meeting.”

5-2-2. Nampula Workshop as Testing Ground for the Project

(a) Selective Invitation to/Exclusion from the Nampula Workshop

The “*first meeting of a dialogue platform*” determined in JICA’s ToR or the “*founding meeting for the advisory committee of ProSAVANA*” in MAJOL’s action plan was held on 11 and 12 January 2016 in Nampula. The invitation letter was made and sent and announced in newspapers by MAJOL. The above four “*first founder*” organisations offered their names and logos. As the ToR determines the list of participants, budget, and agenda for the meeting, the ToR had to be approved by JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ in advance (ToR to MAJOL, 2-3).

From interviews with UNAC and provincial peasant unions, the exclusion (including tentative exclusion) of these unions was confirmed. MAJOL’s invitation letter for the Nampula workshop of 11 January (Monday) was received by the provincial union in the afternoon of 7 January 2016 (Thursday). Though this was a tactic repeatedly used by the ProSAVANA promoters when they did not want to invite certain organisations, especially peasant organisations, now their umbrella platform was acting and treating the union in the same way.

Being a provincial union of peasant organisations, the leaders and members are not in offices but in their fields scattered around the province. ProSAVANA targets 10 districts in Nampula Province, and the distance between the districts and the provincial capital is huge, something like 600 km. If they need to come to provincial capital, not only time and money but also logistics (boarding and food) must all be prepared. Although all the involved organisations including the government and JICA know this reality, they sent the invitation only a few days before the workshop. The same thing happened to the other provincial unions.

While the unions were discussing what the workshop was about and how to participate, MAJOL and their partners (provincial NGO networks) were ready to send “representatives of the peasants” from all 19 districts to the Nampula workshop. Their transportation (including flights) and boarding were fully covered by “MAJOL.” It was not the provincial union that selected these peasants “representatives.” The leaders of provincial unions were surprised to see their names right before the workshop. Some of them were leaders of associations that were affiliated with UNAC, but they were members who had not been engaging in the discussions about ProSAVANA, thus provincial unions would never have selected them to be the representatives to attend the workshop.

The ToR of the Nampula workshop attached to the invitation letter confirms that it was not only MAJOL’s fault but that of JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ that no effort was made to bring the representatives of UNAC, provincial and district unions. The

budget for travel costs were only allocated to the following people:

- 19 people, one from each ProSAVANA district
- 2 people for each provincial capital
- People of Nampula (those who do not need transportation and accommodations)
- People of the Team from Maputo. (ToR for the meeting:5)²⁰⁵ *Authors' translation.

Both leaders of UNAC and provincial unions were not invited with an offer to pay for their expenses. So did another “No Camapign” organisation (JA!) who was not even invited to the meeting.

It is interesting to note that MAJOL allocated a budget for “*People of Nampula*” even though these people “*do not need transportation and accommodations.*” Another point is that by writing “*People of the Team from Maputo*” instead of “MAJOL team” it implies that people from outside of the consulting agency are included in “the team from Maputo”. Other than UNAC and JA!, WWF Mozambique, the Alliance of the Platforms, OXFAM and CARE participated from Maputo. It is not known officially who covered their travel costs and the reason why these international NGOs were prioritised to national NGOs. The latter question was answered by the leaked reports.

(b) MAJOL’s Explanation and Denial of Authenticity by JICA

JICA’s ToR instructed MAJOL to establish the “Stakeholder Engagement Platform” by 20 January and to complete a “Roadmap of the consultation process” by 22 February 2016 (ToR to MAJOL:3). The detailed survey and their reports were all for these goals. MAJOL’s consultants could not fail to meet the goal as subcontractors because a further contract promising a larger amount of money was involved (*ibid.*:5). But this was also because their reputation was hurt by the happenings that occurred during the Nampula workshop and several statements denouncing their involvements with the project.²⁰⁶ Thus, the leaked final report dated on 1 March 2016 is full of self-praises, excuses and accusations against certain organisations and individuals.²⁰⁷ Its analysis will be shared later.

At the beginning of the Nampula workshop, MAJOL’s consultants again gave false information about ProSAVANA. The followings are explanations given by the team leader:

²⁰⁵ The title of the document is: “ToR for the Meeting of Civil Society for the Establishment of a Working Committee for ProSAVANA (*Termos de Referencia para o Encontro da Sociedade Civil para o Estabelecimento do Comite de Trabalho para o ProSAVANA*)”.

²⁰⁶ <http://farmlandgrab.org/25710> <http://farmlandgrab.org/25864>
<http://www.unac.org.mz/index.php/artigos/internacional/139-ativistas-da-unac-escapam-de-tentativa-de-es-pancamento-protagonizada-por-um-dos-consultores-da-jica-durante-a-sessao-de-consulta-as-organizacoes-sobre-prosavana>

²⁰⁷ http://www.farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/Final_.pdf

- *“Civil society won in the struggle against ProSAVANA. Now, the question is how to use this victory. Civil society must commit, negotiate and involve itself with the dialogue of ProSAVANA.*
- *By saying “No to ProSAVANA”, it means wasting 9,325,000,000 Metical (about 130,414,228 US Dollars). The Japanese parliament discusses this matter, and if you don’t agree with moving ProSAVANA forward now, all this funding (amount) will disappear. Are you alright with it?*
- *Why doesn’t civil society formulate another rural development plan? Shouldn’t civil society and peasants use this fund for its plan?*
- *Since JICA doesn’t understand the reality of Mozambique, it is indispensable for civil society and peasant organisations to engage. By engaging, we can change them.*
- *The civil society must take advantage of this money and opportunity. If you lose this opportunity now, it will be lost forever. JICA has money. So, let us advance ProSAVANA. Let us create a “Committee,” engage and take advantage.* (Nampula workshop, 11 January 2016) *Authors’ translation from the Japanese translation of the recording of the Portuguese presentation.²⁰⁸

As in the case of the explanations given during the “*individual consultations*,” the above information perverts the truth. When JICA was officially asked to confirm: (1) if the information appearing the above is consistent with fact; and (2) if the MAJOL consultants gave these explanations to the civil and peasant organisations during the workshop, their answers were: (1) no; and (2) they cannot check (The 15th and 16th dialogue, 19 February and 9 March 2016).

(c) MAJOL’s Tactics of “Saving Face” to Move ProSAVANA Forward

MAJOL admits that they gave this presentation, especially the “victory” slide (emphasis), as a tactic for capturing and persuading civil society participants (Final Report:16). The following are the explanations by MAJOL:

- *“MAJOL decided that the only way for everyone to save face was to maintain the name ProSAVANA but still acknowledge the civil society that their efforts and their campaign were fundamental in changing the ProSAVANA approach...”*
- *It helped very much...Thus was born the famous “CIVIL SOCIETY WON...WHAT DO YOU WANT TO DO WITH YOUR VICTORY?” slide that opened the January 11 and 12th meeting of civil society in Nampula.*
- *The wording of this slide was careful and intentional.... (ibid.)*

Despite JICA’s proclamation, MAJOL could not help admitting that the ultimate objective of its consultancy for JICA was not just to “*facilitate a creation of a dialogue platform*” but to mobilise Mozambican civil society to move ProSAVANA forward in the final report.

²⁰⁸ The Japanese translation was extracted from the statements by 12 Japanese NGOs (19 March 2016). http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/activities/ps20160318statement.html

(d) Contestation of the Process and Challenged Legitimacy

The descriptions in this final report are not report like, rather they are like a diary and with an obvious direction: to twist all the facts around in order to reorganise the past in accordance with the single narrative they offer and the picture of the present that they want to diffuse. Broadly summarising the 22 page-long report, all what the writers wanted to say was: (a) they overcame challenges; (b) what went wrong was due to the past experiences and framework of ProSAVANA and especially two individuals of UNAC; and (c) they have treated everything skilfully and successfully.²⁰⁹

Despite this nature (or because of the nature), the remarks of the representatives of MoFA and JICA regarding the “dialogue platform” were heavily based on the contents of the draft final report, and this alignment is shown in what is written.²¹⁰

All the narratives in the final report are not supported by any evidence or references, and further they contradict the previous reports that were submitted to JICA. As introduced previously, it was MAJOL’s suggestion to exclude UNAC and other campaign organisations from the process and use peer pressure to bend the will of groups who continued opposition to the programme (Mapping report:33). Now, they want to blame UNAC staff who questioned the lack of a democratic, open, and inclusive process and asked for an explanation about the legitimacy of having JICA’s subcontractors lead on and intervene in a civil society matter and facilitate the whole workshop. From the recordings, it is clear that these questions and critiques were supported by the peasants who attended to the meeting.

Only the reason why the newly elected president gave a favourable remark towards the “committee” once during the workshop (cited in the final report, p.19), was due to the “*fear of being left out when others are agreeing*”.²¹¹ This is exactly what they planned. Yet, collectively the peasants resisted to the process.²¹²

Despite all the questions and contestations, the sole platform was established as JICA, and ProSAVANA promoters wished, and later it changed the named drastically to “Mechanism of Civil Society for Development of Nacala Corridor (MCNC).” The only problem for them was that UNAC did not participate in it despite the false information and the attempt to use “peer pressure” during and after the Nampula workshop.

5-3. Aftermath of the Nampula Workshop and End of MAJOL’s Contract

5-3-1. Aftermath of the Workshop: Confirmed Manoeuvre towards UNAC

(a) UNAC as “subject to intensive lobbying”

Contrary to the existing facts and records, the MAJOL consultants were ready to write the following:

²⁰⁹ http://www.farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/Final_.pdf

²¹⁰ The 16th and 17th dialogue, 9 March and 21 July 2016.

²¹¹ Japanese NGO’s interview with the UNAC president in June 2016.

²¹² <http://farmlandgrab.org/25797> <http://farmlandgrab.org/26181>

- *“The fact that the UNAC president and provincial representative did not attend the final meeting should not be seen as a setback....*
- *The fact that there was no UNAC attendance, but also no public reaction to the meeting, shows that the UNAC position is in flux, and this creates an opportunity, with proper engagement, to bring them fully in to the negotiation process.” (ibid.:20)*

MAJOL and ProSAVANA-HQ suddenly cared about UNAC’s participation in the process. This is because of questions that were raised about the legitimacy of the process of the creation of the mechanism were manifested in several statements not only in Mozambique but also in Japan and Brazil.²¹³

Even the disclosed contract and ToR and the information from all sort of sources were enough to generate worry about the process and its aftermath. Knowing the risk of further criticism, and before civil society gained access to more information such as MAJOL’s reports,²¹⁴ JICA, MoFA and the Mozambican authority wanted to seal the case quickly. That was to have UNAC’s participation in the mechanism.

MAJOL confirms this in its final report:

- *“UNAC was subject to intensive lobbying from a visiting Japanese delegation during the time of this meeting.” (ibid.)*

This is the time when the director general of MoFA and high ranking official of JICA visited Mozambique (4 - 6 February 2016), and the president of UNAC was receiving all kinds of pressure to attend to the meeting of the Mechanism and to meet with the Japanese governmental delegation. Although it was a widely known fact that UNAC and its president were receiving pressure to accept the mechanism, thus ProSAVANA, it is new to have this fact proven by a document.

(b) Expectations for Cleavage within UNAC

As examined previously, MAJOL, JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ were ready to intervene not only among civil society organisations but also within organisations (Inception Reports:18). By the time the final report was written, it seems that these intervention actions had become a commonly natural thing to do and were no longer hidden.

MAJOL not only wanted to cultivate difference to create conflict among Mozambican organisations, but now wanted to discover, cultivate and produce results. MAJOL insisted that the non-participation of UNAC in the mechanism was because of two individuals from UNAC who “dominated the discussion” during the Nampula workshop (Final Report:19). Yet, this contradicts with how UNAC makes decisions. As previously discussed, being a social movement of peasants, the organisational

²¹³ See Note 205 and 211. http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/activities/ps20160318statement.html

²¹⁴ A Japanese parliamentarian was requesting MAJOL’s reports at the time.

decisions must be made bottom-up and collectively, and cannot be made by an individual even if that individual was their president, let alone an office staffer or national coordinator. UNAC took its position a long time ago (“No to ProSAVANA”) in the past general and regional assemblies, and if it is to be changed, discussions from grass-roots level need to be organised.

Still, MAJOL went further to write the following:

- “... *We found out through our own contacts in civil society that the behaviour of these two representatives had been censured within UNAC*”. (ibid.:19)

MAJOL could not stop but went even further than that.

(c) De-empowerment of UNAC by Utilising Parliamentarians

MAJOL emphasised that “*even if all failed*” (UNAC did not participate in the Mechanism), JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ could challenge the legitimacy of UNAC as “*the largest organisation of farmers and thus de facto representative of Mozambican farmers in the Nacala corridor*” (ibid :20). MAJOL shared the tactics that they formulated with their Nampula partners:

- “*The tactic of the Nampula civil society organisations to invite Provincial and National Parliamentarians to the February seminar goes some way towards responding to this argument.*
- “*After all, who is better placed to represent farmers than their own elected representatives?*” (ibid.) *Authors’ emphasis.

This particular description proves that MAJOL also became deeply influenced by the ProSAVANA way of thinking and approach established over the years. Once the leaders of Nampula civil society used to call these people “*Prosavanistas*.”²¹⁵ The “tactics” represent the collective feeling of humiliation against UNAC, “No Campaign” organisations and those who do not participate and cooperate with ProSAVANA promoters, including civil society leaders of the newly established “Mechanism.” Yet, these are the same organisations that they arbitrarily excluded (or attempted to exclude) from the process.

JICA’s “Stakeholder Engagement Project” after the establishment of the ProSAVANA’s “Communication Strategy” (also financed by JICA) has created this situation. Now they have formulated governmental and civil actors working against UNAC and “Campaign” organisations, and installed Mozambican politicians in the place of the elected leaders of peasant movement and organisations, yet they call this assistance for “agricultural development” and a programme for supporting small-scale farmers.

²¹⁵ Elizabeth Clements (2015) http://www2.fct.unesp.br/pos/geo/dis_teses/15/ms/elizabeth_clements.pdf

5-3-2. Aftermath: Continued Hostility and Counter-“campaign”

(a) “Sensitisation activities” against “No to ProSAVANA Campaign”

By the end of March 2016, MAJOL left. JICA did not formulate another contract. What MAJOL created under JICA remained: severe cleavage among civil society organisations and within the organisations.

MAJOL even left saying the following:

- *“ProSAVANA should not simply let civil society with UNAC. There are tensions within civil society that might militate against success of a civil society led effort here” (ibid.).”*

It was MAJOL under JICA’s contract who created and cultivated the tension. Once that tension came to fruition, MAJOL was able leave, but not the civil society organisations. According to the leaked minutes of the meeting among the representatives of the Mechanism, JICA, MASA and ABC held on 12 April 2016 at JICA Mozambique office in Maputo, it is confirmed that civil society organisations have begun to take the role of the governmental ProSAVANA promoters.

The minutes do not conceal what was talked about during the meeting since they had no idea that one day someone might leak the document. The coordinator of the Mechanism announced as following:

- *“We had already carried out ‘sensitise missions’ towards other NGOs and the supporters of “No to ProSAVANA Campaign” to (promote to) align with the vision of the “mechanism” in Maputo and at provincial level.*
- *In order to visualise the participation in the mechanism at the local level, the coordinator asked for permission for the network (of PPOSC-N) to go ahead to do “mapping” (of districts).” (Minutes, 12 April 2016) ²¹⁶*

They asked for permission of the governmental authorities and financial support from JICA, and they got both. They organised member organisations under the Agriculture Network to carry out this task in 10 districts within Nampula Province. From the field research conducted by the local organisations in the same districts, it is confirmed that they carried out a “sensitise mission” for local communities and peasants to align with the Mechanism and not with the “No Campaign”.²¹⁷

(b) “Rebranding of ProSAVANA” together with CS in Brazil

“Sensitisation” against the “No to ProSAVANA Campaign” did not end in Maputo, provinces and communities. The representatives of the mechanism went to Brazil together with the ex-vice minister of MASA (the ProSAVANA coordinator), other MASA officials and JICA Mozambique and Tokyo. In 3 June 2016, “International

²¹⁶ http://www.farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/doc_2.pdf

²¹⁷ The field research was carried out in July 2016.

Seminar on ProSAVANA” was organised by ABC in Brasília, and attended by the Mozambican and Japanese ambassadors to Brazil and journalists. The Brazilian civil society groups aligning with the “No Campaign” were also invited (but in a short notice). JICA and MoFA did not inform this to Japanese civil society, even during the 17th dialogue held a month later (21 July 2016).

According to the reports and recording of the seminar, it was basically to promote a “new image” of the programme together with the civil society representatives, thus a “rebranding of ProSAVANA.” They were to explain that now “the dialogue mechanism” was established and came to ask for the understanding and support of Brazilian civil society.

The coordinator of the mechanism also explained that the engagement with “*revision of the master plan is slow*” and “*currently working actively in districts for facilitating the implementations of ProSAVANA.*” This shows the objective and functions of “the mechanism” were no longer only for dialogue and not at all for monitoring. It became a part of ProSAVANA, and that was exactly what JICA and the three governments longed for by using the term “ProSAVANA advisory committee,” whose draft ToR had already been prepared by MAJOL by 13 November 2015, two months before the Nampula workshop took place, under the claims of “*initiatives of civil society.*”

APPENDIX 5 - SUGGESTED TERMS OF REFERENCE OF PROSAVANA ADVISORY COMMITTEE
STARTING POINT FOR DISCUSSIONS

Suggestions based on world best practice for a

“Charter of Governance: Key terms and conditions of a Civil Society ‘Working Committee’
for the ProSAVANA Programme, Mozambique”

The JICA’s disclosed Inception Report:24.

Conclusion

This analysis is the product of a thorough examination of the primary sources including 46 leaked and over 100 disclosed documents of ProSAVANA and of the information collected through participatory observation from 2012 to 2016. Special focus was placed on two JICA projects carried out with two Mozambican consulting agencies: “Definition of Communication Strategy for ProSAVANA” by CV&A (August-November 2013) and “Stakeholder Engagement Project” by MAJOL (October 2015- March 2016).

These two projects were based on an official agreement made by the three signatory countries of ProSAVANA (Japan, Brazil and Mozambique) during their coordination meeting held on 3 December 2013—two months after the critical statement released by the largest peasant movement in Mozambique, UNAC. The minutes of the meeting state that formulating a “social communication strategy” in order “*to reach civil society as soon as possible*” (MoM:2) was agreed by three parties. The minutes were one of the ProSAVANA documents exposed by the first leak—civil society learned about this agreement by April 2013, but still did not have any information about how ProSAVANA promoters were “reaching civil society”. The leaked and disclosed JICA and governmental documents revealed how this was being done.

In this conclusion, the outcomes of the analysis will first be summarised. Second, the analysis will be placed in the socio-political, military and historic context of Mozambique. Finally, ProSAVANA’s compliance with the laws, principles and guidelines of Mozambique, Japan and the world will be examined.

Reviewing the Analysis (1): “ProSAVANA’s Communication Strategy”

It may not have been what each staff or official of the three countries intended, but collectively they made the decision to not directly respond to any claims or demands by civil societies. Rather, they formulated “strategy” and carried out countermeasures against them while moving the projects ahead. As CV&A concluded, there were “*interest groups that see economic and political gains from the outcome of ProSAVANA*” (*Estratégia*:8). In other words, the ultimate decision was to move the programme ahead. In order to calm, silence, persuade and weaken the voices of civil society in the three countries, formulating a “ProSAVANA communication strategy” was indispensable and crucial.

This task was carried out by a local consulting agency (CV&A, under the umbrella of a Portuguese firm) contracted not by ABC or MINAG/MASA, but by JICA directly. This provides a clear indication of the leading role and deep involvement of the Japanese government with the implementation of the above decision.

As discussed in Chapter 2, comparing the documents (JICA’s contract including its ToR

and CV&A's reports) with what happened in reality revealed the following four points:

1. Various counter-measures against civil society organisations and peasant movements that had raised reservations or are in opposition to ProSAVANA were planned and implemented.
 - i. The scheme was financed by JICA as a "ProSAVANA Communication Strategy (*Estratégia da Comunicação*)", that is, an "*intervention proposal and action plan*" (ToR to CV&A:4).²¹⁸
 - ii. The implementation was also financed by JICA under an ambiguous contract whose documents have been closed. CV&A continued to implement "the Strategy" formulated under the above i. ([Monthly] Activity Report July, August and October 2014).
2. A "District network of collaborators (*rede distrital de colaboradores*)"—including district administrators, traditional authority figures, and cooperative individuals ("*colaboradores*")—was formed (*Estratégica*:10-12;23-26;46).²¹⁹
 - i. The aim of this "network" was to diminish the influence of peasant and civil society organisations in the local communities of 19 districts targeted by the program and to undermine their claims (*ibid.*:34-35).
 - ii. Another aim is manifested in the following sentence: "by "*minimis(ing) the strength of these organisations...By taking importance away from the Mozambican civil society organizations, it will take strength away from the foreign NGOs to operate in Mozambique*" (*ibid.*:35).
3. In order to create division among civil society groups and to undermine the credibility of, and trust in, international civil society organisations (especially those from Brazil and Japan), various measures were taken involving discourse and local government authorities (*ibid.*:30-35).
 - i. "Doing away with the connection between the Nacala Corridor and the Brazilian Cerrado will help devaluate some of the principal arguments of these international NGOs" (*ibid.*:34-35).
 - ii. "Question or criticise the role of foreign organisations...by some Mozambican authorities" (*ibid.*:35).
4. ProSAVANA and JICA gave clear instructions to generate favourable media coverage at both the national and international levels (ToR to CV&A:3-40; "Communication Strategy in the framework of ProSAVANA":3-7).²²⁰
 - i. They instructed CV&A to hire the consultants who "*comprehend the following*

²¹⁸ http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/docs/102.pdf

²¹⁹ http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/docs/104.pdf

²²⁰ "Framework" is attached to the contract between JICA and CV&A.
http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/docs/102.pdf
http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/docs/103.pdf

- aspects: consultancy based on outputs: TV/radio, written articles*” (ToR to CV&A: 3-4) in order to “*Prepare journalist articles, shows and TV and radio broadcasts*” (The framework”:3).
- ii. “The framework” lists a “*press-trip to Nacala Corridor to prepare a ‘campaign’ about ProSAVANA and its beneficiaries*” and “*promote press trips to Brazil*” at “*ProSAVANA’s expenses*” as “immediate actions” (*ibid.*:6-7). CV&A responded to the instruction by formulating proposals (Estratégica:33) and carrying some of them out (Activity Report, August 2014).
 - iii. “The framework” and “the strategy” report emphasise the importance of covering the expenses of the journalists despite the following notion: “*the international media does not tend to take such offers, but ProSAVANA must always offer to support expenses*” (Estratégica:34).

The “ProSAVANA: Communication Strategy” (“the strategy” report or “Estratégia”) formulated by CV&A under its contract with JICA between August and September 2013²²¹ can be determined to be a public document for ProSAVANA, since it was agreed upon by its principal contractor (JICA) and the three countries, authored and released by ProSAVANA. Its authenticity is also confirmed by JICA since it was disclosed by the agency. And the continuation of its effectiveness was affirmed by JICA during the dialogue meeting with Japanese NGOs held on 19 February 2016.

The events and incidents that have occurred since August 2013 onward confirm that most of the above strategies have been carried out. As detailed in Chapter 3, the most notable consequences of the formulation and implementation of “the Strategy” were: (1) antagonism and carrying out countermeasure against those who have openly raised reservations and are in opposition to ProSAVANA; (2) attempts at intervening in civil society and peasant organisations to create division and co-optation and to exclude “anti-ProSAVANA” leaders; and (3) an “internalisation (domesticisation)” of the problems of “international cooperation.”

These consequences caused serious harm to the Mozambican civil society, especially to peasant organisations and their leaders, for example: (a) a series of human rights abuses such as intimidation, oppression and stalking committed by Mozambican authorities from district, provincial and national levels; (b) denial of facts and past events while manipulating and concealing information and documents; and (c) confusion among peasants and civil society organisations.

Although the local peasant leaders were suddenly placed on the frontline of the confrontations, they did not cease their resistance and reaffirmed their position against ProSAVANA and the massive human rights abuses (Nampula Declaration, May 2014). They stood up and established the “No to ProSAVANA Campaign” in June of 2014 as

²²¹ The contract between JICA and CV&A was the second one. As the ToR of the first contract (14 December 2012 – 14 February 2013) was excluded from the series of the disclosed documents related to CV&A, the details are not known. The analysis of the first contract is at the following site: <http://farmlandgrab.org/25696>

discussed in Chapter 1.

In April 2015, the further adaptation of “the Strategy” was observed in the “public hearing/consultation” meetings regarding the 204-page technical “ProSAVANA Master Plan Draft Zero” at district and sub-district levels by inviting the people who are indicated as “*District Network of Collaborators*,” governmental officials and partisan members of the ruling party. This ended up drawing heavier criticism from more Mozambican organisations who had not previously taken critical position against ProSAVANA (Chapter 1).

Reviewing the Analysis (2): “Stakeholder Engagement Project”

In October 2015, JICA secretly initiated the “Stakeholder Engagement Project” by contracting a local consulting firm. For responding to the condition given by JICA to hire consultants with Mozambican civil society background (ToR to MAJOL:3), JICA’s subcontractor, MAJOL, put together a team of consultants who used to work with international NGOs in Mozambique, especially those that had worked in Northern Mozambique, ProSAVANA’s target area (Chapter 3).

In order to comply with JICA’s contract and ToR, the MAJOL’s consultants prepared a number of materials: (a) three reports (Inception, Mapping and Final reports); (b) ToRs (for Nampula workshop and the “ProSAVANA advisory/working committee); (c) the list of participants of “preliminary meetings” and platform meetings for the establishment of the “committee” (*ibid*:2) (they also organised and facilitated these meetings for the sake of JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ and “civil society”) (*ibid*:2-3).

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 analyse the above items, focusing especially on the objectives, methodology, data, results, suggestions and descriptions appearing these three reports; recordings of related consultations and meetings; and events during the period of October 2015 to March 2016. The following is a summary of this analysis.

After civil society learned of this project and Japanese civil society held protests against it, JICA explained that the objective of the project was “*to respond to criticism directed at the “public hearing” meetings, especially of UNAC*” (The 16th dialogue, 9 March 2016). What the MAJOL’s reports show is very different from this claim. From thorough examination of the documents, other materials and events, it should be concluded that the real objectives of JICA’s “Stakeholder Engagement Project” were:

- a. to establish “*a sole dialogue platform*” mechanism controllable by the governments and JICA (ToR to MAJOL:2-3), later named “ProSAVANA advisory/working committee;”
- b. to “*achieve buy-in from civil society*” and “*promote the development of alliances*” (Inception Reports²²²:5);
- c. to divide UNAC and the “No to ProSAVAN Campaign” organisations and marginalise/isolate them (Inception Reports:4; Mapping report:33); thus

²²² <http://farmlandgrab.org/25797> <http://farmlandgrab.org/25864> <http://farmlandgrab.org/26181>

- d. “*moving ProSAVANA forward*” (Nampula workshop, 11 January 2016).

The following methodologies were used for achieving these goals:

- a. identifying the position of each civil society organisation towards ProSAVANA, their “*influence*” and “*interest*” rating, and categorising them into four groups (Mapping report:32):
 - i “*hard-line against*” (in red);
 - ii “*strongly against but will talk if dialogue conditions are met*” (purple);
 - iii “*no clear position*” (yellow);
 - iv and “*in favour of ProSAVANA but some changes*” (green).
- b. “*identify(ing) potential conflicts or conflicts of interest...between the groups themselves*” (Inception Reports:18)²²³ and formulate strategic interventions;
- c. “*promot(ing) the development of alliances*”(ibid.) in support of ProSAVANA,²²⁴ and pushing for the “cultivation” of certain groups (Mapping report:20);
- d. inviting only “*those who demonstrate willingness*” and are “approved by JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ” to the preparatory meetings (ToR to MAJOL:2-3);
- e. excluding “No to ProSAVANA Campaign” member organisations including UNAC and its provincial unions since they are “*small enough to be essentially disregarded in terms of negotiations*” (Mapping report:33).
- f. moving ahead to establish the platform and create circumstances in which UNAC and the “No Campaign” organisations would have no choice but to participate for fear of being left behind and isolated (ibid.).

Despite these secretive strategies, UNAC and other organisations continued resisting these interventions and manipulations and made statements that they would not participate right after the Nampula workshop (13 January 2016) and again in February, March and May.²²⁵ Confronted with this, MAJOL tried pry into UNAC’s internal information; this was combined with government visits from Japan and “intensive lobbying activities” for bringing the peasant leaders out to the “dialogue” meetings (Final Report: 19-29).²²⁶

Struggling to include UNAC and provincial unions to the “dialogue platform/mechanism,” MAJOL and ProSAVANA promoters decided to discredit UNAC by bringing in “*parliamentarians*” to represent “*Mozambican farmers in the Nacala corridor* (sic.)” and argue against “Japanese civil society” (ibid.:20).

Reviewing the Analysis (3): Aftermath and Consequences

The same kind of irritation, humiliation, antagonism and countermeasures observed in the plans and activities of the “ProSAVANA communication strategy” could be identified here. This was inherited by some of the civil society leaders even after the

²²³ <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/Incept.pdf>

²²⁴ Mapping report:29.

²²⁵ <http://farmlandgrab.org/26181> <http://farmlandgrab.org/25864> <http://farmlandgrab.org/25797>

²²⁶ http://www.farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/Final_.pdf

MAJOL's contract ended in March 2016.

The leaked minutes of the meeting held among JICA, ABC, MASA and the representatives of the “dialogue platform/mechanism” (or MCSC) in April 2016 revealed the existence of “*sensitisation missions towards other NGOs*” against the “No to ProSAVANA Campaign” in order to promote an “*alignment with the vision of the mechanism,*” which were carried out “*in Maputo and at provincial level.*”²²⁷ These parties discussed how to finance: (a) further efforts for carrying out the same kinds of missions at the district level in Nampula Province;²²⁸ and (b) the mechanism to review the Master Plan (*ibid.*).

ProSAVANA achieved what they had been seeking since October 2013. They finally “*reached (out) to civil society*” in order to “*move ProSAVANA forward*” by: (1) concealing and manipulating the necessary information and documents for their judgements; (2) sowing confusion among and within peasant, regional and civil society organisations; (3) creating sharp divisions and “tensions” within Mozambican civil society; (4) isolating and marginalising communities and peasant and civil organisations aligned with the “No to ProSAVANA Campaign”; and (5) disempowering and discrediting those organisations as a result. The explanation given by MAJOL's team leader expresses the position of JICA well: “*they just want to get things done, and move ProSAVANA forward*” (November 2015).²²⁹

Contextualising the Analysis

In short, ProSAVANA, formally an “international cooperation/solidarity programme for agriculture development,” transformed itself into a programme for political manoeuvre.

This transformation, however, should be contextualised within the historical, socio-political and military circumstances of Mozambique, as well as the socio-political conditions of Japan and Brazil, and the global situation, namely “diminishing of civil society space.”²³⁰ Since further research and analysis are needed in this regard, two points will be highlighted here.

First, as briefly discussed in the introduction and Chapter 1, the Mozambican people and peasants have suffered numerous difficulties stemming from: (a) the resurgence of military confrontations (resulting in refugees and displaced people); (b) undemocratic and non-transparent governance including hidden government debts; (c) intimidation, kidnappings, assassinations and the criminalisation of civil society leaders including professors, academics, journalists and “pro-people” prosecutors; (d) numerous human

²²⁷ http://www.farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/doc_2.pdf

²²⁸ Based on the above minute and on the field research carried out in 10 ProSAVANA target districts in June 2016.

²²⁹ The recording from one of the “individual consultation” meeting with a “No to ProSAVANA Campaign” organisation in Maputo.

²³⁰ We would like to invite national and international scholars to deepen these discussions.

rights abuses; and (f) deepening inequality.²³¹

These situations indicate that a drastic “diminishing of civil society space” is also occurring in Mozambique. Notably, all of these phenomenon intensified from early 2013 onward, coinciding with the formulation and implementation of the “ProSAVANA’s Communication Strategy.”

Second, the historical process and its legacy need to be taken into considerations when reviewing the details of “the Strategy,” its functions and outcomes. Mozambique is under the government of the same political party with the same centralised administrative system since 1975; this has influenced immensely how things were perceived, treated, planned and carried out especially after the “internalisation (domesticisation)” of ProSAVANA in 2013.²³² The concept of the “District Network of Collaborators” fit neatly into the socio-political and administrative structure of the country,²³³ and the sudden emergence of the concept of the “ProSAVANA Community Development Fund (*Fundo de Desenvolvimento Comunitário: FDC*)” in the “draft zero” of the ProSAVANA’s master plan draws serious concerns (p.7-8).²³⁴

Examining Compliance with Existing Laws, Principles and Guidelines

To conclude, the above analysis of the developments of the past four years obtained through the examination of the ProSAVANA’s primary documents, materials and information, will be put into the perspective of the sovereignty and rights of Mozambican peasants and people and of Japanese policies, especially ODA and JICA’s guidelines.

Although the Mozambican constitution was discussed in Chapter 2, the following articles should be revisited in order to examine compliance of the activities of ProSAVANA and the consequences revealed in this analysis. The Mozambican constitution proclaims that:

²³¹ On these points, Japanese scholars and NGOs have been sharing their insights and research outcomes basing on their field and literature survey with MoFA/JICA. The representatives of MoFA (the directors [the first and second] and assistant director of Country Assistance Planning Division III, International Cooperation Bureau), however, repeatedly refused to learn and admit the critical situation that the Mozambican people are facing with. According to them, “*according to the World Bank, the rating and ranking of Mozambique is not that bad.*” The following is the presentations used during the meetings.
http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/moz_update.pdf
http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/oda/2015301.pdf
http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/oda/2015112602.pdf
http://www.jacses.org/sdap/mof/gijiroku/mof61_question.pdf

²³² This point should be examined more deeply in the future by political and/or social scientists.

²³³ The following academic work may help understand this point. Bernhard Weimer (ed.) (2012) *Moçambique: Descentralizar O Centralismo*, IESE.

http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/publication/livros/Descent/IESE_Decimalizacao.pdf

²³⁴ <http://prosavana.gov.mz/> Japanese academics, experts and NGOs have analysed the master plan, and shared its comments with JICA/MoFA during the 12th and 13th dialogue (24 July and 27 October 2015) and shared this concern. Interestingly, the information on the fund is excluded from the Japanese translation of the master plan. http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/12kai_shiryo/ref11.pdf
http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/12kai_shiryo/ref12.pdf

1. (Article 2) “Sovereignty is vested in the people;”
2. (Article 3) Mozambique “is a State governed by the rule of law, based on pluralism of expression” and “on the respect for and guarantee of fundamental human rights and freedoms;”
3. (Article 4) “the fundamental objectives of the Republic shall be...the consolidation of national unity, the building of a society of social justice, the strengthening of democracy, freedom, social stability and social and individual harmony...the promotion of a society of pluralism, tolerance and a culture of peace;”
4. (Article 249) “the Public Administration shall respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens...act with respect for the principles of equality, of impartiality, of ethics and of justice.”²³⁵

All three countries (Mozambique, Brazil and Japan) ratify the “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” Related to ProSAVANA, Article 19 is the most important article. The article states:

1. *Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.*
2. *Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.*²³⁶

The analysis shared in this paper indicates that ProSAVANA may have violated the rights of Mozambican peasants and citizens. With regard to Japan’s international cooperation policy, it will be helpful to introduce the “Cabinet decision on the Development Cooperation Charter” proclaimed in 2015. In its “(2) Basic policies” and “B. Promoting human security,” the charter emphasises the following:

- *“Human Security—a concept that pursues the right of individuals to live happily and in dignity, free from fear and want, through their protection and empowerment—is the guiding principle that lies at the foundation of Japan's development cooperation.*
- *Japan will thus focus its development cooperation on individuals - especially those liable to be vulnerable... and provide cooperation for their protection and empowerment so as to realize human security.*
- *...Japan will make efforts so that this basic policy will be understood and accepted widely among its partner countries...Japan will also proactively contribute to promoting basic human rights, including women's rights.”*²³⁷

From what has been observed in this analysis, Japanese assistance has been violating

²³⁵ Official Portuguese version:

http://www.presidencia.gov.mz/files/republica/constituicao_republica_moc.pdf English translation: [http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Constitution_\(in_force_21_01_05\)\(English\)-Mozlegal.pdf](http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Constitution_(in_force_21_01_05)(English)-Mozlegal.pdf)

²³⁶ <http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx>

²³⁷ <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000067701.pdf>

its own principles as they appear in the ODA charter and in JICA's guidelines. Instead of "providing cooperation for protecting and empowering" the local peasants, citizens, peasant movements and civil society organisations, the Japanese public fund (ODA) has been used to create oppression, intimidation, fear, tension, division, conflict, mistrust, social instability, and the oppression and dis-empowerment of peasants. Moreover, opaque, undemocratic, unjust, discriminative, non-pluralist governance and management structure of the programme have been constructed. The principle of "Do No Harm" was once again neglected.

By law, the Mozambican people have sovereign power and the right to self-determination, a right that they won after ten years of the armed struggle for independence seeking "*liberation of people and land*". They proudly continue to live with this spirit, nevertheless, the three governments call them "*poor*," "*illiterate*," "*traditional/pre-modern*," and now "*hardliners*."²³⁸

These expressions are far from how the peasants of Nacala Corridor defined themselves in their first protest statement to ProSAVANA on 11 October 2012.²³⁹

– "*Peasants are the guardians of life, nature and the planet.*"

Their determination to contribute to the Mozambican society and its future as sovereign people and unified peasant movement have been neglected, undermined and damaged. That is:

– "*Fighting to give peasant farmers a greater role in building a fairer, more prosperous society, based on solidarity.*"

The first statement, which includes these two phrases, was written collectively by the peasants of Northern Mozambique even after the meeting room losing sunlight, in darkness.

– "*We, peasants of the Provincial Nucleus of Peasants in Nampula, the Provincial Nucleus of Peasants in Zambezia, the Provincial Peasants Union of Niassa and the Provincial Union of Peasants of Cabo Delgado, and who are all members of the National Peasants' Union (UNAC), met...in the town of Nampula with the aim of discussing and analysing ProSAVANA...*"

Looking back, the statement demonstrates what the peasants had foreseen almost four years ago what we have "discovered" through this analysis. That is:

– "*Ever since hearing about ProSAVANA, we have noticed a lack of information and transparency from the main stakeholders involved (the governments of*

²³⁸ "Poor farmers" is the favourite expression used by the representatives of MoFA, and "extensive/traditional/pre-modern/low productive" farming used to be used frequently by JICA staff. The Mozambican ministers have been emphasising the "illiterate" nature of peasants in order to argue that "someone else wrote their statements" (during and after TICAD V, May and June 2013).

²³⁹ <http://farmlandgrab.org/21211>

Mozambique, Brazil and Japan)...

- *...peasant farmers condemn the way in which ProSAVANA was created and the way it being implemented in Mozambique, which has been characterised by a lack of transparency and the exclusion of civil society organisations throughout the process, especially peasant organisations.*
- *Following a comprehensive analysis of ProSAVANA, we peasant farmers have concluded that:*
 - *ProSAVANA is the result of a top-down policy, which does not take into consideration the demands, dreams and basic concerns of peasants, particularly those within the Nacala Corridor.” (Pronunciamento, 11 October 2012)*

ProSAVANA keeps shifting its emphasis, but its core nature has not changed, and over the years has worsened to the point of severely damaging Mozambican people and society.

Epilogue

This analysis paper is the response of Japanese civil society to the questions that the Mozambican peasants of the ProSAVANA target area have been raising over the past three years. Everywhere we went in Northern Mozambique to attend peasant meetings, we heard the question over and over:

– *“Why can’t ProSAVANA respect peasants?”*

This simple question, however, includes many profound implications. It has been a learning process for us, but based on their remarks and statements, we came to understand that this question contains a number of deeper questions:

1. *Why did ProSAVANA ignore the existence of local peasants in first place?*
2. *Why has ProSAVANA hidden the truth and concealed information instead of making information available to gain understanding and acceptance?*
3. *Why didn’t ProSAVANA respond to the “Open Letter” for a year and to their request for “stop and reflect” but rather continued implementing projects?*
4. *Why didn’t ProSAVANA explain the implementation and outreach campaign instead of having them suddenly appear in local communities?;*
5. *Why does everyone from ProSAVANA dealing with communities appear to become arrogant and oppressive towards peasant leaders?*
6. *Why does ProSAVANA try to sow division among peasants and civil society?*
7. *How can ProSAVANA say that it supports local peasants while damaging and disempowering peasant movements?*
8. *Why can’t ProSAVANA respect peasants who are firmly committing to sustainable agriculture, who are “friends of nature,”²⁴⁰ and with whom sovereign power resides?*

These questions have also been ours. As the situation deteriorated, our search for information began. A series of dialogue meetings on ProSAVANA between Japanese NGOs and MoFA/JICA began in January 2013, which were supposed to function as a platform of information sharing and opinion-exchange. However, the amount and quality of information and documents that JICA shared with us was far too limited, ambiguous, and often times contradictory. As such, the programme remained opaque.

When the first leak occurred of FGV’s “Master Plan Report 2” prepared under ProSAVANA-PD in April 2013, we realised that what JICA/MoFA and their counterparts in Mozambique and Brazil were saying and what they are doing were very different. This is why we decided to exercise our rights as the people of Japan, and began using the Administrative Information Disclosure Law to request governmental

²⁴⁰ <http://farmlandgrab.org/21211>

documents on ProSAVANA. To date, we have collected more than 100 documents. We have been sharing these documents with the public and with civil society in the three countries in order to increase transparency of the programme, and we have also been examining and analysing them. The first analysis paper in English and Portuguese were released in January 2016 at the height of confusion caused by JICA's "Stakeholder Engagement Project."²⁴¹

As citizens of the donor country of this programme, it is painful to accompany this historical process and discover the facts behind the lies and manipulations. We believed and continue to believe that the truth may help not only the people who are currently struggling. It will also help those who are inside the system yet do not have a full picture of what has been happening, why things have been happening in certain ways, what they may have unwittingly committed to, and the future generation of the three countries. This is not merely an issue of "land grabbing," "international cooperation/assistance/solidarity," "agriculture development programme and models," but of the people's sovereignty and democratic governance.

Although we released the first analysis paper in English in January 2016 using some of the officially disclosed documents, we still had difficulty understanding the whole picture. When we gained access to the 46 leaked documents online,²⁴² especially of MAJOL's reports ("Stakeholder Engagement Project"), the picture finally became clear.

Without access to these documents, it was impossible to have a deep and grounded analysis. We would like to express our sincere admiration and appreciation to the persons who had the conscience, faith and courage to do the right thing, exposing unjust and unfair process and system of ProSAVANA.

We would like to also note that these actions should not be, in any means, attributed to some Mozambican civil society organisations and individuals who made decision of "engaging" with ProSAVANA for promoting the programme. As we have examined in the current paper and previously, the necessary information and documents to required to make informed decisions, as well as the real objectives of the project, were concealed, and everyone was fed false information. Such "*conflict among the Mozambican civil society*" propagated by MAJOL and ProSAVANA promoters would not have existed if there were these two projects, and of course, if ProSAVANA was not brought to Mozambique by Japan and Brazil in 2009. The real victim of these manoeuvres is, thus, Mozambican people and society.

Rather painfully, the whole process indicates the problems with Japan's democracy and transparent/democratic governance determined also in its constitution and other laws and also the weakness of Japanese civil society. It was a learning and developing process for us all in Japan who committed ourselves to this struggle, to learn about and reaffirm our own sovereign power.

²⁴¹ <http://farmlandgrab.org/25696>

²⁴² <http://farmlandgrab.org/26158>

We would like to end this lengthy analysis with the following sentence that President Mafigo of UNAC always said with a timid smile:

A Luta Continua.