Post-Fukushima Anatomy of Studies on ProSAVANA: Focusing on Natalia Fingermann’s “Myths behind ProSAVANA” (English version)

Sayaka Funada-Classen

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- Reflectir e promover a troca de opiniões sobre temas da actualidade moçambicana e assuntos internacionais.

- Dar a conhecer à sociedade os resultados dos debates, de pesquisas e reflexões sobre temas relevantes do sector agrário e do meio rural.

O OBSERVADOR RURAL é um espaço de publicação destinado principalmente aos investigadores e técnicos que pesquisam, trabalham ou que tenham algum interesse pela área objecto do OMR. Podem ainda propor trabalhos para publicação outros cidadãos nacionais ou estrangeiros.

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Os textos publicados no OBSERVADOR RURAL estão em forma de *draft*. Os autores agradecem contribuições para aprofundamento e correcções, para a melhoria do documento final,
NOTE FROM THE OMR

This text is part of a debate about ProSAVANA and deals mainly with the article “The myths behind the ProSavana” (“Os mitos por trás do ProSavana”) written by Natalia Fingermann, published by the Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE), series IDeIAS, Nº 49, on 29 May 2013. The reader can access this article in http://www.iese.ac.mz (IESE’s webpage).

The text we now publish in the Observador Nº 12 do OMR is more than just a debate between the two authors. Based on a detailed analysis of the ProSavana documents and on field research, Sayaka Funada-Classen deals with several areas, such as:

- The evolution of the philosophy and speeches about the ProSavana.
- The positions of the three involved parties (the governments of Mozambique, Brazil and Japan).
- The possible incoherence and incompatibilities for implementing fundamental aspects of underlying the ProSavana.
- The aspects to take care and alerts for precaution that should be considered when implementing the project.

Sayaka Funada-Classen analyses also the possible relations of the ProSavana and other mega-projects being implemented in the area of the Nacala corridor.

Due to the importance of the theme, the OMR publishes this text as a contribution to the important debate about the ProSavana. Although the project is at the final stages of preparation, the author calls for the principle of "precaution approach" that enables to foresee future damages, considering also similar case-studies (comparative method).
Post-Fukushima Anatomy of Studies on ProSAVANA: 
Focusing on Natalia Fingermann’s “Myths behind ProSAVANA

Sayaka Funada Classen¹

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This is a complete and revised version of the article entitled “Fukushima, ProSAVANA and Ruth First: Examining Natalia Fingermann’s “Myths behind ProSAVANA” published from 国際論叢第 2巻第2号(2013).

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Introduction

When I read Natalia N. Fingermann’s article entitled “Os mitos por trás do ProSAVANA” on the IDEIAS Boletim (published on May 29, 2013), the first thing that came to my mind was neither Mozambique, nor the triangular agricultural cooperation called ProSAVANA. I thought instead of the nuclear accident that occurred at TEPCO’s reactor in Fukushima, in my home country of Japan, on March 11, 2011, which led many Japanese researchers to halt and seriously re-consider their role, objectives, responsibility and approach to research. I also thought about the lessons from the life and work of Ruth First, who fought for the liberation of Africa and Africans, and was killed in Maputo by a bomb sent to her at CEA (Centro de Estudos Africanos) in 1982 by the South African apartheid regime.

1. Framework of this paper
1-1. Lessons from Fukushima: Whose interests? Why are we debating now, and not later?

In Japan, following the devastating disaster at Fukushima, the role, objectives, responsibility and approaches of academia and researchers were suddenly called into question, and active revision and reconsideration has since been carried out in many academic circles. Before the accident, there had certainly been many independent-minded researchers, who sought to serve the interests of the Japanese people through their research and writings, but unfortunately, much of their works had been neglected in the dominant academic sphere, and such researchers were often excluded from receiving grants or promotion. The fact is that up until the nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japanese academia, for the most part, was far from independent from state power or corporate interests. This academic culture, highly influenced by power, privatisation and self-interest, played a role in producing in Japan, one of the most advanced countries in the field of science and technology, the worst nuclear accident in human history (NAICC, 2012).3

Until March 11, 2011, the majority of nuclear experts in Japan were receiving research funding from the nuclear industry and/or state agencies tightly controlled by politicians and bureaucrats with close ties to the industry. These experts, supported by industry and government, played a significant role in spreading propaganda about the “total safety” and “cleanness” of nuclear power. Two and half years have now passed since the accident, but still no one (including the experts who installed the Fukushima facility and promised its safety) has been able to figure out how to solve the on-going human and ecological crisis resulting from the disaster. Nuclear fuel rods have not been able to be removed from the accident site, and thus leakage of nuclear contamination continues; almost 200,000 people who were forced to flee their homes and communities at the time of the accident remain refugees and still do not know when and if they can ever return; at least twenty-five children have already been reported to have or are suspected to have typhoid cancer; and many families from Fukushima and the surrounding area continue to live in fear. As a result of the accident, the homes, dreams, health and livelihood of thousands of men, women and children were suddenly taken from them.

2 The official name of the ProSAVANA programme is: “Triangular Cooperation for Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savannah in Mozambique”. However, in the first MoM signed in September 2009, the name appears as “Triangular Cooperation Programme for Agricultural Development of the African Tropical Savannah among Japan, Brazil and Mozambique” and “Triangular Cooperation Programme for Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savannah in Africa” (MoM, Sept. 2009). The latter two names appearing in the MoM reveal the original idea behind the programme – Mozambique being “a case” of ambitious Japanese-Brazilian cooperation to develop the African tropical Savannah.


4 Regrettably, it has been observed that the above tendency is returning to the Japanese society.
Another important lesson that us Japanese researchers learned from Fukushima was the necessity and value of applying the “precautionary principle” – an approach developed in the field of environmental studies and adopted as one of the 27 principles of the “Rio Declaration on Environment and Development” at the UNCED (“Rio” Summit) in 1992. The principle offers us another way to address problems in society. However, until then the precautionary principle was neglected by most of us either because we were not comfortable with the idea of “anticipating” and “preventing” problems or because were we not willing to place the burden of proving the safety of a given technology onto Japanese companies that we worked for. Before the accident, most researchers had been willing and comfortable to focus solely on examining the “aftermath of events”, because in doing so, it is much easier to conduct research and defend one’s arguments. But once a technological failure of this kind and scale occurs it is too late to prevent the resulting damage. We finally see the importance of the “precautionary principle” after the deeply and painful lesson of Fukushima.

Today, researchers in Japan cannot avoid facing critical questions from Japanese society and their colleagues regarding whose interests they serve in their research and writings, how independent they are from state power and/or corporate interests, and what it means to be a responsible researcher.

This came to mind after reading Fingermann’s article since she called for civil society and academics to act “in a responsible manner”, to make critiques “with real bases”, and to open channels for “productive communication” for the “future” (Fingermann, 2013:2). I totally agree with her, and this is what I learned from CEA and Ruth First. This is also why I have been researching and discussing issues related to ProSAVANA, now, and not later. Many of the official actors involved with the promotion and development of ProSAVANA treat it as if it were just a matter of any other “programme”, “policy”, “assistance model”, or “experiment”. Yet, the programme has very real implications for the lives and future of over 4 million rural men and women and children, living in 19 districts in 3 provinces of Northern Mozambique (Report No.2, 2013; JICA6, 20137). The region identified for the implementation of ProSAVANA is the most populous in the country, and the majority of the region’s inhabitants depend solely on their agricultural production for their livelihoods. Family agriculture is a way of life for the people and communities of Northern Mozambique, and ProSAVANA was designed so as to have a significant impact on the day-to-day life and future of the region’s people. If things go awry, it could result in the destruction of communities and lives.

The social costs all too often associated with large-scale development projects can already be observed in Moatize District of Tete Province, for example, where the local people have been forced to live in misery due to large-scale land acquisition and exploitation by the Brazilian mining giant,

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5 A particularly important principle to note in this context is Principle 15, which states that: “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”. Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992), Annex I.

6 JICA-Japan International Cooperation Agency. A detailed explanation of this agency and its background as an agency to support Japanese overseas migration (to Latin America) is written in Funada-Classen, 2013a; 2013b.

7 JICA's explanation and handouts during the 1st NGO-MoFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) meeting on ProSAVANA held in Tokyo on Jan. 25, 2013. The summary of the minutes and handouts are at the following MoFA's site.
Vale (Human Rights Watch, 20138). The local government has neither protected the people whose lives have been adversely affected by the mining operations of Vale nor has it defended their rights; on the contrary, many of those who have stood up in an attempt to defend their rights and the rights of those in their communities have been detained and threatened by local police (Justiça Ambiental & Friends of the Earth Mozambique, 2013; ADECRU, 20139).

Considering the scale and possible impact of ProSAVANA, not only for Northern Mozambique but for the entire country, many questions inevitably arise. For example: “To what extent has the programme been produced by the people and society of Mozambique?”; “Was sufficient research and debate conducted within Mozambican society prior to the signing of this mega-programme brought forward by Japan and Brazil?”; “In what ways have Mozambican researchers contributed to the formulation and design of this programme?”; and “When it is discussed, who carries out these discussion and in whose interests, based on whose reality?”

Up until just recently (early-mid 2013), Mozambican scholars have remained virtually absent from the majority of academic discussions regarding ProSAVANA. The programme clearly did not emerge from nor was it accompanied by the discussions or aspirations of Mozambican society. ProSAVANA came from the outside10. This fact can also be observed when considering that the “Agriculture Development Master Plan in the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique”, and its support project, called ProSAVANA-PD (JICA, 2011; ProSAVANA-PD, Report No.1; No.2, 2013), which were written up only by Japanese and Brazilian consulting companies (Oriental Consultants, among others, for Japan and Fundação de Getúlio Vargas [FGV] for Brazil). The leaked reports written by these foreign consulting companies demonstrate their level of understanding of the local context and reality of Northern Mozambique (and, ultimately, their level of willingness to understand)11.

However, in Mozambique, there are presently many researchers, institutes and local universities that are ready to conduct such research and that are prepared to engage in discussions and to make suggestions based on local realities and the Mozambican context. After all, unlike foreign contracted consultants or aid/diplomatic agents who leave the scene when their terms end, Mozambican academics and institutions cannot escape the results and long term impacts that will be brought about by ProSAVANA. Why has Japanese and Brazilian taxpayers’ money gone towards primarily supporting only IIAM (Instituto de Investigação Agrária de Moçambique – Mozambique’s Institute of Agricultural Research), rather than being used to contribute to the sustainable development of wide range of local institutions? As ProSAVANA is not only about agriculture, but also about the rights and lives of the Mozambican people and the future of their livelihoods, social practices and ways of life (the author’s interviews, September 2012; February 2013). These same tendencies can also be observed among much of the personnel from JICA who work in the country, as well as among the majority of officials working at the Japanese embassy to Mozambique – these personnel also generally rotate every 3-4 years.

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8 Human Rights Watch (2013) “What is a House without Food?: Mozambique’s Coal Mining Boom and Resettlements” (http://www.hrw.org/node/115535)
This account was broadcasted by the following national and international media: AIM (April 18, 2013) “Manifestantes paralisam minas de carvão de Moatize” http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/pls/notimz2/getxml/pt/contentx/1642179 BBC, “Mozambique protesters at Brazil-owned Vale coal mine” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world/africa-22191680
10 For detailed discussions on this can be found on Funada-Classen (2013a; 2013b) and Nogueira and Ollinaho (2013).
11 In fact, most of the Japanese consultants involved with ProSAVANA and/or the Nacala Corridor Project do not understand Portuguese and have not spent enough time in Mozambique to really understand the local context (consultants often work with several projects scattered around not only in Africa but in the world simultaneously and are constantly travelling). Most have never spent a single night in a rural community in order to actually learn about the people’s livelihoods, social practices and ways of life (the author’s interviews, September 2012; February 2013). These same tendencies can also be observed among much of the personnel from JICA who work in the country, as well as among the majority of officials working at the Japanese embassy to Mozambique – these personnel also generally rotate every 3-4 years.
society, supporting just IIAM is not at all sufficient. Why has such an important issue been kept out of the hands of the local society and local institutions and researchers, and been largely discussed among those who do not belong to Mozambican society? It is not too late to review the existing framework of “technical cooperation”. Mozambican researchers do not need to wait for the official ProSAVANA actors to open their doors or send them an invitation letter. It is time for Mozambican scholars to participate more actively in the discussions, because ProSAVANA is about their people, society and future, and not that of Brazilians or Japanese.

1-2. How should this issue be approached academically?

How, then, should one conduct independent research on ProSAVANA in the interests of the people who are, ultimately, those who will be most affected by changes brought about by the programme? The “precautionary principle” is one of the key approaches in this regard, especially since ProSAVANA actors officially hold that implementation of the programme “has not begun” and “still changes could be made” (JICA, during the 3rd and 4th NGO-MoFA meetings held in April and May 2013 in Tokyo).

Many researchers tend to misunderstand what the “precautionary principle” is. Some go even further to criticise the approach as if it were simply a means of drawing conclusions without first having conducted adequate research. In fact, there are several academically sound methods that can be applied using the precautionary principle approach. Here I suggest four methods: (1) historical and critical examination of primary sources (documents, articles, minutes of meetings, and interviews); (2) participant observation; (3) field research; and (4) comparative studies. The combination of all four of these methods is ideal, but the combination of at least two of them is a “must” when conducting responsible research. However, there are also challenges involved with the use of each of these methods. I shall now explain the advantages and challenges associated with the use of each method in the context of researching ProSAVANA.

1-2-1. Historical and critical examinations of primary sources for ProSAVANA (a) Lack of publicly available sources and language barriers

To begin with, historical and critical examination of primary sources is the most important and undeniably essential method necessary to conduct independent research on ProSAVANA. This is especially true because four years have now passed since the signing of the MoU and MoM of ProSAVANA, and a significant volume of primary sources have accumulated (although many of these have not been made publically available). One of the serious obstacles to conducting a historical and critical examination of primary sources, however, is language barriers.

ProSAVANA was established as a triangular cooperation among Japan, Brazil and Mozambique. In order to accompany the process of the programme’s planning and development and analyse all the materials which enable one to be able to fully discuss ProSAVANA, it is thus indispensable to be able to read not only Portuguese and English, but also Japanese. If one is writing a scholarly paper

12 I once tried to bring some Mozambican institutions to work with Japanese consultants, but this attempt was never materialised. Not only does JICA’s cooperation scheme not allow this (JICA’s Technical Operation Instruction [TOI] is written mostly in Japanese, and participation of non-Japanese institutions in JICA’s bid for contract in the area of consultancy directly working with projects and programmes is not possible), it was also apparent that JICA consultants did not know how to respect and trust local capacity (The author’s interview with these institutions via e-mail, November 2012).

13 The importance of (4) comparative studies will be discussed in the end of this paper.
on the formulation of ProSAVANA and its objectives (official and unofficial), for example, he or she needs to be able to discuss the context and involvement of each of the three countries and that of their respective agencies and institutions which participate in the programme’s planning. The discussions and documents emerging from the Japanese context, and often written only in Japanese, are especially important since Japan is the main initiator and locomotive of the programme (Funada-Classen, 2013a; Nogueira & Ollinaho, 2013). Certainly, those who do not understand all three languages can still conduct research on ProSAVANA, but the linguistic limitations faced by these researchers should be more openly recognised.

(b) Over-dependence on official interviews and the arbitrary changing of history

Regrettably, it seems that many of those who are currently writing about ProSAVANA tend to depend heavily on interviews with the official ProSAVANA actors and representatives, perhaps in part due to language barriers and to the lack of publicly available primary sources. The research conducted by development consultants often shows the same tendency. It goes without saying that any interviews with official ProSAVANA actors and others who have direct interests in the programme and its implementation, especially while the matter of discussion is still on-going, cannot be used as “proof” of any academic conclusions.

The way in which many programme officials use the current point of inquiry to talk about the past when discussing is also highly problematic, especially since the “re-writing of history” is already apparent among many official ProSAVANA actors. Generally speaking, arbitrary changes of historical facts and records occur by the following means: (a) issuing new official statements; (b) hiding or misplacing old records; (c) creating new records in order to erase the effects of older ones, particularly when it is impossible to eliminate old records; (d) shifting discourses by creating new discourses; (e) offering broad or vague “official interpretations” in response to criticism for media and parliament; and (f) using media to create social and political supports. All these aspects, (a) to (f), are apparent in the official discussions regarding ProSAVANA. The readers of this paper will have the opportunity to observe some of these techniques, as they have been employed by the Japanese bureaucracy, including JICA.

In order to be able to critically analyse ProSAVANA, the results of interviews have to be carefully examined within the unique context of each particular interview, and interview statements need to be thoroughly cross-examined using other primary or secondary sources. Relations of power also need to be considered and addressed. Depending only on interviews with official figures and those with direct involvement and interests in the programme is no more than writing “Officials said A, thus A is the fact”, thereby re-enforcing the official discourse and existing power-relations, and thus contributing to the abuse of power.

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14 A consultation that this author had with JICA in the initial planning phase of the ProSAVANA programme, interviews conducted with JICA staff who worked on ProSAVANA since its beginning, and interviews with other Japanese and Mozambican diplomatic personnel all seem to confirm this. The central role played by Japan and JICA, however, becomes only even more overwhelmingly evident when one does archival research. In fact, most of the publicly available documents on the programme are from JICA. While most of the initial coverage on ProSAVANA comes from Japan, after 2011 a significant portion comes from Brazil, and only recently (late 2012) from Mozambique. The order in which the each letter appears in the acronym “JBM”, included in name of the programme (ProSAVANA-JBM) is also demonstrative of the respective roles played each of the countries and the differential power relations that exist among them; “J”, or Japan, is listed first. One Mozambican civil society member confirmed this point by sharing the following observation: “at any stakeholder meetings in Maputo, the Japanese actors always enter the venue first, then the Brazilians. Representatives of our government always enter last” (the author’s interview, August 2013).

15 JICA should not be considered an independent, non-governmental organisation. It was established as a governmental organisation under the auspices of MoFA, and the majority of its budget still comes from public funds and taxes. Even in its day-to-day activities JICA is not independent from MoFA and its operation is very bureaucratic despite long-lasting efforts by the certain JICA staff (the author’s interviews with JICA staff, 2002-to-present).
1-2-2. Advantages of participant observation for researching ProSAVANA

The use of (2) – “participant observation” – offers several advantages for researching ProSAVANA. Through participant observation, a researcher is able to listen to, and ultimately, better understand the concerns and lived realities of a variety of groups of people as they are experienced on a daily basis. Its use enables a researcher to produce abundant (unofficial or public) primary source information and to then cross-check information collected through (1) – a historical and critical examination of primary sources – with the realities observed and experienced in the field. Participant observation also provides ample opportunity to actively discuss the outcome of one’s research with different interest groups, including official representatives, in order to verify the accuracy and relevancy of research findings.

Although “participant observation” was originally developed as a method for anthropological research, its usefulness and value as a research method, particularly when examining on-going issues, has been widely recognised in several other areas of study in the social sciences. In Japan, for example, participant observation has often been used to conduct medical, social, historical and policy research and analysis. A case in point is the use of this method to examine the first major case of industrial pollution in Minamata, caused by leaking wastewater containing methylmercury from a chemical factory owned by Chisso Corporation (currently Japan New Chisso). The pollution caused by the company’s toxic wastewater continued from 1932 to 1968. This pollution resulted in the emergence of a new disease now known as Minamata – a neurological syndrome which in extreme cases can cause paralysis, coma and death.

Despite the severity and prevalence of the disease in the area and its clear connection to the company’s industrial pollution, however, for decades neither the company nor the government would recognise this disease or its cause. The use of participant observation effectively allowed for the limitations of other more orthodox methodologies – which typically depended on official data, sources and medical research and were formulated based on already known diseases – to be overcome. Such prior studies based on more orthodox methods often simply traced and strengthened the official discourse resulting in the production of little actual new information about the phenomenon, and could not ultimately prevent further contamination and damage. Thus, some determined doctors and researchers decided to live in Minamata near to patients who showed symptoms of Minamata. These doctors, researchers and other medical professionals actively engaged with the patients and the local population collecting empirical data that ultimately contributed to fundamental changes that took place within the company responsible for the contamination, as well as changes made to related policy and research methods in the medical sciences. Their actions also empowered local patients enabling them to transform themselves into experts on Minamata and industrial pollution accidents. In Japan, newly established research approaches such as this are currently referred to as Minamatagaku (Minamata Studies), now highly recognised around the world.

Regrettably, this notable social and scientific achievement appeared to have been long forgotten by most of us Japanese researchers, until the nuclear accident at Fukushima that is. After Fukushima the value of research based on participant observation and the need to frequently cross over between the different structural and methodological frameworks comprising civic and academic activities have been re-discovered by Japanese academics and academia in general.

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16 The Open Research Center for Minamata Studies, Kumamoto Gakuen University explains Minamatagaku as “a new study that crosses over the frameworks of ‘amateur’ and ‘professional’, that transcends the border of academic disciplines”. [http://www3.kumagaku.ac.jp/minamata/english](http://www3.kumagaku.ac.jp/minamata/english)
Historically, in anthropology the “invisibleness” of a researcher was recommended. It is now considered extremely important, however, that researchers in the social sciences (including in the field of anthropology), clarify their “position” in relation to their object of research (i.e. whose interests do they serve?) and include their own identity in their analyses and research discussions. Perhaps the greatest challenge presented by a participant observation approach depends on whether a researcher is able to review all of the obtained sources of information produced through the application of this method, and portray that information fairly, critically and concisely. It is thus important for a researcher not to consider him or herself as being an “invisible observer”, but rather a “visible actor and observer” in the research process. In doing so, one will be able to receive critical review and assessment of his or her works more actively from wider range of parties beyond closed academia.

1-2-3. Challenges in conducting field research for ProSAVANA

Field research, (3), is another important method, but is also not without its own set of particular challenges. Quick and one-time only field research carried out by those who do not understand the local context and who lack experience conducting research on the areas under discussions tends to produce predetermined outcomes based on what kind of research questions are asked, the local guide and interpreters used, as well as with whom and under what conditions one conducts his or her research. Target group interviews organised or facilitated by people in positions of power (such as government officials and representatives or village chiefs, local political party secretaries and traditional chiefs) do not tend to reflect reality, particularly when the issue is the subject of on-going discussion.

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<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>470</td>
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</table>

Table showing district meeting schedule and number of participants (ProSAVANA-PD, Report No.2, 2013:5-9).

17 In the rural context of Northern Mozambique local leaders in positions of power and authority include: “chefes de bairros (village chiefs)” who are elected by village members, “secretários (FRELIMO’s party secretaries)”, a “réguio (paramount chief) and chefes tradicionais (traditional chiefs of lineage or clan chiefs under a régulo)”. For a detailed analysis on this see Funada-Classen (2012). Now, members of “conselhos (consultative council)” are included as “local leaders”. FRELIMO, or Frente de Libertação Nacional de Moçambique, has been in the position of government since the Mozambique’s independence, 1975.
Much of the “research” done by the consultants working on the ProSAVANA programme involved asking local “leaders” and members of rural communities questions such as: “What do you expect from ProSAVANA?”; “Do you want investment in the agricultural sector, or not?”; “Do you want investors to come, or not?”; or “What kind of items/development do you want”? These kinds of pointed questions often elicit obvious (and perhaps desired) answers. Asking rural populations about their “needs” (or shortages) has the same effect. In a conversation with the author, Shinjiro Amameishi, a JICA staffer from its Rural Development Division, responsible for ProSAVANA, explained JICA’s research as follows:

“We asked the Mozambican government to visit every district of the ProSAVANA target area to spread ‘correct information’ about ‘what good ProSAVANA can bring to them’. It is some sort of a ‘rolling action’. We are also conducting field research asking the locals ‘what they want’. So far, most of them say that they are welcoming investments and investors. They are also welcoming ProSAVANA. These efforts show our eagerness of ‘listening to the locals’ and our ‘genuine’ efforts (Shinjiro Amameishi, Feb. 26, 2013)”18.

The “outcome” of District Meetings is shown in ProSAVANA-PD’s Report No.2, yet as one can see from the above table, the main elements prioritised by the “study team” regarding these meetings are place, date and number of participants. Any specific and more detailed information regarding the meetings (i.e. meeting minutes and actual “outcomes”) has been tidily omitted from the report. Ironically, such “meetings” have been used as an alibi for many ProSAVANA promoters, providing justification for them to say that small farmers have not been excluded from participating in the development and planning of the programme. Yet, according to the author’s interview with some of those who participated in the “Farmers Meetings” held in a few of the districts of Niassa Province (shown in the above table), the “farmers” who attended the meetings had been chosen by district authorities, and were predominantly farmers affiliated with the leading political party (the author’s interview, July-August 2013). As the above contradiction serves to highlight how “field research” conducted through interviews and meetings can often be used as a political instrument and feed into a particular predetermined set of results. According to the same JICA personnel cited above, the “outcomes of field research” conducted in “the entire target area” are supposed to be attached to the final version of the Master Plan.

The framework, methodology and specific questions for field research should be carefully prepared, and the limitations of both the researcher and the research itself should be clearly stated and taken into consideration when drawing conclusions. Otherwise researchers should not use the “outcomes/results” of field research as if they are simply undeniable “proofs”.

2. Analysing the three arguments in Fingermann’s “The myths behind ProSAVANA”

Based on the above discussion, I would now like to analyse the Fingermann’s article “The myths behind ProSAVANA (Os mitos por trás do ProSAVANA)”. Her short, two-page long article warrants a particularly close examination and analysis particularly because the article is now being used by the Ministry of Planning and Development of Mozambique (MPD), among other ProSAVANA promoters and supporters, as a “proof” that the criticism of ProSAVANA by academics and civil society organisations is “not real”19. A recent news story found on the MPD’s

18 When asked about the possibility that Japanese aid could result in interference with respect to the results of the local municipality elections planned for 2013, considering the historical background and political realities of Northern Mozambique — a region that FRELIMO, the leading political party, has had difficulties of gaining political control over — JICA’s Amameishi replied that “aid has nothing to do with politics”.

19 See the Ministry of Planning and Development (Ministério de Planeficação e Desenvolvimento) website: http://www.mpd.gov.mz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=211%3Aprosavana-nao-pretende-usurpar-terr
The sources that I have used for this analysis have been obtained by the above methods (1), (2), (3) and (4). A shorter version of this analysis on Fingermann’s article has already been published by the author (Funada-Classen, 2013c; 2013d). In the present paper, the latest findings from interviews (1), participant observation (2) and field research (3) conducted from July to August 2013 have been included in the analysis. Also, in order to facilitate future studies and discussions, the author will share primary sources that are difficult to obtain or understand for non-Japanese and/or non-participant-observers as much as possible.

After reviewing previous literature on ProSAVANA, one by one, the author shall examine the three “myths” presented by Fingermann in her article, and the reasoning used by that author to determine each “myth” as such. According to Fingermann the three myths are: (1) ProSAVANA is a “replica” of PRODECER; (2) ProSAVANA will grab land from small farmers; and (3) There are conflicts between agribusiness and Mozambican small farmers. At the end of this article, the author will return to the questions related to the role of researchers in the Post-Fukushima era.

2-1. Reviewing Pre-Fingermann and Post-Fingermann Literature

In the beginning of her article Fingermann writes: “it has been called to my attention” that the ProSAVANA programme has become an “object of criticism from different civil society organisations, with a series of published articles in the academic field”. Although she mentions “a series of published articles in the academic field” on ProSAVANA, the only academic work actually mentioned by Fingermann in her article was one entitled “Land Grabbing, Agribusiness and the Peasantry in Brazil and Mozambique” by Clements & Fernandes, 2012. The rest of the references used in her article were either statements released by civil society organisations or personal interviews with official ProSAVANA actors. What about the other academic articles that have been written about ProSAVANA? Why did Fingermann not also include them in her article? What exactly do they say?

Using “google scholar”, I typed “ProSAVANA” into the search engine. To my disappointment, the top-listed search result was my own work in English "Analysis of the Discourse and Background of the ProSAVANA Programme in Mozambique: focusing on Japan’s role"(with the Portuguese version – “Análise do Discurso e dos Antecedentes do Programa ProSAVANA em Moçambique: enfoque no papel do Japão” – in the 4th position) as of June 26, 2013. Before Fingermann’s publication, it seems that the only academic publication on ProSAVANA other than

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20 It is interesting to note that the ministry used the name of a Mozambican research institute, IESE (Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económico) in its news story heading, as if the article was an official declaration of that institute. Although the article was actually written by Fingermann (and Fingermann alone) the ministry also misused the word “researchers” in order to emphasise the “findings” of the article. The ministry does not mention anywhere on its site that Fingermann is a Brazilian researcher who studied at FGV, the very same Brazilian institution that is the sole contracted consultant for ProSAVANA from the Brazilian side. As one can observe from IESE’s subsequent publication of a critique of Fingermann’s article written by the author (Funada-Classen, 2013c), it is obvious that Fingermann’s article does not represent the IESE’s position on ProSAVANA. This offers another interesting case for those who study the role of responsible research and influence of researchers with power. This issue will be dealt in detail at the end of this article.

21 Confidential source.
mines is the work of Clements & Fernandes (2012; 2013). Researchers at Future Agricultures Consortium also produced two works on the Brazilian involvement in Mozambique which each allocate sections discussing ProSAVANA in some detail (Cabral & Shankland, 2013; Chivava et al., 2013). The remaining published documents and works to be found related to ProSAVANA are primarily journalistic works; articles written by JICA staff involved with PRODECER (Japan-Brazil Agricultural Development Cooperation in the Cerrado, 1979-1999 22) and ProSAVANA (e.g. Hosono, 201323); or otherwise reports produced by individuals, institutes or companies associated with the ProSAVANA programme and its official actors, such as FGV, a private Brazilian institution and ProSAVANA-PD’s sole contracted consultant from the Brazilian side (Ferreira, 201224, Fingermann, 2013).

Much like the work of Clements & Fernandes (2012), my own works discuss PRODECER and ProSAVANA, and draw similar conclusions, but mainly using the Japanese primary sources. The articles written by the researchers of Future Agricultures Consortium also touch on some of the issues that Fingermann deals with in her article, and their conclusions do not align with the conclusions Fingerman draws. Yet, she does not refer to these works at all when she calls the work of Clements & Fernandes (2012) a “myth”.

Since Fingermann’s article, several other articles on ProSAVANA have been published, namely that of Ferrando (2013), Funada-Classen (2013c: 2013d), Nogueira & Ollinaho (2013), and Schlesinger (2013). The approach of each work is different, but all arrive at similar conclusions with that of Clements & Fernandes (2012). A report written by Jaiantilal (2013) with interview data included, has also recently been published. Among the mentioned works, that of Nogueira & Ollinaho (2013) merits particular attention. Based on analysis of official documents, 41 semi-structured interviews with informants from the participating three countries (Japan, Brazil and Mozambique), and multi-sited ethnographical research in the districts making up the Nacala Corridor, the article:

“(…) examines Brazilian cooperation practices in the agricultural sector in Mozambique against a backdrop of its discourse. It empirically investigates Brazilian role in the framework of ProSAVANA, an ambitious trilateral agricultural program in Northern Mozambique. The authors identify some sound ruptures between discourse and practice, and argue that Brazilian practices, instead of distinguishing themselves from traditional actors, are rather a precise manifestation of the recent development cooperation trend associated with the mainstream response to land grabbing claims” (Nogueira & Ollinaho, 2013: 1).

In the present article, these works will also be used to examine the arguments of Fingermann.

22 As part of PRODECER, “colonisation projects (projetos de colonização)” and 10 pilot projects were implemented. The joint Brazilian-Japanese programme also facilitated the acquisition of land for 758 families on an area of the Cerrado totaling 334,000 ha according to CAMPO (Company of Promotion Agriculture), a private company created by Japan and Brazil in order to implement the programme. http://www.campo.com.br/proceder/ The numbers provided by CAMPO regarding the number of families and land area acquired differs slightly from those provided by JICA.


2-2. Examining “Myth 1- ProSAVANA is a replica of PRODECER”

2-2-1. Whose “myth” is it? Who associated PRODECER with ProSAVANA?

(a) The origins of the idea that “ProSAVANA is a replica of PRODECER”?

It is interesting to note that Fingermann did not mention where the idea that ProSAVANA is “a replica” of PRODECER originally came from. The expression “replica” was officially used for the first time by José Pacheco, a Mozambican Agriculture Minister, during an interview that he gave on national media, right after a meeting with the JICA delegation coming from Tokyo and Brasilia in late December, 2012:

“Pacheco added that Pro-Savana [sic.] is a replica of a development project that occurred 30 years ago in Brazil, in a region with characteristics similar to those of the Nacala Corridor” (AIM English article, Dec. 26, 2013).

In the original text in Portuguese Pacheco’s intention is even clearer. Adding to the above remark, he affirmed that:

“We [the Mozambican government] shall look into every possibility to make this replica in Mozambique” (AIM’s original article in Portuguese, Dec. 25, 2013)\(^{25}\).

It is important to consider the background of this particular meeting and interview, especially since they both took place in the context of rising domestic criticism of ProSAVANA in Japan. Public discussions related to ProSAVANA began in the country after a statement on the programme was released by UNAC (National Peasants Union – União Nacional de Camponeses), Mozambique’s largest and most important farmers’ association, on October 11, 2012. In response to UNAC’s statement, several Japanese scholars and civil society organisations with long histories of experience working on ODA (Official Development Assistance), rural development, and land issues in Mozambique and/or Africa came together to establish a loose coordination body to monitor Japanese involvement in the ProSAVANA programme\(^{26}\).

The public dialogue between the Japanese NGOs and JICA formally began in November 2012. The following month, discussions with MoFA were also initiated. MoFA and JICA only finally became fully aware of the concerns and criticisms being directed at the ProSAVANA programme when some of these issues and concerns were brought to one of the regular meetings of the ODA Policy Council\(^{27}\) attended by the Vice Minister of MoFA on December 14, 2012. During this official meeting, the following three points were discussed in some detail: (a) the possibility of land grabbing; (b) problems related to the nature of the programme, especially the its heavy focus on PRODECER; and (c) negligence of local farmers’ rights and the lack of participation of farmers

\(^{25}\) AIM’s article in Portuguese describes: “Na ocasião, Pacheco disse que o Pro-Savana é uma réplica de uma cooperação bilateral que há 30 anos ocorreu no Brasil, numa região que com características idênticas às do Corredor de Nacala. ‘Olhamos todos com bons olhos a possibilidade de fazer essa réplica em Moçambique’, afirmou o Ministro” (AIM, Dec. 25, 2012).

\(^{26}\) All of these Japanese scholars (including the author) belong to more than one NGO and the majority teaches at Japanese universities and belongs to academic associations. This cooperation demonstrates the changing nature of Japanese civil society and academia, previously discussed in the first section of this paper.

\(^{27}\) The council was set up jointly by Japanese NGOs and MoFA in 2002, after a series of scandals and problems related to ODA came to the fore in 2000. One of these problems was related to the Japanese government’s donation of pesticides to Mozambique during 1980s and 90s while Mozambique was still under war.
associations and civil society organisations in the process. The first point, regarding the possibility of land-grabbing, was particularly highlighted during the discussion.

Immediately following this ODA policy council meeting in Tokyo, JICA’s mission to Maputo was dispatched. Subsequent meetings in Mozambique between JICA and Mozambican officials led to the following statement given by Minister Pacheco: “no farmers will lose their land as part of the Pro-Savana project in Nampula”. This statement was presented as an official comment by the national news agency, AIM.

This promise by the Mozambican minister that “no farmers will lose their land” was warmly welcomed by his counterparts in Tokyo. The same article published by AIM (only the English version) was presented by the MoFA representative, Yuka Shibamura, in the planned absence of her senior, during the visit of the president of UNAC, Augusto Mafigo, to the ministry in Tokyo on February 26, 2013. Shibamura read out the following official government statement which had been given to her by her senior:

“The Japanese government totally supports the contents of the Minister Pacheco’s statement in this [AIM] article. (...) Since [the Mozambican] minister is promising there will be no land-grabbing. (...) Only a minimal level of relocation will happen. But no worries, since the residents will be compensated”.

What was left out from the official statement presented by Shibamura, however, is the part of the very same AIM article where Minister Pacheco had referred to ProSAVANA as being a replica of PRODECER. He used the word “replica” twice in his statement. When asked about why this part of the statement was left out of the official speech given during the 2nd NGO-MoFA meeting on ProSAVANA held in Tokyo on March 5, 2013, Kijima, Shibamura’s senior answered that Minister Pacheco’s remark as a just “political message” trying to emphasise his intention of “bringing the success of PRODECER to Mozambique”.

Even if Fingermann was not aware of the discussions on ProSAVANA happening in Japan at that time, the AIM article is readily available on the internet (in both English and Portuguese). Whether it is a “myth” or not to call ProSAVANA a “replica” of PRODECER, the idea was actually initiated by a Mozambican minister after a meeting with JICA’s delegation, and his statement was “totally supported” by the Japanese government.

28 The minutes and handouts are available at the following MoFA site: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shimin/oda_ngo/taiwa/pdfs/seikyo_12_2g.pdf In the course of preparing the minutes for the meeting, MoFA officials who were in charge of ProSAVANA attempted to re-write remarks made by NGO presenters, and also to add to their comments (mostly to negate remarks). This was taken seriously by the council members, and these “corrections” made by the officials were removed. This incident demonstrates just how political the issues related to ProSAVANA have become for the Japanese government.

29 Her senior, Yoshiko Kijima, was responsible for matters related to ProSAVANA and was requested to attend the meeting. Kijima was present in the same building at the time of the meeting, but chose to be purposely absent from this official visit for the following reason: “the Japanese government did not want to exacerbate divisions among local farmers by meeting only with UNAC who had had the opportunity to come. It is not fair” (the 2nd NGO-MoFA meeting on the ProSAVANA, Tokyo, March 5, 2013). After being criticised for such behavior, given the fact that ProSAVANA is supposed to be a programme for the benefit of small farmers, Kijima apologised during the 3rd NGO-MoFA meeting, and met with the UNAC’s president during his second visit to Japan on May 28, 2013. However, her attitude during this second visit to MoFA left very negative impression to the Mozambican visitors (of UNAC and Nampula CSO Platform), they lamented that “we felt that we are not welcome and as if we were disturbing her, but she is forgetting why we had to come all the way here” (the author’s interview right after the meeting, May 28, 2013).

30 Internal minutes of the meeting (February 26, 2013).

31 Joseph Hanlon analyses this interview in his article in “MOZAMBIQUE: News reports & clippings”, published on December 28, 2012.

32 The summary of the minutes will be available shortly on the MoFA site.
If Fingermann goes back to review UNAC’s first statement that she accuses of being a creator of this “myth”, she will find that she herself uses exactly the same expression in her own text:

“The project (ProSAVANA) was inspired by an earlier agricultural development project implemented by the Brazilian and Japanese governments in the Brazilian Cerrado (savannah), where large-scale industrial farming of monocrops (mainly soybeans) is now practiced” (UNAC, Oct. 11, 2012).

“ProSAVANA was clearly inspired by the experience of PRODECER” (Fingermann, 2013:1)\(^{33}\).

So, who exactly is it that created this “myth”? Since the “myth” began with the promoters of ProSAVANA, Fingermann’s entire discussion regarding this myth is, in fact, extremely misleading. The question remains: Why did Fingermann choose to discuss this matter in this way, without first conducting a simple historical analysis of available documents?

**(b) Real initiators of the concept of “ProSAVANA = PRODECER”**

It is not, however, Minister Pacheco’s fault at all to have referred to ProSAVANA as “a replica of PRODECER” in order to explain what ProSAVANA is. Until the programme was met by major criticism at the end of 2012, it was actually JICA and MoFA that had been creating a favourable atmosphere for this sort of interpretation. JICA’s “Report of the Preparatory Research for the ProSAVANA” speaks for itself:

“Japan has gained experience working for the agricultural cooperation of the Cerrado area (Tropical Savannah) in the past for over 20 years in (...) Brazil. Today, the Cerrado area has developed to become a world class food basket. The two governments of Japan and Brazil declared to support for agricultural development in Africa together, and have been considering implanting the agricultural technologies accumulated through the Cerrado development to African countries where tropical savannahs span. This time, as the first target country of this support for agricultural development by Japan-Brazil triangular cooperation, Mozambique was selected“ (JICA, 2010: S-1)\(^{34}\).

Prior to conducting this preparatory research, JICA clearly defined two main objectives for ProSAVANA:

“(1) Examining which of the experiences of the agricultural development of tropical savannah gained through the development of the Cerrado could be made use of in Mozambique; (2) making a proposal for the direction of cooperation between Japan-Brazil in the future (outline, scale and effectiveness)” (Ibid.)

What this official JICA document, the only available public document that really explains the initial objective and scope of ProSAVANA, highlights is that:

(a) the relationship between Brazil and Japan was viewed as the most important feature of the programme;

\(^{33}\) The original text in Portuguese: “Este projecto inspira-se no projecto de desenvolvimento agrário levado a cabo pelos governos brasileiro e japonês no Cerrado brasileiro” (UNAC, Oct. 11, 2012); and “O ProSAVANA foi claramente inspirado na experiência do Prodecer” (Fingermann, 2013).

\(^{34}\) JICA’s final report of the preparatory research on the ProSAVANA – JBM. JICA (2013) 「モザンビーク国日伯モザンビーク三角協力による熱帯サバンナ農業開発協力プログラム準備調査最終報告書」

(b) “Africa was a target”;
(c) “Mozambique was a case” where Japan and Brazil’s “experiences in the Cerrado” could be transplanted. (Ibid.)

It is also interesting to note that at this earlier stage of the programme, JICA did not yet find it politically or diplomatically problematic to write in such a forthcoming manner using this kind of explanation in an official document.

Given the two main objectives for the preparatory research as described in the JICA final report (cited above), it is evident that research on the actual realities of peasant families and rural communities in Northern Mozambique was considered to be a secondary issue. Although Northern Mozambique is home to over 4 million, the research conducted for the final report involved interviews with only 20 farmers (including mid and large-scale) in the entire Nacala Corridor. The budget of the 6 month-long research was almost 90,000,000 yen (or 9 million US Dollars). Clearly, for JICA, who requested this research, the most important objective of the investigation was to find “similarities with” the experiences obtained from the development of the Brazilian Cerrado 20–30 years ago and “what can be used from” them in Mozambique (JICA, 2010: S-1).

The following map is one of the outcomes of this quest of “similarities between the Brazilian Cerrado and Northern Mozambique” by Japanese and Brazilian ProSAVANA actors.

Map showing “similarities between the Brazilian Cerrado and Northern Mozambique” (EMBRAPA, 2010, in the JICA’s presentation, given on Nov. 15, 2012).

As Fingermann rightly points out (2013:1), “time and situational difference” between PRODECER and ProSAVANA is obvious and by no means insignificant. But why then, does she criticise the researchers and civil society organisations that are pointing out the very same thing, rather than those who formulated ProSAVANA under such a scheme that put considerable emphasis on the experience of PRODECER so as to apply its “experience” to the realities of Northern Mozambique?

One distinctive expression illustrating the emphasis put on PRODECER in the planning and development of ProSAVANA can be evidenced by the subtitle of the “5th Programme for Discussions on the Agricultural Development of Northern Mozambique – ProSAVANA-JBM”

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35 Data from these 20 interviews was held up as proof of JICA’s efforts of listening to the voices and concerns of local farmers during the ODA policy council held on Dec. 14, 2012 by MoFA. Due to public criticism JICA received by NGOs as a result of realising so little a number of interviews and then claiming that they represent “proof”, JICA put pressure on consultants to conduct more interviews in future research endeavours (confidential information given by a consultant, Feb.14., 2013).
organised by JICA in Tokyo on July 31, 2012: “Application of the findings of the Cerrado development to ProSAVANA”.

(c) Re-writing history: “ProSAVANA was sought by Mozambique”

The denial and modification of historical facts related to ProSAVANA by the official promoters of the programme began in December 2012 during the ODA policy council meeting between NGOs and MoFA. Kijima, the above mentioned MoFA official, emphasised the appropriateness of her ministry’s actions and described her interpretation of the background of the programme as follows:

“It was the Mozambican government who heard of the success of Japanese agricultural technology and the agricultural development [programme] carried out by Japan in Brazil, and requested its utilisation in the country [to the Japanese government]. (…) Since Mozambique also wanted to learn from the Brazilian experiences, it decided to receive assistance from Brazil” (Yoshiko Kijima, Dec.14, 201236).

After contradictions between this interpretation and previous explanations that had appeared earlier on in official documents and been given by other MoFA officials and JICA staff, the official ProSAVANA actors and promoters effectively began their efforts of “re-writing history”. Sudden avoidance of talking about PRODECER became apparent37. Such “avoidance” was attempted during the High Level Seminar held by JICA on April 2, 2013 in Tokyo, attended by representatives from Mozambique (Minister Pacheco) and Brazil (the General Director of ABC, Fernando José Marroni de Abreu). After attending several meetings with MoFA and JICA, the Mozambican and Brazilian representatives present at the High Level Seminar chose, thereafter, to emphasise the following “history of ProSAVANA”:

“It was President Armando Guebuza of Mozambique who wanted this kind of project in order to learn from experiences of the Cerrado agricultural development” (General Director of ABC, April 2, 2013).

Some background information is necessary in order to understand exactly why MoFA is so concerned with changing the historical fact of who initiated the ProSAVANA programme. In the late 1990s a series of “ODA scandals” erupted in Japan which significantly impacted public perception of the country’s ODA policies and practices at that time. As a result of the scandals, much of the Japanese public no longer saw the country’s ODA as being “genuine assistance”. On the contrary, it was widely regarded as being problematic and lacking transparency. Subsequently, taxpayers’ support for ODA rapidly diminished. Since a large portion of their budgets is related to ODA, MoFA and JICA suddenly made ODA reform a key priority in attempt to regain public support so as not to lose public funding. It is in this context that cooperation between MoFA/JICA and NGOs began38. After these scandals, it became even more important for MoFA and JICA to stick to the principle of planning ODA projects and programmes based on the “request” for

36 Minutes of the meeting at MoFA’s site (http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shimin/odango/taiwa/pdfs/seikyo_12_2g.pdf).
37 Prior to December 2012, most of the JICA’s presentations on ProSAVANA were devoted to telling the “success” story of PRODECER and the Cerrado development. This fact can be observed in the amount of time JICA representatives allocated during their presentations to talking about PRODECER and the Brazilian Cerrado as well as the number of pages of their handouts that were devoted to the topic and that were distributed during seminars and lectures (e.g. MoFA and JICA’s presentation at UNDP’s seminar for TICAD V held on June 1-3, 2012, and JICA’s seminar on Northern Mozambique –ProSAVANA held on July 31, 2012).
38 The “dialogues” that now take place between NGOs and MoFA have been made possible, and the “minutes” from meetings are now publically available online, as a direct result of this ODA reform process.
assistance “from recipient governments”. In the widely criticised scandals of the past, Japanese politicians, corporations and governmental officials had actually created ODA enterprises out of their own necessity or self-interest, and then had “request documents” signed by recipient governments after the fact. Thus, in the case of ProSAVANA, the request for providing ODA for the programme should have come directly from the government of Mozambique, and, even the idea itself, should not have come from either JICA or ABC.

This is but one example of why researchers should not overly depend on official interviews and writings without first critically analysing the dynamics of internal/external, national/international politics and cross-checking information attained by official interviews and documents with other sources or by conducting one’s own fieldwork/participant observation.

2-2-2. Fingermann’s 3 reasons why the ProSAVANA isn’t PRODECER

Fingermann shares three reasons why she thinks it is a myth that ProSAVANA is a replica of PRODECER: (a) “the differences in the historical moment and political situation between Brazil in 1980s and today’s Mozambique”, and the fact that “negative aspects of PRODECER are recognized and not hidden by the governments of Japan and Brazil”; (b) since ProSAVANA is “a trilateral initiative, transparency will be improved in comparison with PRODECER, a purely Japanese initiative”; and (c) because “Quick Impact Projects (of ProSAVANA) are considering environmental impacts and including family agriculture”, unlike PRODECER (Fingermann, 2013:1).

(a) “Negative aspects of PRODECER are not hidden by Japan”?

Let us examine Fingermann's argument for the latter half of this first “myth”, that is, “negative aspects (environmental and social impacts) of PRODECER are recognised and not hidden by the governments of Brazil and Japan” (Ibid.). Despite what she states so confidently, the author could not find any clear description or analysis of these negative aspects in any of JICA’s published reports on PRODECER, except several sentences in (JICA, 2001; 2010).

There are numerous research and reports on environment impacts on the Cerrado region conducted by JICA, but nothing about the deforestation and pollution caused by PRODECER is mentioned. Rather, JICA’s “PRODECER: Environment Monitoring Report” only lists general environmental problems in the region (JICA, 2000:2-4), and stresses some measures taken by JICA for “protecting

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39 One of the most notorious cases involved an influential politician from the then leading party (LDP), Munen Suzuki. He was implicated in the construction of the Sondu Miriu Dam in Kenya (assisted using Japanese ODA) that was constructed on a water scarce river at a location considered to be a sacred site by the local population. Also, collusion before a bid, bid-rigging, and screen writing the official request of the recipient governments was revealed to have been common practice among some big-name Japanese trading companies involved with providing food assistance (KR) and supplying agricultural materials (KRII) during this period.

40 There are many cases of this. One such case is that of the “pesticide assistance” that Mozambique received from Japan during its civil war. Beginning in 1983-4, considerable amounts of chemical pesticides were donated every year to Mozambique by Japan under a scheme called KRII/2KR in order to support an “increase of food production”. As these pesticide donations took place during a prolonged period of war in Mozambique, most of the pesticides either disappeared or became obsolete. When this ODA programme later turned into a major scandal for the Japanese government, MoFA continually emphasised that the disappearing and non-use/misuse of the pesticides was not their problem, but that of the Mozambican government since the aid was given based on the Mozambican governments “annual requests” and official procedure was being followed correctly. However, due to insiders’ information (from JICA and Japanese corporate personnel involved in the KRII/2KR process), it soon became apparent that “request letters” were actually being prepared by a Japanese corporate official who had been appointed through “bid-rigging”. All that the Mozambican government ministers essentially did was sign the pre-prepared request forms that were being presented to them. A more detailed analysis of this matter can be found on the site of a Japanese NGO, 2KR-Net (http://www.paw.hi-ho.ne.jp/kr2-net).
environment” (Ibid.: 8). Any discussion of a cause-and-effect relationship between the general problems and PRODECER is completely omitted. In the report’s introduction, a JICA board member declares: “[through this report, you will come to understand] that PRODECER was an environmentally friendly developmental enterprise, like other Frontier Agriculture (programmes), and this fact should influence to future consideration and planning of cooperation projects” (Ibid.).

PRODECER is more frequently described as a “success” and a “miracle” by the Japanese government and JICA. This can be observed clearly in the title of a book by Yutaka Hongo (a key figure in JICA’s implementation of PRODECER and later one of the planners of ProSAVANA), and Akio Hosono (a director of JICA’s Research Institute): “Miracle of Development of ‘Cerrado’, Barren Land in Brazil” (Hongo & Hosono, 2012). Those authors even describe PRODECER as “environmentally prudent”, promoting an eco-friendly image of the programme during the Rio+20, UN Conference on Sustainable Development (JICA-RI News&Topics, 2012).

In addition, whenever ProSAVANA or PRODECER are discussed, JICA’s Hongo comes and stands up and says: “the critiques are all false. You will realise if you read MY BOOK” (Nov.8, 2012; May 28, 2013).

These are people who are highly influential in designing and carrying out the programme.

This is exactly why civil society organisations in Mozambique, but also in Brazil and Japan have become worried about ProSAVANA. As Fingermann rightly implies in her reasoning, by failing to recognise past problems and learn from previous errors, problems may repeat themselves. The “proof” claimed in her argument, however, is, ultimately, invalid. Her assumption that the Japanese government recognises the “errors” that occurred during PRODECER, and thus has learned from them, is simply not borne out by the facts.

(b) “The trilateral initiative will improve transparency

As Fingermann confirms, PRODECER did suffer from lack of transparency because it was result of a “purely Japanese initiative” taking place “during military government” (Fingermann, 2013:1). Yet, it is not true to say that “there were no possibilities for civil society organisations to monitor and expose its negative aspects” (Ibid.). Since the beginning of the 1980s, a multitude of voices have criticised the programme: Brazilian deputies, farmers (with/without land), religious organisations, researchers, associations and unions, journalists, and even governmental institutes (Câmara dos Deputados, 1980; Revista Urgente, 1981; Diário de Manhã, March 10, 1984; Associação dos Engenheiros Agrónomos do Estado de Goiás (AEAGO), 1984; Comissão Pastoral da Terra (CPT), 1984; 1985; San Martin & Pelgrini, 1984; IPEA; and Pessoa, 1988).

41 Remarks from floor at lectures by Japanese and Brazilian civil society representative on PRODECER held at Meijigakain University on Nov. 8, 2012, and at Jochi (Sophia) University on May 28, 2013. At the university lecture by UNAC’s President at Tokyo Univ. on Feb. 28, Hongo again took a microphone from floor, asking the president, “Why don’t you talk about China? Chinese and European agribusiness are also causing harm?”
Fingermann’s assumption that ProSAVANA, unlike PRODECER, naturally grants transparency since it is “a trilateral initiative” which incorporates “the principles of South-South Cooperation” as part of “Brazilian foreign policy” and because “international development cooperation is completely different [now]” is arguable.

It is not a natural process for Governments or private enterprises to be transparent and accountable, nor does the current international environment simply grant it. Human history teaches us that — around the world — this can only be achieved when the local people fight for it. Indeed, this has certainly been the case with ProSAVANA.

Noticeably, all of the public statements on ProSAVANA published by Mozambican CSOs explicitly criticise the programme for its lack of transparency and its top-down nature (UNAC, Oct. 11, 2012; JA! & Friends of the Earth Mozambique, Jan. 25, 2013; “Joint Statement”, April 29, 2013; “Open Letter”, May 28, 2013). As we can observe, a common thread can be found in the following descriptions of problems regarding both of the programmes: “PRODECER is prepared from the top and outside, and there was no consultation with the people” (Pessoa, 1988:128) and “We have noticed a lack of information and transparency from the main stakeholders involved. (...) ProSAVANA is a result of a top-down policy” (UNAC, Oct. 11, 2011).

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42 This is clear if one reads all the minutes of the past NGO-MoFA meetings. Special attention should be given to the minutes of the 3rd meeting on ProSAVANA held on April 19, 2013. In this meeting, Japanese CSOs criticised MoFA and JICA for not sharing information about JICA’s High Level Seminar on ProSAVANA. The NGOs had to request information on this event regarding the date it took place, members of the delegations that were present and the contents of discussion from members of parliament. MoFA apologised for this situation during the meeting.
Illustrations (CPT-MG, 1984: 13; 10). *These illustrations show how the process of formulation and preparation of PRODECER was viewed by locals in Minas Gerais.

Why do we see identical critiques despite a time-lag of thirty years? Because the initiators of the programmes (the Japanese government and JICA) are the same, the principle objectives of these programmes are the same, thus same kind of procedures and attitude are repeated.

Both programmes are shaped by food crisis around the world and in Japan (1973- and 2008-), a focus on “vast uncultivated land”, “public-private enterprise”, and “agricultural cooperation through strengthened Japan-Brazil relations” (JICA, 1979; 1983; MoM, 2009; JICA, 2011; and Funada-Classen, 2013a; 2013b). This can be observed in identical expressions given as principle reasons in JICA’s initial documents for these programmes: “in the centre-western region of Brazil, there is an extended unexplored area with almost 1,300,000 km2 (almost 3.5 times bigger than Japanese territory)” (JICA, 1979:1); and “Along the Nacala Corridor, there are more than 1,400,000 ha (or 3 times of Japan’s total cultivated land) that is adequate for agriculture [but unused]”(JICA, May 14, 2012) or “70 % (or 540,000 km2) of national territory is (...) left as vast unused land suitable for agriculture” (JICA, Sept. 28, 2009).

Pictures on the JICA site explaining about signing of the MoU for ProSAVANA, Sept. 28, 2009. *The author’s translation of the given caption: [left] “Near the Nacala Corridor where Japan and Brazil will advance agricultural development. There is cast unused farmland surrounding maize field”; [right] “There is vast unused land behind the small farmers [houses]”, implying those local farmers are not able to use land effectively.

The strong focus on “vast unused land” was the basis for the formulation and attraction of both PRODECER and ProSAVANA. It is neither Mozambican CSOs nor academic publications such

\[\text{43} \text{ This can also be observed on the JICA’s official page describing ProSAVANA. Their strong interests are in “landscape} \]
as Clements & Fernandes (2013) that are responsible for creating this so-called “myth”. The responsibility for creating and promulgating this “myth” falls upon the promoters and official agents of PRODECER and ProSAVANA who acted identically despite the difference of country and era.

[Left] Maps on CPT-MG, 1985: 11; [Right] Slide presented by JICA’s “Project for Nacala Corridor Economic Development Strategies (PEDE-Nacala)” on Feb. 13, 2013, in Tokyo. *In the middle of the slide, one can observe a word “Agriculture de Grande Escala (large-scale agriculture)“.

Thirty years have passed since the beginning of PRODECER. Mozambique is not ruled by a military dictatorship as Brazil was in the 1980s. Several stakeholders meetings were organised, but many local farmers’ and civic organisations who attended them feel that these meetings were held only with the intention that the ProSAVANA actors could later claim that the process is inclusive and democratic. In fact, the JICA’s internal document (“work instructions [TOI]”) to the Japanese consultants supporting these meetings indicates that their focus is on the number of participants from various sectors and the transmission of information rather than listening to and discussing issues with the participants (JICA, 2011:8;11). The same document, however, orders the consultants to “integrate the opinions and needs of the Japanese corporations into various plans [of ProSAVANA]“ (Ibid.:4).

Certainly there are more formalised monitoring systems available for civil society compared to PRODECER, but this does not mean that the programme is transparent and accountable in reality. This can be seen in the strong anxiety and frustration shown in the “Open Letter” from 23 Mozambican civic organisations to leaders of three governments (of Japan, Brazil and Mozambique) calling for the immediate suspension of all activities and projects under ProSAVANA (“Open Letter”, May 28, 2013) in belief in social justice, concern for the protection of human rights and a desire for a better future for all Mozambicans.

It was Brazilians who fought against PRODECER and the development scheme in the Cerrado who brought Agrarian Reform to their country, and ended the dictatorship. In the case of ProSAVANA, it is precisely those whom Fingermann denounces as creators of “myths” who are committed to obtain transparency and accountability for people and the environment despite many sacrifices.

Yet, the Japanese ProSAVANA actors, JICA staff and Japanese consultants, who do not accept the claims made by Mozambican civil society, also join to denounce them as being “only one part of the society”, saying “they are criticising ProSAVANA because they belong to an opposition party” , spreading this mislead message in order to justify themselves (Dec. 2012 – June 2013). Some have even gone as far as to say that since “Mozambicans cannot write Portuguese properly” it must be “Brazilians who are writing these [declarations and statements]”. Most regrettably, according to some Japanese parliamentarians, these interpretations were shared by MoFA officials and JICA staff members who visited them to “explain about ProSAVANA” (the author’s interviews with 3 parliamentarians, March- May, 2013). This sort of trivialisation of protest brought echoes to some of Mozambican ministers after their visit to Japan for TICAD V (the 5th International Conference on African Development), June 1 to 3, 2013:

“Mozambican farmers are illiterate. (…) There must be someone behind them who wrote this [“Open Letter”]” (Transport Minister, Paulo Zucula, June 2, 2013 during JICA’s TICAD V Side Event).

“The criticisers of the programme [ProSAVANA] are ‘conspirators and manipulators’ who want Mozambique [to continue to] depend on importing food that we can produce here” (Agriculture Minister, José Pacheco, Aug. 14, 2013).

What exactly does Figermann attempt to do by claiming that the voices of Mozambican CSO’s and social justice groups are spreading “myth”? In doing so, she is, in fact, only preparing the ground for further attack on the very organisations who are seeking transparency accountability.

(c) “Quick Impact Projects are considering environmental and social impact”?

A final point of Fingermann’s reasoning that remains to be analysed is her argument that: (c) ProSAVANA is different from PRODECER, since Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) will consider environmental impacts and include considerations for family farmers in their design. There are two assumptions in this statement that should be noted. The first assumption (c-1) is that PRODECER did not consider environmental impacts and excluded family farmers; the second (c-2) is related to the design of QIPs. These two assumptions will be examined one by one.

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47 The author’s interviews with Mozambican CSOs, Sept. 2012- to present.
48 The author heard this interpretation directly and indirectly from JICA’s staff and consultants who confirmed that it is widely known as “fact” among the Japanese ProSAVANA actors.
49 This speech was filmed by a Japanese TV-TBS, and broadcasted on June 8, 2013 in Japan. This TV programme can be watched at the following site: www.farmlandgrab.org.
50 According to Mozambican CSOs, a similar kind of interpretation was given by the Agriculture Minister in June, 2013.
(c-1) PRODECER did not consider environmental impacts and excluded family farmers?

The first assumption seems to be a widely accepted understanding of PRODECER in Brazil. My literature review on PRODECER also confirms this. Here, Fingermann draws obvious conclusions about the programme and its negative social and environmental impacts in Brazil, giving the impression that she knows the topic well enough.

The fact is that PRODECER did clear almost 300,000 ha of the Cerrado biome, an area that was formerly home to a wealth of biodiversity, with 7,000 recognised species, and high levels of endemism (Klink & Machado, 2005:1), and also contributed to the pollution of the main Brazilian watersheds. Yet, for Hongo & Hosono and the Japanese government, the Cerrado region is “barren land” (Hongo & Hosono, 2012; JICA, June 30, 2009). Together with other development programmes carried out by the Brazilian military dictatorship (1964-85) in the Cerrado, almost 50% of the biome has been “converted into pasture and agricultural lands occupied mostly by cash crops” (IBAMA, 2009:12; Klink & Machado, 2005:1).

Prior to PRODECER other Cerrado development programmes had been implemented by the Brazilian government, such as PCI, PADAP and POLCENTRO. It is estimated that together these three programmes led to the deforestation of almost 3 million ha of the Cerrado (Ferreira Ribeiro, 2002:266). PRODECER came as the last phase in the promotion of mega-scale development programmes of the Cerrado.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAMA</th>
<th>CRIAÇÃO</th>
<th>CUSTO (US$)</th>
<th>AREA (ha)</th>
<th>LOCAL (ESTADO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PCI</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>32 milhões</td>
<td>111.025</td>
<td>MG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PADAP</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>200 milhões</td>
<td>60.000</td>
<td>MG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLCENTRO</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>886 milhões</td>
<td>3.000.000</td>
<td>MG, MS, MT,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRODECER I</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>94 milhões</td>
<td>60.000</td>
<td>MG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRODECER II</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>409 milhões</td>
<td>180.000</td>
<td>MT, BA, MG,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GO, MS</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>66 milhões</td>
<td>80.000</td>
<td>MA, TO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRODECER III</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.669 milhões</td>
<td>3.491 025</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.669 milhões</td>
<td>3.491 025</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ferreira Ribeiro, 2002:266.

It was criticised for reproducing “an economic model imposed by the post-1964 system”, and the decision of expanding PRODECER to PRODECER II in 1984 was seen as an act of “inconsideration of the necessary changes that were taking place in the Brazilian agrarian structure” (Diário de Manhã, March 10, 1984). PRODECER I, II and III ended up opening vast areas for only 717 colono (settler) families, mainly Japanese and European immigrants/descendants who were living in the south of Brazil, and were considered to be “superior farmers (capable of conducting modernised farming)” (Hongo’s interview in JICA, June 30, 2009).

Each colono family, already well-off financially, was granted 400 to 500 ha with additional financial support, at a time when locals were struggling to obtain land in order to overcome unjust land distribution dated since colonial period. The frustration caused by this is clear from the

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51 Numbers are different from the ones offered at the Campo’s site. See note 17.
enduring land conflicts all over the Cerrado region since 1980 (Folha de São Paulo, 1985, in Pessoa, 1988: 181-182). Even though JICA’s preparatory research revealed this (JICA, 1983:91), it did not stop the agency from continuing with unjust land and credit distribution (assistance). Rather, JICA even expanded the same scheme to many other states, and opened an “agricultural frontier” adjacent to the Amazon.

[Left] JICA, 2013:7. PRODECER target area and locations of their “colonias (colonies)”;

Although Japan has not been willing to engage in any real analysis of PRODECER’s cause and effect impacts in the Cerrado, now over 30 years after the fact, in the mid-1980’s local populations, family farmers, and land commissions had much to say regarding the programme’s skewed social priorities and inequitable distribution of benefits. In a report published in 1985, the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT) in Minas Gerais contested that:

“PRODECER is totally against Agrarian Reform. It promotes mechanised large-scale agriculture [in a country] where there are 12 million landless families (...) Nikkeis [Japanese descendants] receive almost 500 ha of land while there are no farmers [in the region] who own more than 5 ha of land. (...) Cerrado development programmes are for [the benefit of] a small number of people who already have advantageous [social and economic] positions” (CPT-MG, 1985:29; 33).
Reflections regarding the social aspects of PRODECER are also tellingly absent from JICA’s reports, as well as Japanese academic works more generally. A rare exception can be noted in the following observation made by a former journalist, Tamotsu Aoki, who was sent to Brazil by JICA in order to examine the outcomes of PRODECER. Although Aoki’s entire report is devoted to justifying the programme and highlighting its profound importance, he does concede that:

“From the point of view of traditional small-scale farmers, PRODECER seems to be prioritising large-scale farmers” (JICA, 2001: 23).

As mentioned earlier, I conducted an extensive literature review on PRODECER and after reviewing countless JICA reports and primary source documents, the only vestige of admittance by JICA that PRODECER had any sort of negative environmental impact can be observed in the preparatory report for ProSAVANA:

“In the beginning of PRODECER, environmental considerations were lacking, thus, we [at JICA] think it indispensable to create harmony between agricultural development and environmental conservation” (JICA, 2010: S-27).

In the same report, however, it is nowhere mentioned what these “environmental considerations” that were said to be lacking might have been. The report also fails to mention how exactly “harmony between agricultural development and environmental conservation” is achieved and what kinds of conservation projects this “indispensable” task might include.

Ironically, the case of Lucas do Rio Verde, a “soybean municipality” of Mato Grosso, has been repeatedly offered up in JICA presentations or ProSAVANA handouts as “proof” of just how “eco-friendly” PRODECER was. As Hosono & Hongo describe it:

“[T]he city of Lucas do Rio Verde, located in the Cerrado region, presents an example of a successful environmental preservation endeavour. The most outstanding achievements of the city include, among others, the promotion of Cadastro Ambiental Rural (CAR), a farmland registration program created using GPS data as part of its social environment project. With these efforts the city was commended by Jornal do Brasil, one of Brazil’s major newspapers, as the
most accomplished environment-friendly city in the country in 2006” (JICA’s News and Topics, 2012).

The reality on the ground in Lucas do Rio Verde, however, presents a very different picture than the eco-friendly city that Hosono & Hongo claim it to be. Presently, about 73% of the entire municipality (266,000 ha out of 364,000 ha) is occupied by vast soybean plantations (which effectively required extensive deforestation in order to be brought into operation) (Schlesigner, 2013a:13). Soybeans are the main crop grown in the municipality and of most of the soy is produced from genetically modified seeds. In Brazilian agriculture, soybean production accounts for significantly greater use of pesticides than any other crop (the industry accounts for 45% of total consumption), making Brazil the top consumer of pesticide in the world since 2008 (Ibid.: 21).

According to Danielly Palma, the average exposure of Brazilian people to pesticides nationally is 3.66 litters per person; in Mato Grosso it is 29.8 litters per person, and in case of Lucas do Rio Verde, 136.35 litters per person, 37.25 times more exposure than the national average (Palma, 2011:19). The list of pesticides used in Lucas do Rio Verde from 2005 to 2009 shows that the local residents and environment were exposed to high risk toxins, with 40% of the pesticides being listed as being “extremely toxic” and 15% “alarmingly toxic” (Ibid.)

According to the dossier published by the Brazilian Association of Collective Health (ABRASCO – Associação Brasileira de Saúde Coletiva) in 2012, the water pollution in Lucas do Rio Verde due to the heavy application of pesticides is so severe that 83% of 12 wells providing drinking water to local schools and 56% of rain water samples taken from the patios of local school were contaminated by various types of pesticides (ABRASCO, 2012:39). The heavy use of pesticides and the contamination of environment that it has caused is affecting the health of local residents. Wanderlei Pignati, a medical doctor and professor at Federal University of Mato Grosso, found that 10 out of 62 samples of breast milk taken from local mothers was contaminated by pesticides (Ibid.; Schlesigner, 2013a:22).


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52 The detailed analysis of the risk of these types of pesticide is shared on (Schlesinger 2013b: 49), based on his interview and sources given by Wanderlei Pignati of Federal University of Mato Grosso.

Given that these are all relatively well-known and well-documented facts, how is it that JICA has remained unaware of them for so long? Did JICA really not recognise these aspects when they visited Lucas do Rio Verde in 2012 on a mission to “collect evidence of Green Growth (JICA’s News and Topics, 2012)? Or did JICA simply choose to omit such facts from its discussions and reports regarding PRODECER and the agricultural development of the Cerrado? Even after the above mentioned data and explanations were given by Sergio Schlesigner, a Brazilian economist who has researched and written about Brazilian agricultural investment and cooperation, agricultural development in the Cerrado and ProSAVANA (Schlesigner, 2012; 2013a; 2013b; 2013c), during his lecture at a Japanese university, JICA’s Hongo who was present at the lecture eagerly refuted: “But very important and prestigious people and institutions did evaluate Lucas do Rio Verde as an ‘eco-friendly city’!” (Sophia University, Tokyo, May 28, 2013).

Regardless, civil society organisations in Mozambique, Brazil and Japan are not concerned about thirty years ago, it is about what JICA’s veteran associates are saying today, and how this has been passed on to JICA’s younger ProSAVANA staff. For instance, in remarks such as: “JICA through PRODECER conducted environment related projects in order to promote conservation farming (…) ‘Cerrado-type Family Agriculture’ based on large-scale farming (…). JICA believes that it is Japan who can contribute to inclusive and environmentally friendly development” (Kota Sakaguchi, Nov. 15, 2012).

JICA did not see any problem with emphasising the “success of ‘family agriculture’ of PRODECER” as a useful experience for Northern Mozambique until it was criticised by the Japanese NGOs at the 1st NGO-MoFA meeting on ProSAVANA held on Jan. 25, 2013. JICA did not differentiate between those “colono families” with 400-500 ha of land and a heavily mechanised system of production in the Brazilian Cerrado and local workers and Mozambican family farmers, most of who cultivate less than 1 ha.

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53 Lecture at Meijigakuin University, held on November 15, 2012. Whether he was pressured to give such presentation is not known. This direct translation is based on his hand-out and the minutes of his presentation prepared by the organisers of the event. Its publication was denied by the presenter, thus publically not available.
The following graph and table show the high concentration and unequal distribution of farmland ownership in Brazil, highlighting Mato Grosso, the heart of soybean production and PRODECER, and Lucas do Rio Verde respectively. In Brazil there are 1,744,540 small property holders (with less than 10 ha of land) yet they occupy only 1.4% of land in the country.

![Graph representing the property size of producers in Mato Grosso state, Lucas do Rio Verde and Brazil, respectively.](image)

**Graph representing the property size of producers in Mato Grosso state, Lucas do Rio Verde and Brazil, respectively.**

**Source:** Inácio Werner using IBGE 2006, in Schlesinger, 2013b:37.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estratos de área total (ha)</th>
<th>Nº de imóveis</th>
<th>Em %</th>
<th>Área Total (ha)</th>
<th>Em %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Até 10</td>
<td>1,744,540</td>
<td>33,7</td>
<td>8,215,337</td>
<td>1,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 10 a 25</td>
<td>1,316,237</td>
<td>25,4</td>
<td>21,345,232</td>
<td>3,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 25 a 50</td>
<td>814,138</td>
<td>15,7</td>
<td>28,563,707</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 50 a 100</td>
<td>578,783</td>
<td>11,2</td>
<td>40,096,597</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 100 a 500</td>
<td>563,346</td>
<td>10,9</td>
<td>116,156,530</td>
<td>20,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 500 a 1000</td>
<td>85,305</td>
<td>1,6</td>
<td>59,299,370</td>
<td>10,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 1000 a 2000</td>
<td>40,046</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>55,269,002</td>
<td>9,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mais de 2000</td>
<td>39,250</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>242,795,145</td>
<td>42,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>5,181,645</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>571,740,919</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Land distribution in Brazil.**  **Source:** ABRASCO, 2012:99.

In contrast, in Mozambique, 96.4% of cultivated area is used by 3,801,259 farming households, or 99.3% of the total, cultivating an average of 1.43 ha, while there are some 884 “large-scale” farming families which occupy only 1.3% of the entire national area cultivated, and whose average land use is 84.4 ha according to INE’s Agriculture Census. This same figure is also given in ProSAVANA-PD’s Report No.1, written by JICA’s Japanese consultants (ProSAVANA-PD, Report No.1: 2-6).
The following table shows the number and percentage of farm households in each Northern province based on the INE data. One can confirm that percentage of small holders is even bigger in Northern three provinces, counting 99.89%, and they represent almost half of the entire national small holders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Small</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Large</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National (number)</td>
<td>3,801,259</td>
<td>25,654</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>3,827,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niassa (number)</td>
<td>224,577</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>225,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nampula (number)</td>
<td>828,788</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>829,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambézia (number)</td>
<td>828,123</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>828,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of 3 provinces</td>
<td>1,881,488</td>
<td>2,019</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>1,883,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of 3 provinces in National farm-households (%)</td>
<td>99.889</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table showing number of farm-householders and their cultivated area in Northern Mozambique (drawn by the author based on INE, Censo-Agro:Pecuário, 2009-10).

Although, Fingermann implies that those who recognise misconduct (in PRODECER) can improve their behaviour in the future (ProSAVANA), her assumption is not borne out by the facts. Certainly, it is neither correct nor accurate to call ProSAVANA “a replica of PRODECER”, but based on the above discussion and analysis of sources it can be concluded that several of the founding initiators and promoters of ProSAVANA belong to the same organisation (JICA), and in some cases are the very same people, that were involved with PRODECER and who have not yet admitted to any negative social or environmental impact of PRODECER. Although over 30 years have passed since the outset of PRODECER, many of those who were involved in the programme (and that are now involved in ProSAVANA) have not seemed to have learned from the past.

Should researchers want to examine the above argument more closely, but are unable to read Japanese or do not have access to the Japanese archives that I have utilised in this article, the author recommends watching an English-language television documentary recently produced by a Japanese national TV company, based on Hongo and JICA’s version of the Cerrado development (NHK, June 7, 2013). The title of the documentary – “land for innovation”54 – speaks for itself.

54 See NHK World, June 7, 2013 (http://www.jibtv.com/programs/405985249/about.html). This particular television programme was developed with support from the Japanese government and JICA in order to respond to the rising tide of criticism on Cerrado agricultural development, PRODECER and ProSAVANA. One of this programme’s principle coordinators is Yutaka Hongo.
Source: Images of Lucas do Rio Verde shown in the NHK television programme on PRODECER and ProSAVANA: “land for innovation” (NHK, June 7, 2013).

Also, a page on JICA’s English webpage (see link below) talks about ProSAVANA and offers some insight as to what is meant by the slogan “land for innovation” - describing the agency’s intention of bringing “innovation” to Mozambique through ProSAVANA, and transforming the “landscape” through agriculture.

Source: JICA’s site on ProSAVANA
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/thematic_issues/south/project07.html

Interestingly, the picture painted by JICA coincides with that described by Sergio Schlesinger and Augusto Mafigo of UNAC during their presentations on PRODECER and ProSAVANA in Japan:
“Agriculture without Farmers” or “Agriculture without Farmers” (Pre-TICAD V CSO International Conference on ProSAVANA in Yokohama, May 28, 2013). In fact, this echoes with the view of the local protesters of the Cerrado towards PRODECER, and the current realities of agriculture in Brazil.

In fact, this echoes with the view of the local protesters of the Cerrado towards PRODECER, and the current realities of agriculture in Brazil.

Not surprisingly, the extensive deforestation caused by PRODECER I, II and III is completely omitted from NHK’s documentary, just as it is conspicuously absent from the works/reports/statements of Hongo, Hosono, Sakaguchi and JICA. In order to promote a more positive image, the documentary instead discusses the current monitoring system against deforestation in the Cerrado. The programme further portrays a utopian account of “coexistence between small-scale and large-scale farmers” in the region, yet fails to mention anything about Brazilian social movements, like the MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores sem Terra) and MPA (Movimento dos Pequenos Agricultores), and their struggle for land in the Cerrado. The ways in which PRODECER has adversely affected the struggle for Agrarian Reform in the Cerrado, either directly or indirectly, are also nowhere mentioned.

(c-2) QIPs considering environmental and social impacts?

A second assumption (c-2) made by Fingermann should also be examined. That is that the QIPs consider environmental and social impact and thus will mitigate any potential negative effects.

It is interesting to note that soybean, the crop promoted by PRODECER, requires the smallest number of agrarian workers, only 2 per 100 ha. This tendency reflects the small capacity of job creation upon agribusiness in Brazil (only 26%) as it is shown in the slide (on left). The presentation is at the following site.

http://mozambiquekaihatsu.blog.fc2.com/blog-entry-36.html

55 It is interesting to note that soybean, the crop promoted by PRODECER, requires the smallest number of agrarian workers, only 2 per 100 ha. This tendency reflects the small capacity of job creation upon agribusiness in Brazil (only 26%) as it is shown in the slide (on left). The presentation is at the following site. http://mozambiquekaihatsu.blog.fc2.com/blog-entry-36.html
Obviously, mitigating possible problems that might result from the programme is incredibly important and clearly defined and transparent measures for doing so need to be taken. Report No.2 of the ProSAVANA-PD does mention “criteria” for such environmental considerations (Ibid.:3-8), how these criteria will be implemented and monitored, however, remains obscure. It is also not clear exactly how the ProSAVANA Development Initiative Fund (PDIF), which Fingermann listed as a “QIP”, but is listed as a “Pilot Project” in the report, will effectively “mitigate possible problems” that might “involve local small farmers” (Fingermann, 2013:1). Although Fingermann concludes, based on her interviews with ProSAVANA actors and the existence of a statement found on a single page of Report No.2 (3-14), which holds that QIPs “consider questions of environmental impact and include incentivising strategies for family agriculture” (Fingermann, 2013:1), a comprehensive analysis of the same ProSAVANA-PD’s reports (especially, Report No.2) gives a completely different picture. Let us first deal with PDIF and then QIPs.

**ProSAVANA Development Initiative Fund as Pilot Project**

The PDIF was officially launched in September 2012 right before the ProSAVANA programme became the subject of intense criticism from civil society organisations. In response to questions by Japanese NGOs regarding the PDIF, JICA did not mention any such objective that was related to environmental considerations. JICA and MoFA also refused to publically divulge the names of the agribusiness companies included in the PDIF, except for IKURU (which JICA emphasises is not a corporation, but a farmers’ organisation), to the Japanese NGOs, saying that such information is related to “privacy” (JICA’s response to NGOs’ questions, March 2013). Two official requests for information were sent to MoFA and JICA by Japanese NGOs under the framework of the ODA Policy Council, but as of July 22, 2013, the information requested had still not been disclosed.

![Source: JICA’s reply to NGOs, for the 3rd NGO-MoFA meeting (April 2013).](http://www.paw.hi-ho.ne.jp/kr2-net/2kr/)

Reluctance of JICA and MoFA to share this information is difficult to understand, especially given that the PDIF’s entire funding—a total of 750,000 $US—comes from the Counterpart Fund (*Mikaeri Shikin*), which is pooled through the Japanese Food (KR) assistance to Mozambique.

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56 No name or affiliation is not indicated.

57 The scandals related to Counterpart Funds (not only of Mozambique but of all the other recipient countries) and their common characteristics of being non-transparent were also part of the reasons of ODA reform in 2001-2002. As these funds were allowed to be allocated outside of National Treasuries of the recipient governments, mainly of pro-Western ones under the context of Cold War, how they had been used before the reform is not known. In the case of Philippines, it is widely said that the Marcos regime used the fund for their presidential election campaigns. This hidden-monetary assistance to pro-west governments through Counterpart Funds is a scheme developed by the U.S. government originally. The Counterpart Fund accumulated through the U.S.’s food assistance to Japan helped the Japanese government to establish a paramilitary organisation (later transformed into Self Defenced Army) despite the limitation given by its constitution because it could avoid discussions in the parliament due to the fund being outside of the National Treasury (Ishikawa, 1999). In case of Mozambique, after the visit and request for food assistance of Samora Machel to the U.S., the American government requested the Japanese government to offer KR and KRII to “soften the president’s attitude towards the west” (the wired document from MoFA obtained by a Japanese NGO, 2KR Network, in 2KR Network, 2005). See the following site regarding KRII and the Counterpart Fund in Mozambique: [http://www.paw.hi-ho.ne.jp/kr2-net/2kr/](http://www.paw.hi-ho.ne.jp/kr2-net/2kr/)
Despite the Japanese government reluctance to give up the names of the agribusiness to Japanese NGOs, the names had already been divulged right after the announcement made about launching the PDIF in September, 2012. Report No.2 is also listing the following details of PDIF, including the names of the companies.

Despite the Japanese government reluctance to give up the names of the agribusiness to Japanese NGOs, the names had already been divulged right after the announcement made about launching the PDIF in September, 2012. Report No.2 is also listing the following details of PDIF, including the names of the companies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of the Company</th>
<th>Project Site</th>
<th>Project Overview</th>
<th>Products</th>
<th>Amount (M$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lusane Farm</td>
<td>2A Abi-Mosâue</td>
<td>1) Contract farming providing inputs and interest in farming on agricultural products and organization of management. 2) Investment in rice local variety (20% irrigated rice. 3) Production of fresh seeds (maize and sunflower) and vegetables at Nampula City.</td>
<td>Soybean, Vegetables (tomato, potato, okra)</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>KURU</td>
<td>NI Monapo, Moçovâfii</td>
<td>Full package of contract farming with written agreement (including the provision of sufficiently used tractor service for sowing preparation, tillage, technical extension).</td>
<td>Soybean (Monapo), Green bean (Moçovâfii)</td>
<td>2,860,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Omgora Seed Company</td>
<td>NI Maramâla, Moçovâfii</td>
<td>1) Soybean production on contract farming with inputs of technical extension services. 2) Basic seed production at its own farm.</td>
<td>Soybean, Vegetables (tomato)</td>
<td>1,640,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Malanje Engenhamentos</td>
<td>NI Risâue</td>
<td>1) Soybean production on contract farming at its own farm (15 ha). 2) Provision of seed production with smallholders. 3) Soybean production with smallholders providing technical support.</td>
<td>Soybean, Vegetables (tomato)</td>
<td>1,640,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Gentico Agricola</td>
<td>NI Mavore</td>
<td>1) Contract farming for vegetable production (10 ha), 2) Vegetable production at its own farm with irrigation system (20 ha).</td>
<td>Vegetables (tomato, onion, garlic, okra)</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Surprisingly, while this sort of information has been withheld from NGOs it has been given to Japanese media that was covering issues related to ProSAVANA; JICA was also taking Japanese media personnel to visit some of the ProSAVANA project sites to prove that the programme is “contributing to small scale farmers” (the author’s interview with some of Japanese media, April-May 2013). When asked about how many visits were made by the Japanese media and others to project sites, a JICA consultant confessed that “more than 10” different visits had been made to the same farm nearby Nampula City (the author’s interview with JICA’s consultant, Aug. 9, 2013).

Although JICA introduces this “farm owner” as “a leading farmer” to media and other official guests, he is not a “farmer”, but a “school teacher” who does not live in rural setting but in a nearby Vila (town) or does not cultivate by himself, and his occupancy of farmland is 40 ha (the author’s interview with the farm owner, Aug. 9, 2013), where almost 99.3% of Mozambican farmers, who are predominantly small farmers, cultivate around 1.4ha (Agriculture Census 2009-2010 by INE) as explained previously. In fact, this teacher is not receiving direct support from the ProSAVANA’s pilot project. He has a contract with a local agribusiness company funded by PDIF. The teacher buys the seeds from the company, and sells them what is produced. In fact, his contract with this company is just a part of his business, and he has contracts with other agribusiness companies. Obviously, he is not a small farmer that JICA’s president nowadays indicates as a target agency of ProSAVANA, and willing to expand his farm from 40 ha to 120 ha within 5 years. JICA may defend its objective by pointing out the fact of the employment of local small farmers given by this teacher, but most of them are used as temporary labourers during busy season receiving 70 meticais/MT (2.5 US dollar) a day or food.

The same company funded by PDIF is giving a contract with a local farmers association, but even after interviewing with the members of the association and the wife of the president of the

58 He doesn’t have land title for this land. A Portuguese family possesses it, and he is currently borrowing it because he is a “friend of their son”. He is worried about non-possession of DUAT (the author’s interview, Aug.9, 2013).
59 According to JICA, for ProSAVANA-PD, they use the following “interim” categorisation: up to 10 ha “small scale”; to 50 ha “medium scale”; and 50 ha “large scale” (“JICA’s reply”, March 25, 2013).
60 The farm owner told us that he is hiring 10 men as fulltime, but did not answer if they have labour contract or not, and interviews with these workers were not possible.
company, it is not yet clear what it means to “support local small farmers” within the scheme of ProSAVANA\(^{61}\). “Including family farmers to ProSAVANA” can mean anything, and it could be easily used as a mere political propaganda.

In fact, local small scale farmers in Ribaué who cultivate by plantation of an agribusiness company, Matharia Empreendimentos (appears in the fourth place of the previous table), owned by a Portuguese family, locally recognised as “Rui Santos”, who currently lives in Maputo and receives 1,640,000 MT (almost 55,000 dollars) from PDIF, expressed an identical complaint on ProSAVANA with CPT on PRODECER.

“ProSAVANA came here, but they were looking for those who had large farms and established conditions\(^ {62}\). (…) We (local small farmers) want to tell ProSAVANA [people] not to support those brancos [whites] who have already conditions and capacities compared to us. Instead, they should support those who do not have capacity” (the interview by Japanese NGOs conducted field research, Aug. 11, 2013).

According to the famers, the company holds DUAT 2,800 ha where the local people used to cultivate. After more than 20 years absence, the owner showed up in the area, and chased those farmers out of “his land” in 2009, and enclosed the farm (the same interview)\(^ {63}\).

In order to capture the scale of 2,800 ha, it may be useful to take a look at the following “certificate of delimitation” of a community in the same district which determines 1,840 ha of land as its territory of the entire community.

![Certificate of Delimitation](image)

“Certificate of Delimitation” of a community in Ribaué District (photo taken by the Japanese NGOs visited the district, 11 de Agotso, 2013).

JICA’s real intention was made much more clearly in a presentation given by Eiji Inui, the director of JICA’s African Division, in June 2012. Inui was also head of the Japanese delegation for “ProSAVANA’s Joint [Japanese-Brazil] Mission to Mozambique” carried out in April 2012. In his presentation, Inui describes JICA’s “future vision” of agricultural development in Mozambique as being the “establishment of [an] Agriculture Development Model by [promoting] co-existence between small-scale and large-scale farmers through ProSAVANA” (Eiji Inui, June 5, 2012). Even

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\(^{61}\) This shall be discussed in detail in future articles in preparation.

\(^{62}\) According to a JICA consultant, since PDIF is not a grant but a loan, in order to make the fund successful and sustainable, GAPI and JICA selected companies based on documents showing “capacity” of those companies, such as DUAT and car registration.

\(^{63}\) This information must be verified by interviewing the company and its owners.
though the Joint Mission (16-20 April, 2012) was conducted under the auspices of the ProSAVANA programme, during their time in Mozambique the delegates only visited large-scale commercial plantations, as shown on the following presentation slide.

Source: Eiji Inui's presentation, June 5, 2012: 18; 12 (photo taken at soybean plantation of a foreign investment “managed by a Brazilian” in Lichinga by JICA).

*The English translation was made by the author.

Although this presentation and other JICA materials used at their seminars on ProSAVANA (including those for Japanese investors) were repeatedly requested by Japanese NGOs to MoFA/JICA under the scheme of ODA Policy Council, it took half a year and four meetings for JICA to provide the presentation materials, and some part of the presentations are not yet released (as of Sept.3, 2013). However, even partially offered materials confirm that, until protest towards ProSAVANA became apparent, ProSAVANA’s main focus was drawing external investment to the Nacala Corridor, and attention and considerations towards local farmers were almost non-existent.

In order to minimise impact of these materials, JICA attached the following “explanation” of the presentation materials they were sending: “Although promotion of investment is focused [on these materials], situation of poverty of small farmers is also considered important since the initial phase of the programme” (JICA, July 11, 2013). This justification illustrates persistent JICA’s view on local farmers even after repeated meetings with farmers’ organisations. The small farmers of the Nacala Corridor were only considered as “poor”, and not a driving force of Mozambican agriculture or food production.

Such a justification further elucidates the way in which JICA actually views local farmers, even after holding repeated “meetings” with farmers and farmers’ organisations, the small farmers of the Nacala Corridor were only considered as “poor” people, not the driving force of Mozambican agriculture and food production. This negative view on local farmers, who only knows “primitive means of productions” are repeatedly emphasised in many JICA documents on ProSAVANA as the
author examined (Funada-Classen, 2013a; 2013b). Interestingly, this attitude of JICA is identical to what it was observed by the farmers of the Cerrado 30 years ago as one can see in the following illustration drawn by them.

Illustration showing 2 Japanese telling a local farmer that “We two will teach you how to work on land” (CPT-Goiás, 1984:23).

**Anatomy of “Pilot/Quick Impact Projects” in the Japanese context**

The discourse on ProSAVANA by its official actors and promoters, particularly by JICA, is constantly shifting, and despite the now public availability of the leaked reports of the Master Plan, much important information about the programme remains undisclosed or ambiguous. Farmers’ requests for information regarding clear mechanisms that will protect the environment and people’s rights in the Nacala Corridor still have not been addressed.

In fact, as the “Open Letter” criticises, proceeding with the projects while there is still so much debate over the programme, and the contents of the Master Plan are not widely known, proves to be very problematic. The letter calls for an “Urgent Stop” because “[ProSAVANA] is already being implemented (…), without the Environmental Impact Assessment Study ever having been carried out, publicly discussed and approved”. It also considers “initiatives” to create “local beneficiaries” (like the PDIF) as a means of manipulating the local society, effectively creating divisions between those who are for the programme and those who oppose it or have serious doubts or concerns (“Open Letter”, May 28, 2013).

In the Japanese context, “pilot projects” or “quick impact” projects have often been carried out prior to the full-scale implementation of controversial programmes by private or government enterprises, and have been used by the government as means of creating “local beneficiaries (thus allies)” and *fait accompli*. When the Japanese government has introduced new large-scale development programmes or infrastructure projects in the past, “quick impact” projects have commonly been used to target selected populations/local communities and ensure that they experience the “benefits” of the enterprise being promoted. In this way, the central government is able to forge alliances with local governments and politicians, and strengthen the relationship of these local officials with the segments of the local population identified as being the “beneficiaries” of the intended

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64 The official ProSAVANA actors, especially JICA, constantly change the objective and contents of the programme (Funada-Classen, 2013a; 2013b): from “contribution of food security of the world and Japan (JICA, 2009)” and “effective utilisation of vast uncultivated African Tropical Savannah (JICA 2009)” to “increase productivity of the Nacala Corridor area whose agricultural potential is high (JICA 2011)” and “seeking for coexistence between small scale farmers and large-scale farmers (JICA, 2010; The Presentation by JICA’s Inui, June 2012)”. After being met with considerable criticism, the objective was changed to “increasing income of small farmers”, but “through investment” (JICA’s President, 2013).
development. This strategy also often feeds favourably into the local political context by preparing the ground for elections. Such “pilot projects” or “quick impact” projects are especially used during the initial phase of polemical large-scale development and enterprises such as the construction of nuclear power plants, dams and roads. The central government uses these projects in attempt to bring “quick and visible benefits” to local communities prior to the full-blown implementation of the enterprise.

This often results in social fragmentation by creating divisions among local residents regarding the proposed development, visibly pitting “pro” and “con” against one another, and effectively attempting to exclude from the discussion those who question the enterprise. After the initial benefits of a quick impact project have been felt among a certain number of locals, the marginalisation of those who oppose, protest or simply raise questions about the respective enterprise is more easily achieved. These people who oppose are often accused of “damaging the reputation of the community”, “reducing profits that communities can receive”, “chasing away good intentions by their criticism”, and “having hidden political interests and agendas”. On the other hand, those who are already seeing the “benefits” from “quick impact” projects are brought to the frontline to talk publically about these benefits and justify the development to the media or parliamentarians who may suspect problems or be skeptical of the proposed enterprise. The supporters and promoters of these enterprises often emphasise that “the local government is welcoming the enterprise”, that “there are residents who are supporting it”, and that “criticism comes from only a small circle of people, that do not represent the society” as a whole.

In Japan, the results of large-scale development ventures preceded by “pilot/quick impact projects” have typically been: failure of any independent examination of the social and environmental impact of the enterprise to be carried out; a lack of transparency and accountability evident throughout entire implementation process; the creation of conditions favourable for corruption, serving only the interests of the limited circle of people who support the enterprise; fragmentation and severe division within and among local communities; dependency of funds coming from outside of the communities; and the neglect of locally devised and supported initiatives and alternatives for solving local and regional problems. All of these elements, to some extent, contributed to the devastating occurrence in Fukushima in 2011. A similar trend also occurred with PRODECER and is now currently occurring with ProSAVANA.

In the case of ProSAVANA, statements like “there are organisations in favour of the programme” and “objection is coming only from a limited number of local people and groups” have been repeated several times by JICA representatives. This tendency was first observed during a lecture given by Kota Sakaguchi, a member of JICA’s ProSAVANA team in November, 2012. In the lecture, Sakaguchi offers JICA’s response to UNAC’s statement on ProSAVANA made in Oct. 2012. According to him:

“JICA considers that UNAC’s statement is a result of their misunderstanding [of ProSAVANA] due to lack of information distribution. (…) Among those [with whom] we conduct dialogues, we have constructed very good relationships”(Kota Sakaguchi, Nov. 15, 2012).
Since Sakaguchi’s lecture the expression “misunderstanding” has been used often by JICA’s staff involved with ProSAVANA when talking amongst themselves or to the Japanese CSOs, parliamentarians, and the national and international media. After receiving the “Open Letter” in May, 2013, for example, JICA again used that expression when making comments to the media, only this time regarding the contents of the letter (Globalpost, June 3, 2013; Southern Times, June 10, 2013). In fact, responding to the strong tone of the letter, JICA’s representative said “there are on-going projects and people who are expecting to receive (benefits as part of the programme), thus we cannot stop” (JICA, May 28; 30, 2013).

**“Local beneficiaries” created by PDIF**

Who are those local beneficiaries that “conduct very good relationships” with JICA? Sakaguchi mentions:

“Regarding local farmers organisations, we are beginning our cooperation with IKURU. We think that we can show good results in early stage. We are currently trying to establish our cooperation with ALIMI in Niassa.” (Kota Sakaguchi, Nov. 15, 2012).

Since its participation in the PDIF, IKURU has repeatedly been referred to by JICA as a “Pro-ProSAVANA farmers’ organisation”. Interestingly enough, IKURU is actually registered as an agribusiness company, whose major share-holders are OXFAM Novib and GAPI – each holding 45% the company’s shares, while shares held by local farmers are limited to 10% (the IKURU’s site). According to the JICA consultant in charge of PDIF, IKURU was originally established to support local farmers’ production efforts and assist in the marketing of their products, but “as Cooperative Law is virtually non-existent in Mozambique, IKURU was forced to register as a company” (the author’s interview, Aug. 9, 2013). However, the same consultant did not have any information regarding the basic organisational structure of the company that would support the claims made by some of JICA staff – that IKURU is a “farmers’ organisation” – and who, in doing so, have attempted to hold up the company as being a shining example of the representation of farmers in ProSAVANA decision-making processes.

In fact, in an interview with the General Manager of IKURU conducted by Naoko Watanabe, a Japanese NGO staff, the general manager himself clearly stated that “IKURU is a company” (Watanabe, 2013). According to Watanabe’s same interview, there are 7 seats in the company’s

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65 **Globalpost** (June 3, 2013) "Concern mounts over agriculture development plan in Mozambique" (http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/kyodo-news-international/130603/concern-mounts-over-agriculture-development-plan-mozam)

66 According to it site, GAPI is a Mozambican “developmental financial institution” of whose objective involves the “promotion of national entrepreneurship”. See: http://www.gapi.co.mz/content/sobre-nos/missao-visao-objectivos.php

67 See the following site of IKURU. http://www.ikuru.org/stories.html

68 This was confirmed by an interview conducted by a researcher from a Japanese NGO, Naoko Watanabe, with IKURU’s general manager on Aug. 12, 2013, according to her report (Watanabe, 2013).
General Assembly: 1 seat is allocated to GAPI and another to OXFAM Novib, the remaining seats are allocated to 5 farmers elected from among 554 different farmers’ associations that join activities with IKURU. The current CEO of IKURU is the board member sent by GAPI and company decisions can be made as long as 2 board members agree (Watanabe, 2013).

Considering that GAPI, the financial organisation that JICA also admits as a half-governmental entity, which runs PDIF, or ProSAVANA’s Development Initiative Fund, provides a Chief Executive Officer to IKURU, and actually requested to its staff to submit a proposal for the fund together with JICA, things look quite different from what JICA has been claiming to use IKURU as their success case of partnership and support through PDIF. It also indicates problems in transparency and accountability of ProSAVANA. Did JICA simply not know who the CEO of IKURU was?

In contrast to JICA’s claims, none of the local farmers associations and CSOs interviewed in Nampula considered IKURU as an organisation “representing local farmers” (the author’s correspondence and interviews, November 2013; August 2013).

For its high level seminar on ProSAVANA held on April 2, 2013 in Tokyo, JICA planned to bring a representative of a Mozambican farmers’ organisation, perhaps as a means to counteract the impact of UNAC’s president’s visit to Japan a month earlier, and requested that the Ministry of Agriculture of Mozambique (MINAG) find a “suitable” representative. Surprisingly, a representative from IKURU, “the farmers’ organisation in closest partnership with JICA” according to JICA, was not chosen. The organisation that was chosen by MINAG was the Provincial Union of Farmers of Niassa (UPCN – União Provincial de Camponeses de Niassa), a sub-organisation of UNAC. Shocked by and clearly uncomfortable with this choice, JICA’s head of one of the sections of the Africa Division, Yoshiro Kurashina, claimed that it “could not give” the name of the organisation representing farmers in the ProSAVANA target area that was to be present at the seminar, nor comment on its background, that is, until the day of the seminar, holding that “they [JICA Tokyo] didn’t know” since the information hadn’t been received by JICA from Mozambique regarding the matter (Yoshiro Kurashina, March 2013).

According to UPCN, who send a representative to Japan for the seminar, in the beginning of March, MINAG had requested UPCN’s visit to Japan in order to participate for the Farmers Union to participate in “Farmer to Farmer Exchange”. Yet, it was revealed that the trip was with the Agriculture Minister, the Governors of three provinces, the Provincial Directors of MING and others to “ask the Japanese government to fund ProSAVANA”. Surprisingly, according to the organisation, they discovered serious modification of the power point presentation prepared by it, not only the critical points related to ProSAVANA but even the name of UNAC was deleted. JICA’s Hongo and a JICA’s Brazilian coordinator of ProSAVANA [Jusimeire Mourão] informed the organisation that they had to adjust to a purpose of seminar (the author’s interview with UPCN, Aug. 25, 2013).

According to representatives from some of the Japanese NGOs who attended a meeting with the UPCN’s representative after the seminar, when they asked him if he and his organisation belonged to UNAC, JICA’s Mourão, who was assigned to be his official interpreter by JICA, denied the fact. Indeed, Mourão actually (mis)interpreted almost everything that the UPCN’s representative explained about his visit to Japan during the meeting. For instance, he explained (in Portuguese) his

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Note: This expression was used to imply that MINAG find a “pro-ProSAVANA” farmers’ organisation, according to a Japanese parliamentarian, Michihiro Ishibashi, who called JICA to find out more information on the matter (the author’s interview, March 2013). After the seminar, MoFA’s Kijima paid a visit to Ishibashi in which she explained that it was herself who had requested the Mozambican government to send someone from UNAC, she repeated this version of events during the 3rd NGO-MoFA/JICA meeting on ProSAVANA, April 19, 2013.)
understanding (described above) as to why MINAG chose UNCP to join the mission; his explanation was translated by Jusimeire Mourão as follows:

“The invitation came from the government [of Mozambique]. I think (...) because our Union disturbed our government. We, as a Union, have repeatedly been asking the provincial directorate of MINAG questions such as “for whom is ProSAVANA?” and requesting more clarification from them. We also participated in meetings on ProSAVANA and asked many questions related to the [impacts of the programme on] small farmers. Due to such intervention and doubts, as small farmers, I think, the local direcção [the MINAG’s provincial office] wanted to invite us.” (speech by the UPCN’s representative originally in Portuguese, translated by the author from the informal minutes, April 2, 2013).

Mourão’s English interpretation is, again, completely different from what the speaker actually said to the Japanese NGOs. It reads:

“About our cooperation and relationship with the government, we were invited because the Union wanted to know what ProSAVANA is, and had asked questions to the government. The Provincial directorate invited the Union from the beginning and explained the design of the project [ProSAVANA]. The Union also held some meetings with the government. That is why I came here. I came to participate and to tell you, that is, the audience of Japan, our expectations as small farmers [of the programme]” (extracted from the informal minutes without any corrections, April 2, 2013).

Not only is UPCN affiliated with UNAC, it is also one of the organisations that signed UNAC’s first statement condemning ProSAVANA (UNAC, Oct. 11, 2013). Yet, all information about the Union’s affiliation with UNAC and its critical views and questions regarding the ProSAVANA programme were completely omitted from the original presentation by “two JICA agents” (the author’s interview with UPCN, July 25, 2013).

After return of this representative from Japan, the way in which the statements and speeches he had made had been misinterpreted and misrepresented by JICA soon became widely known among farmers and CSOs of Northern Mozambique. During a CSO meeting held on August 7, 2013 in Maputo, a representative of Nampula CSO Provincial Platform (PPOSC-N) stressed how this event resulted in generating (only an even greater degree of) mistrust among rural populations and CSOs regarding ProSAVANA and towards its official agents. As she explains:

“Many farmers and civil society members learned what happened to UPCN. That is why while the farmers were gathering and discussing the contents of and expressions used in the “Open Letter”, participating farmers insisted that we not remove any words given by them from the text. [They insisted that] even commas [,] and periods [.] should not be changed. Out of fear that what happened to the representative of UPCN might be repeated, they begged the Secretary General of the platform to make sure to take the letter to Japan [exactly] as they had directed and agreed, and that’s what he did” (comment made by the representative of PPOSC-N, Aug. 7, 2013)\(^7\)

Official ProSAVANA actors, realising the difficulties of actually creating a genuine farmers’ organisation that would support with the programme, began their quest to convince small farmers

\(^7\) The drafting process of the “Open Letter” by 23 Mozambican organisations was explained clearly at this meeting. During the same meeting, a representative of UNAC, who lives in Nampula and had participated in one of the “Open Letter” drafting meetings, gave a similar account of the drafting process. The remarks made by two Mozambican ministers that the letter had been written by non-Mozambicans were heavily criticised during this meeting, especially by farmers and CSOs coming from Northern Mozambique.
and farmers’ organisations of ProSAVANA’s benefits in order to counteract the negative attention resulting from the release of the “Open Letter” which requests a “Stop (immediate suspension)” to the programme. All the target districts of ProSAVANA in Niassa Province were visited by some ProSAVANA actors. Four of the participants of one such meeting described the meeting as follows:

“Last month, they [a Japanese and some officials of MINAG] came to explain that ProSAVANA is [a programme] to support local small farmers. They said that they would offer credit, tractors, improved seeds, and fertiliser to “superior farmers [those who have capacity of producing well]” (the author’s interview, July 26, 2013).

When asked if anything was mentioned at the meeting regarding Brazilian experience and investment by foreign agribusiness, the participants responded that they “did not notice any remarks on that”. According to them, the participants of the meeting were FRELIMO secretaries, FRELIMO’s Mozambique Youth Organisation (OJM) members, and local council members, thus primarily pro-FRELIMO farmers who had been gathered together by the local government. They also confirmed that the majority were men (the author’s interview at a district in Niassa, July 26, 2013).

In another district in Niassa Province, a female leader of a local farmers’ association gave the following explanation of such a meeting:

“In April, um branco [non-African, it could be a Japanese in Mozambican context] with our government representative came to explain that the programme [ProSAVANA] is to give tractors to local farmers. They told us to choose 7 farmers and to formulate a group to begin renting these tractors, so during the meeting, we began our discussions on grouping” (the author’s interview, Aug. 12, 2013).

According to a GAPI’s representative at this same district: “Although they mentioned tractors during the explanation of ProSAVANA [at the meeting], these tractors are part of the Fundo de Desenvolvimento Agrícola [Agriculture Development Fund], a national scheme, and not related to ProSAVANA. Both sides [ProSAVANA agents and the government] took an advantage of this gathering” (Interview with GAPI’s representative in a Niassa district, Aug. 12, 2013).

In the aftermath of the “Open Letter”, it appears that one of the primary objectives of JICA’s mission to Northern Mozambique was to launch the second round of PDIF. According to a JICA consultant, the briefing meetings for the second round of call for proposals were held in three provinces in the end of June, and the call was closed on July 15 (the author’s interview at ProSAVANA DPA office, Aug. 9, 2013). This time around, a truly ‘genuine farmers’ cooperative’ was needed.

JICA targeted a farmer-owned cooperative in Niassa Province, visiting it in June 2013. According to the president of the cooperative and his staff, JICA’s representatives of ProSAVANA explained that ProSAVANA was rejected by civil society organisations, especially by UNAC, because these organisations did not have clear information about the programme. However, JICA representatives assured that governance-issues related to ProSAVANA will be improved saying that, after all, ProSAVANA is a programme to increase farmers’ capacity to produce better, and will bring new technologies for increasing productivity (the author’s interview with the cooperative, Aug. 12, 2013). The ProSAVANA representatives also explained that they were launching a ‘fund to support local producers’, and requested the cooperative’s participation. Since it had been urgently seeking funding for some time and was looking into all the different funding options available, the cooperative submitted a proposal as per requested. But the president of the cooperative emphasised
that his organisation is not fully aware of everything that ProSAVANA entails, only the loan program that was presented to it (the author’s interview, Aug. 12, 2013)\(^1\).

In a similar fashion, IKURU’s general manager also mentioned that “We [IKURU] have heard of ProSAVANA, but we don’t know what to think of [it]. Critiques are sometimes about land issues and other times seeds. With or without ProSAVANA, we just continue our relationship with local farmers” (Watanabe, 2013).

A member of UPCN and a local government official in Niassa Province recognise a significant shift in the way that ProSAVANA promoters attempt to “win-over farmers”. They describe this shift as follows:

“ProSAVANA used to be coffee, bitter to swallow, now it turned to be chocolate, very sweet” (the author’s interview at UPCN, Aug. 2, 2013).

“[ProSAVANA and investment, he explains] are like namoro [courtship] or lobolo [bride price] before marriage. In order to obtain agreement, [the grooms-to-be and his family] promise anything. But once they obtain the agreement, you know (…)” (the author’s interview at a district officer, July 27, 2013).

In many ways the PDIF pilot project replicates similar strategies (described earlier in this paper) that are commonly used in Japan by Japanese governmental enterprises in order to ‘win’ the support of locals for contradictory development projects. The PDIF, in this sense, can also be seen as a means for ProSAVANA to create “local beneficiaries” who could later potentially become actors favourable to the programme – a sampling of the local population to sing ProSAVANA’s praises.

A similar strategy was used during the establishment of PRODECER in Brazil in the 1980s, which, according to Frei Rodrigo Peret, a coordinator of Brazil’s Pastoral and Social Promotion of Rural Environment (APR – Animação Pastoral e Social do Meio Rural)\(^2\), contributed to the “exclusion” of local peasants. As we saw earlier, the same scenario – characterised by the need to rapidly create local beneficiaries – also took place “after” the release of the “Open Letter” on May 28, 2013; the Mozambican CSOs are still waiting for an official response to their Letter from the three governments. Further, when asked by a group of Japanese NGO’s on July 22, 2013 about whether JICA had launched the second round of PDIF, JICA’s Amameishi, who is in charge of ProSAVANA related matters in Tokyo, denied the fact.

Interestingly, the Japanese Ambassador to Mozambique, Eiji Hashimoto, was not aware of this second launch of the PDIF, mentioning in a conversation with the author that, such a scenario “is impossible since the responsibility of Counterpart Fund belongs to our embassy”. Hashimoto elaborated saying that “We are also in the process of re-considering the methodology of participation of local civil society organisations, and in midcourse of such revision, we cannot possibly pull such an act” (the author’s interview with the ambassador, Aug. 16, 2013). Yet, after consulting with the local JICA office in Maputo and others, the embassy returned to explain that although it was not aware of the fact, “the second round of this call seemed to have been determined during the first round” (correspondence from the Japanese embassy in Mozambique, Aug. 26, 2013).

\(^1\) The proposal of this cooperative to PDIF was accepted by GAPI, but they withdrew their proposal (the author’s follow-up with the cooperative, Sept.30, 2013).

\(^2\) Frei Rodrigo Peret, “PRODECER: Transformação e Exclusão”, in an APR newsletter from Triangulo Mineiro e Alto Paranaíba. (the exact date of the publication not known, but it seems likely that the newsletter was published in 1990s).
Projects of ProSAVANA implemented?

As can be evidenced in the above remarks of the ambassador, the eagerness of some JICA actors to create “local beneficiaries” through the PDIF is strongly contradictory with what other Japanese stakeholders have been saying. In attempt to further deflect criticism of ProSAVANA, JICA also keeps mentioning that implementation of the programme has not begun yet since the Master Plan is still being prepared (the 3rd, 4th and 5th NGO-MoFA/JICA meeting in Tokyo, April-July 2013).

Responding to the point made by a Japanese NGO that in Report No.2 it states that some QIPs are already being carried out, Shinjiro Amameishi of JICA’s Division of Rural Development declared that: “No QIPs have been implemented. That point is being discussed [internally]. It is true that [the report] includes on-going projects, but the expression [used in the report] was not adequate. We are currently re-considering QIPs.” Responding to another point posed by another NGO that the report clearly mentions that a pilot project is already implemented, “It is true that a pilot project [PDIF] has begun. How to reflect this in the Master Plan is still under discussion” (Shinjiro Amameishi, the 4th NGO-MoFA meeting held in Tokyo, May 10, 2013). MoFA’s Yoshiko Kijima also confirmed during the same meeting: “For the MoFA, QIPs have not been launched, nor materialised. Some ideas were listed only” (Yoshiko Kijima, May 10, 2013).

It seems that the JICA staff and MoFA officers in Tokyo are trying to overcome the contradiction by differentiating Quick Impact Project from Pilot Project such as PDIF, the former now being “re-considered” and the latter being used for the creation of “local beneficiaries” to counter-balance local growing criticisms.

Examining leaked reports of ProSAVANA-PD

Let us now examine in more detail QIPs outlined in ProSAVANA-PD’s Report No.2. The Report, now widely available on the website of the international NGO, GRAIN, was prepared by Brazilian and Japanese consultant agencies contracted for ProSAVANA-PD (Support Agriculture Development Master Plan). It is one of three major activities of ProSAVANA and is dated March, 2013. The subtitle of the report is “Quick Impact Projects”, but as the report itself explains, its objective is to “draw up an overall plan (blueprint) for agricultural development in the Nacala Corridor” (Report No.2, 2013:1-3). Thus, it is not “just a report”, it is also a document setting out the framework of the Master Plan, and endorsed by the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture (as can be seen on its cover).

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73 Leaked Report No.1 and No.2 are available at the following site: [http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/21996](http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/21996)

*The information appeared on these documents is identical.

JICA admitted that the presentations given by MINAG at ProSAVANA’s stakeholder meetings in Maputo and Nampula in March and by JICA at an NGO-MoFA meeting in Tokyo in April of 2013 were based on Report No.2. There is no reason to ignore the document.

The following table is based on the information provided in Report No.2, and shows the timeframe for the preparation of the ProSAVANA Master Plan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Release date</th>
<th>Reports/MP</th>
<th>Topic (Subtitles)</th>
<th>Expected outputs</th>
<th>Major activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2013*</td>
<td>Report No.1*</td>
<td>Overall Picture of Development Plan</td>
<td><strong>Output 1</strong> Data collection and information analysis</td>
<td>(*look at the original document.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle of March 2013</td>
<td>Report No. 2</td>
<td>Quick Impact Projects (Supporting the 2nd stakeholder meeting)</td>
<td><strong>Output 2</strong> Drawing of an Overall Picture</td>
<td>2-1 Drawing an overall plan (blueprint) of agricultural development in Nacala Corridor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Output 3</strong> Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) planning</td>
<td>3-1 Characterization of selected areas which have agricultural development potential based on basic survey</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>3-2 Formulation of QIPs and expected immediate effects for target areas</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3-3 Prioritization of QIPs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3-4 Beginning of the actions to attract investors for the implementation of prioritized QIPs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

74 The power point was used for the 3rd stakeholder meetings in Mozambique, and also obtained by Japanese NGOs during the 3rd NGO-MoFA meeting in Tokyo, after several discussions on the importance of information sharing for transparency and accountability.

75 This confirmation was given by JICA's Shinjiro Amameishi during the 3rd NGO-MoFA meeting (April 19, 2013).
Preparation of draft 2013 Middle of August

Report No.3: Draft Final Report and Investment Data Book (Supporting the 3rd stakeholder meeting)

【Output】

- Environmental impact assessment for the development projects. Supporting the formulation of resettlement plan if required for QIPs
- Elaboration and presentation of Data Book to private investors
- Holding seminars and workshops for stakeholders

- Final report and Investment data Book


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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drawn by the author. *According to the original text, “Report No.1 (draft) was prepared in 2012” and “the final version will be prepared by May 2013.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If GRAIN had not obtained these reports and made them publicly available on its website, the Mozambican farmers, civil society organisations and researchers would have continued to have had absolutely no idea as to the contents of the Master Plan, up until even now (as of July 2013). Official actors involved in ProSAVANA and those responsible for writing these reports, were against their public disclosure. And still are.

During the 3rd stakeholder meeting in Maputo, March 2013, ProSAVANA actors had promised to show only a “final draft” of the documents a few months prior to their official finalisation. What was offered up to Mozambican civil society groups and concerned citizens and researchers during the meeting was yet another quick presentation which offered a vague description of the programme and the Master Plan (the author’s correspondence with participants of Maputo meeting including a representative of a donor organisation, March-April, 2013). Given that ProSAVANA is about the lives, land and future of Mozambican society, why should Mozambican farmers and civil society organisations have to wait until the “last minute” to learn about the details of the Master Plan, at which point it would likely be too late to change its framework and contents?

According to the participants at the 3rd stakeholder meeting in Maputo, many questions and critiques were raised by Mozambican CSOs. However, according to one CSO that participated in the meeting, these questions were not responded to due to “lack of time”. Still, stakeholder meetings, such as these, are later used by ProSAVANA promoters as “evidence of participation” of NGOs/CSOs in ProSAVANA’s design and development process. Interestingly, as one can observe in the following table from Report No. 2, “NGOs” are included in the same stakeholder category as “donors”.

44
The identity of the actual actors and groups that were present at these meetings remains obscure as “participation” is indicated only by number, rather than by name, and any questions or suggestions that were made during the meetings are not mentioned anywhere in the Report. As I have discussed in a previous work, the organisations that participated in the 2nd stakeholder meeting in Nampula also raised many questions and critiques regarding the programme, but these too were not included (the author’s correspondence with the local CSOs, November – December 2012).

It is only thanks to these leaked reports that Mozambican farmers, CSOs, and academics now have a better understanding of the contents of ProSAVANA and its Master Plan, and thus are now better able to discuss the programme more effectively and on more equal ground with the official ProSAVANA actors. Why was this situation not created long ago? Why did ProSAVANA officials want to withhold these reports right up until the last moment, even though there has been so much talk from officials about the need for the “participation” of Mozambican farmers and CSOs in the programme? Given the extent and degree of exclusion of local farmers and CSOs from the discussions and drafting of ProSAVANA-PD, it is difficult to picture how the ProSAVANA actors and the Master Plan that they have devised will ensure the protection of farmers’ rights in Northern Mozambique.

### 2-3. Analysis of the leaked Report No.1 and No.2

Recently, three Japanese scholars with Ph.D. in agronomy and with many years of experience researching rural areas in Africa, along with the author and several development consultants, conducted a detailed analysis of Reports No. 1 and No. 2. The result of this collaborative analysis bore many similarities to the conclusions presented in the “Joint Statement” by Mozambican CSO’s and was shared during the 4th NGO-MoFA meeting on April 9, 2013.

Upon careful and thorough analysis of these reports, especially Report No.2, it became evident that the authors’ underlying intention for ProSAVANA is effectively to exploit (or “develop”) the resources (land, labour, water, forest, and infrastructure) of Northern Mozambique in the interests of agribusiness, and promoting foreign land investments. This underlying intention can be particularly observed when considering the following three points: (a) the expansion of the original target area beyond Nacala Corridor and increased zoning categories; (b) the emphasis put on

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76 The result of the analysis is posted on the following site.([http://mozambiquekaihatsu.blog.fc2.com/blog-entry-24.html](http://mozambiquekaihatsu.blog.fc2.com/blog-entry-24.html))
clearly demarcating local farmers’ land by “combating shifting farming” and establishing “DUATs”; and (c) a tentative implementation of toothless and ineffective principles of land management (PRAI).

2-3-1. Expansion of original target area beyond the Nacala Corridor for Brazilians

From its nascent beginnings, ProSAVANA is said to be “a programme for the area along Nacala Corridor”. The idea for the programme was, in large part, based on the claim that Northern Mozambique and the Brazilian Cerrado share the similar agronomic characteristics. The reality, however, is that the two respective regions exhibit drastic differences. The final report of the preparatory research for ProSAVANA conducted by JICA consultants from September 2009 to March 2010, unambiguously acknowledges this fact. Proposals written by EMBRAPA (The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation, Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária) based on their own research were included in the report’s conclusion. EMBRAPA's summary of the findings reveals that:

“The ‘preparatory research’ was done along the EN13 (national highway) in parts of the Nampula, Niassa and Zambézia provinces. However, in these areas (1) there is no farmland where large-scale farming can be developed; (2) there is no land similar to the Cerrado except the land already being used by small family farmers who produce commercial crops in the Southeast part of the EN13” (EMBRAPA 2010, in JICA, 2010: S-23).


According to EMBRPA, these facts leave two challenges for seeking market-oriented agricultural development in these areas. These challenges are: (a) introducing commercial farming technology (…); and (b) that production by local medium and small farmers would have to remain more important (for a while) and should be improved (Ibid.).

As the above findings confirm, the initial assumption made by ProSAVANA planners, especially by JICA, emphasising the “similarities” in Mozambique’s Nacala Corridor and Brazil’s Cerrado, was based entirely on false assumptions. The above summary of findings by EMBRAPA also clearly demonstrates that its primary interest in ProSAVANA was to find farmland on which large-scale “market-oriented agriculture” could be developed. EMBRAPA’s findings then went on to make the following recommendation, explaining that:

“[t]he research team of EMBRAPA (…) [has] confirmed the existence of a 6,400,000 ha area with similar soil to the Brazilian Cerrado in Northeast of the Nacala Corridor in Niassa and Nampula provinces. However, only 12 % of this Cerrado-like-area belongs to the target area, and the other 88% is outside of the 12 districts (initially identified for implementation of this study) along the EN13 highway. Thus, EMBRAPA considers that the above mentioned 6,400,000 ha

77 EMBRAPA was an important organisation for implementation of PRODECER in the past (Hongo & Hosono, 2012), and has been playing an important role for promotion of ProSAVANA. http://www.embrapa.br/
should be included [to the target area of the programme] in order to make it possible for ‘commercial scale’ agricultural production and investment, and in addition, to ‘support the increase of income of medium and small-scale farmers’ along the EN 13” (Ibid.).

Map shown during a presentation given by the President of EMBRAPA in March 2010, in JICA 2010: S-24. *Showing the non-target area (indicated by the black circle) where 6,400,000 ha of “Cerrado-like area” were located by the EMBRAPA research team.

This request by EMBRAPA to expand the original ProSAVANA target area was accepted by the three signatory governments on March 18, 2010.

If the only objective of the ProSAVANA programme is indeed to support local farmers of the Nacala Corridor area as JICA and MoFA have repeatedly insisted, then: (a) why was there a need to expand the programme to include areas that are not located along the Nacala Corridor and that were not originally included in the target area?; and (b) why was it so critical for the research teams to look for “farmland for large-scale farming”? Finally, (c) why was it so imperative that “soil similar to the Cerrado” had to be found and that such land should ideally be scarcely occupied or otherwise not currently being cultivated by farming families? Ironically, such land claimed by EMBRAPA to be “similar to the Cerrado” is not currently being cultivated or utilised by rural communities because much of it is, in fact, densely covered by forest.

The richness of Northern Mozambique in terms of its forests (and thus also in terms of its biological diversity) can be observed in the following maps taken from Report No.1. National statistics (2007) also confirm this. The percentage of area covered by forests in each of the provinces targeted by ProSAVANA – Niassa, Nampula and Zambézia – is 77%, 35.5% and 49.1%, respectively. The total sum of the forest area of these three provinces amounts to approximately 43% of the entire national area covered by forest.
A central feature of the Master Plan important to analyse with respect to the expansion of the target area is “zoning”. Report No.2 classifies the entire target area into six categories (I to VI) and gives the outcomes of SWOT analysis of each zone. Although the idea of “zoning” itself is very problematic (“Experts Analysis”, 2013 26), this SWOT analysis highlights deeper problems. The classification of zones I to VI and the SWOT analysis outcomes of each zone can be observed in the following table and map.

Miombo forest in Majune District, Niassa Province (photo taken by the author, August 2012).

Figure 3.1.8 Location of Local Villages and Farm Land of Local People
Source: Location of villages and its population data source are ANE.

Figure 3.1.9 Population Density and Wood Energy Consumption
Initially, Zone I to Zone IV were planned to be the “study area” for ProSAVANA (JICA, 2010). Upon acceptance of Brazil’s request to include a further 6,400,000 ha located in the North-western part of Niassa, Zones V and VI were then added to the initial “study area”. The central feature of both Zone V and VI is that the occupation of farmland by local farmers is currently quite low while forest cover is abundant. It is interesting to note that while the SWOT analysis classes a “large forest area” in Zone V as “helpful”, in Zone I “high population” and “large forest conservation area” are seen as “harmful” to “agricultural development strategy” (Report No.2, 2013:2-27; 2-24).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zones</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Districts &amp; Area</td>
<td>Monapo, Muecate, Mecuburi</td>
<td>Meconta, Mogovolas, Nampula, Murupula</td>
<td>Ribabe, Lalaua, Malema, Alto-Molocue</td>
<td>Gurue (except Lioma Admin. Post)</td>
<td>Gurue (Lioma), Cuumba, Mecanhelas, Mamdimba, Ngoma</td>
<td>Majune, Lichinga, Sanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land use (area % of cultivated area, forest, and others)</td>
<td>Cultivated: 50%</td>
<td>Cultivated: 60%</td>
<td>Cultivated: 43%</td>
<td>Cultivated: 40%</td>
<td>Cultivated: 29%</td>
<td>Cultivated: 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forest: 41%</td>
<td>Forest 25%</td>
<td>Forest 46%; Others: 10%</td>
<td>Forest 42%; Others: 9%</td>
<td>Forest 62%</td>
<td>Forest 77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others: 9%</td>
<td>Others: 15%</td>
<td>Others: 10%</td>
<td>Others: 9%</td>
<td>Others: 10%</td>
<td>Others: 10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The SWOT analysis of Zone VI is even more perplexing. Although it classes “large forest concession and DUATs (land register title) area in Lichinga and Majune and “large forest conservation area in all districts”, as “harmful”, in Majune and Sanga “large forest area and “medium to high farmland accessibility” are classed as “helpful” (see the following scanned table from Report No.2). If the real objective of the ProSAVANA was to “support local small farmers”, why would their existence and use of the land be considered “harmful”? If the official ProSAVANA actors are truly concerned about environmental impact, why would “large forest conservation area” also have been classified as “harmful”?

A close examination of the report leaves little doubt that the development of large-scale commercial agriculture is the real objective of ProSAVANA, and for this objective to be able to be met, it seems apparent that the north-western part of Niassa (Zones V and VI), had to be added to the initial target area. In 2010, the justification given for expanding the ProSAVANA target area was that land “similar” to the Brazilian Cerrado and suitable for the development of “market-oriented agriculture” was found outside the target area, and “there is no such land along the Nacala Corridor” (EMBRAPA, 2010, in JICA 2010: S-23;24). The same conclusion was given in a report published by Future Agricultures Consortium, based on an interview conducted with EMBRAPA’s
Mozambique representative in Maputo on July 17, 2012. According to the report:

“[t]he initial focal area was subsequently expanded to incorporate regions that were considered more suitable for the application of Brazilian agricultural techniques, especially for soybean cultivation (Chivava et al., 2013: 12).

What do the ProSAVANA-PD reports have to say about this additional added area? One explanation is found in Report No.2:

“The grain cluster was recommended to be primarily located in Majune District due to its low environmental and social vulnerability and its excellent soil and climate conditions” (ProSAVANA-PD, Report No.2, 2013: 2-17).

Interestingly, the same report also mentions that the district of Majune (which forms part of “the grain-cluster”) is characterised by the existence of “large forest concessions and large forest conservation area” (Ibid.: 2-28). The same report identifies “serious land conflict between local farmers and corporate farms in all districts” (Ibid.). Given this characterisation, it is curious that the district’s environmental and social vulnerability has been classified as only “low”. Moreover, while EMBRAPA had earlier called the soil located in this district “Cerrado-like” (EMBRAPA 2010, in JICA, 2010: S-23; 24), the ProSAVANA-PD report describes its soil quality as “excellent” (ProSAVANA-PD, Report No.2, 2013:2-17). This is somewhat of a contradiction considering that fact that much of the Cerrado’s soil quality is not “excellent”, and is in fact highly acidic and contains high aluminium content (Mozambique, 2013 no.2010: 5). Land in the Cerrado often requires heavy inputs of calcium and chemical-based fertilisers in order to be brought into use for large-scale agricultural production.

Due to its “favourable conditions” of Majune District, land rush by foreign investors is already occurring in this district.

Newly opened soybean plantation of a Brazilian entrepreneur in Majune District (photo taken by the author, August 2013). *500 ha of land was acquired by this entrepreneur.

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78 There are, however, many researchers who point out that despite these generalised characteristics, one should not simply presume that the quality of soil in the Cerrado is “poor”. See discussions in Mazzeto Silva (2006).
According to the same report, a “Pioneer Project for Integrated Grain Cluster Development” is planned to be implemented in the Majune District. The project is described as follows:

“Feasibility indicators show that the project has a high profitability and the IRR [Internal Rate of Return] was calculated at 20.3% [to investors] and the payback is 9 years. (…) The 45,000 hectares will be divided into 5 modules, and the first planting will be divided within the 5 first years after installation of the project. It is estimated that for the effective production in 45,000 ha, about 60,000 hectares are needed. (…) Each module should have 9,000 hectares and operate as an independent farm from the others, with a management team, employees and own machinery” (ProSavana-PD, Report No.2, 2013: 3-43).

At this point, another important question arises – that is, “who is financing all these projects? The objective of the Grain Cluster project described in the following passage is particularly telling:

“The installation of the cluster in the region referred to above aims to boost the local economy with the cultivation of large areas of grains, especially soybeans, maize and sunflower, [as well as with the development of] a processing unit to produce oils, meal and corn starch. (…) Investments and management of agricultural activities and industrial grain processing will be the responsibility of a single legal entity” (Ibid.: 3-43).

The final sentence of the above passage gives rise to a number of questions, to which neither the report itself nor ProSavana’s actors have yet provided any answers. For example, what exactly is meant by the authors of the report when they write that “a single legal identity” should be responsible for “investments and management of agricultural activities and industrial grain processing”? What kind of entity would this be and how would it be decided upon? Who would control or manage this entity? How would its activity be monitored? Who would it be held accountable to? And, perhaps most importantly, what role then would the regions’ small-scale farmers have in this entity and in the “management of agricultural activities”, if any?
From the careful analysis of Report No.2 one can conclude that the main intention of ProSAVANA is ultimately to enable safe and easy access to land, water, and infrastructural resources in Northern Mozambique for foreign investors to make “high profits”. The profits/benefits that the programme may result in for local farmers are considered by the authors as supplementary to the aforementioned point and central focus. An analysis of the Report further reveals that there is indeed cause to be concerned over the programme. Despite all of the claims that have been made by ProSAVANA actors and promoters, farmers’ rights (including their right to land) could potentially be infringed upon, denied or stripped away from them in the process of implementing ProSAVANA projects, as they are currently written in the report. This will be dealt in the following section.

2-4. Examining “Myth 2 - ProSAVANA will grab land from small farmers”?

Fingermann thinks that one should not mention the possibility that ProSAVANA will facilitate land-grabbing from small farmers for two reasons: (a) “the Master Plan does not delimit land for any foreign investors including Brazilians”; and (b) “ProSAVANA has no connection with the Nacala Fund” (Fingermann, 2013:2).

2-4-1. Master Plan does not delimit land, but “paves a safe path” for investors

The framework of her second “myth” is problematic given that there are no academics or civil society organisations saying that the Master Plan is delimiting land. What they have said is, for instance, “the copy [the Master Plan] makes clear that the project’s intentions (...) pave the way for a massive land grab in Northern Mozambique” (“Joint Statement”, April 29, 2013). As we previously analysed using documents (JICA, 2010; 2011; ProSAVANA-PD, Report No.2, 2013), one cannot avoid this conclusion based on the framework of ProSAVANA-PD’s Master Plan, where there is a clear intent to create conditions for safe entry of external investors to carry out large-scale agricultural production. This is especially clear in the above mentioned case of Majune District in Niassa Province.

(a) ProSAVANA’s land projects and “fixation” of local farmers to land

Several of the QIPs outlined in Report No.2 appear to have been developed with the objective to “fixed” farmers on their land by “promoting a non-shifting cultivation system”. Such a strategy would, at least in theory, make the identification of land for delimitation easier in the future. One such QIP is called “Planning of Land Reserve for Medium and Large Scale Investment”. It involves allocating “10,000 ha of land” to be “divided into 500 to 900 ha” for “medium and large scale companies” for “ensuring a mechanism for large-scale production” in Ribáuè of Nampula Province (ProSAVANA-PD, Report No.2, 2013: 4-19). Ribáuè is included in Zone III where 43% of the land is already cultivated by local farmers and 46% is covered by forest (Ibid.: 2-7). The project directly lists “promoting a non-shifting cultivation system” as one of its target goals.

Another QIP called “Land Registration of the Small and Medium Scale Farmers” seems to be for small farmers, but its goals are set to “facilitate the identification of areas for the promotion of agriculture by large farmers, private companies” (Ibid.: 3-15). A further project is “Model Project for Family Farming”, and again despite its name, its goal is defined as “combat[ing] the practice of shifting agriculture” (Ibid.: 3-48; 4-55), and only those “for transition to a fixed agriculture” are intended to be “provision of land titles [issue of DUATs]” (Ibid.: 3-61; seen in the following table).
This last project calls for "short-term soft loans" to be made available to farmers so that they would be able to purchase fertilisers, seeds and agrochemicals that “they need for intensive agriculture” (Ibid.: 3-33). The scheme for these “short-term soft loans” is connected to the PDIF (ProSAVANA Development Initiative Fund, discussed earlier in this article) and is based on the logic that “the introduction of agriculture inputs and services in production” will “in turn result in the promotion of the fixed cultivation system” (Ibid.:3-34). 79

The following passage from Report No.1 for the ProSAVANA Master Plan highlights some relevant facts related to the above discussion on shifting-farming practices and current land use in Mozambique:

“The values [for land use] shown in Table 2.3.1 [of the report] may include a certain amount of fallow land for the agricultural land because extensive farming practices (slash and burning [-] shifting cultivation) prevail in most of the country. It is assumed that a substantial part of other land use in the table could also be abandoned land for fallowing after cultivation. Though many relevant sources conclude that there is about 36 million ha of arable land in Mozambique, they report various data on farmland area. For example, the PEDSA says that only 10% of the arable land is in use at present, while the PROAGRI II (2004) estimated that about 9 million ha were under cultivation. Farmers actually need several times more fallow land than the present amount of cultivated area to continue extensive farming practices on a sustainable basis. Such farming practices make it difficult to assess the precise amount of farmland area in use, which should include the fallow land under shifting cultivation (ProSAVANA-PD, Report No.1, 2013: 2-14).”

A shifting-farming system also makes it difficult to carry out a clear delimitation of land, which is needed for companies currently interested in investing in land and agricultural production in the country through the ProSAVANA programme. In Mozambique, the 1997 Land Law, enacted as the result of much initiative and hard work on the part of civil society organisations, especially of UNAC (Negrão, 2003:7), currently remains a strong tool for protecting the rights of farmers and communities who cultivate land. In accordance with the Land Law, DUATs granted even to incredibly powerful and wealthy international or national investors can, in theory, be revoked

79 Both the PDIF and the “Project for Improvement of Accessibility to Fertilizers [sic.]”, emphasise that chemical fertilisers are indispensable and the most effective inputs for increasing crop productivity” and call for “a pump-priming subsidy system for chemical fertilizers [sic.]” (Report No.2, 2013: 3-27). The report also writes that “reasons of low use [of chemical inputs] are complicated”, but does not at all discuss the livelihood or agricultural strategies of the local people not requiring the use of expensive and often dangerous chemical inputs that have to be bought in from outsiders.
should such land concessions result in the creation of conflicts between the investors and local farmers or rural communities, or should they infringe upon the rights guaranteed to all Mozambicans in the Land Law. It is widely considered to be one of the most progressive pro-farmer/poor laws in the world (Palmer, 2003:4-7; Alden Wily, 2013).

The current rise in land conflicts in the country, associated with the rapid increase in the number of large-scale land concessions and mega-development projects, highlight potential risks for investors interested in leasing national land and implementing development projects. As the above excerpt from Report No.1 emphasises, although rather indirectly, unless local farmers stop shifting-farming practices and switch to a “fixed [non-shifting]” system of agriculture cultivating only in clearly delimited areas, the possibilities for creating conditions for investment are significantly hindered and the prevention of investment risk cannot be achieved. Lease contracts with local or national governments in Mozambique, while “legal”, are in themselves not “enough” to ensure the continued access to land for investors, and do not guarantee the mitigation of risks or of financial losses that might be incurred as a result of land-title insecurity or the potential occurrence of land conflicts. Certainly, corporations, private-entities and their financiers do not like to invest under such conditions of uncertainty/insecurity.

While it is clear, based on the Experts analysis of Report No.2, that the baseline philosophy for ProSAVANA is to offer up “uncultivated” land for foreign investments in large-scale agricultural production, its objectives also include “combating” unpredictable shifting-farming practices; and finding a way to cooperate with those local farmers who are ready and willing to abandon traditional practices and to use purchased inputs (seeds, fertilisers and pesticides), and be incorporated into the plans for the programme. Tomaso Ferrando calls this a “silent land grab” and explains the process as follows:

“ProSavana [sic.] will produce other ‘silent’ or ‘virtual land grabbing’ masked behind the formalisation of land titles, the transition to ‘settled agriculture [non-shifting]’ and the increase in the areas of ‘contract farming’. Whether occupations and evictions will be visible and easily targeted by protesters, this latter form of invasion by foreign interests and capital will be a more subtle way of ‘opening a country’” (Ferrando, 2013:28).

Ironically, throughout Report No.2 whenever “small scale farmers” or “family farms” are mentioned, the expression used to describe them generally exudes a negative connotation. The following selection of words, for example – “harmful”, “low productivity”, “poor” and “unorganised” – are but a few of the more illustrative instances of the kind of language used to describe small-scale farmers in the report. These descriptions are usually immediately followed by comments regarding the necessity for “investment”, “inputs”, “large-scale production” and so forth.

(b) RAI and ProSAVANA as twin initiatives of Japan in 2009

One can still argue that the Master Plan offers mechanisms to prevent conflicts from arising and thus, “cooperation” between small-scale farmers and large-scale farmers/investments/agribusinesses” is possible. After all, in December 2012 the Mozambican Minister of Agriculture did publically promise that farmers’ rights would be protected (AIM, Dec. 25, 2012), and the Japanese government fully supported this position. What then, is Report No.2 offering in order to ensure the prevention of land conflicts and the protection of farmers’ rights?

Whenever “environmental and social considerations” are mentioned in the Report “the principles of
Responsible Agriculture Investment (PRAI)\textsuperscript{80} are referred to, as though they were an effective and concrete safeguard ensuring protection for local residents and environment. PRAI are international principles set up in Sept. 2009 by an initiative of the World Bank with the Japanese government and other countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia, which produce and export large quantities of grain globally. As of yet, no analyses have been made available outside of the Japanese-speaking world on the reason why the Japanese government was inclined to seek the creation of such principles in 2009. Based on available sources written in Japanese, however, it is evident that the Japanese government’s motive for creating and promoting RAI was directly related to its plans to become more involved with large-scale food production overseas in order for the country to meet its domestic demand for large quantities of cheap food imports, in the face of the sharp rise in food prices that occurred in 2008 (MoFA, 2009b; NHK, 2010).

Japan currently imports 62\% of the food (calorie-base) and almost all the grains (95\%) consumed domestically except for rice, producing 9,768 tons of the staple grain, importing 25,919 tons of maize, wheat and grains. In fact, 100\% of the maize consumed domestically (by its population and the livestock industry) is imported (MoFF, 2013). The same source reveals that Japan imports 91\% of its soybean consumption – producing 236 tons while importing 2,727 tons annually. In Japan, 73\% of maize and (only) 4.2\% of soybean is used for animal feed (the author’s calculation based on the source from Ibid.). Figures such as these give some indication as to why Japan is so eager to promote and get involved with overseas agricultural development and investment.

In August 2009, right before the RAI conference, public documents were released by MoFA and MoFF that clearly reveal the following objectives: (a) promoting “overseas agricultural development including land acquisition and lease” (MoFA 2009a); (b) “expanding world agricultural production and thus agricultural investment”; and (c) “engaging with overseas agricultural investment (production, collection, transportation and exportation <value-chain\textsuperscript{82}>) together with (Japanese) private companies” (MoFA 2009b).

\textsuperscript{80} The outline of “ProSAVANA Guidelines on RAI” appears on Report No.2 and the information provided by the ProSAVANA actors (especially, MINAG) during the 3\textsuperscript{rd} stakeholders meetings in Mozambique in March 2013 and by JICA during the 3\textsuperscript{rd} NGO-MoFA meeting in Tokyo in April 2013 are the same.

\textsuperscript{81} Data based on the following site of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MFF).
Calorie-based food sufficiency of Japan was 38\% in 2012 due to the country’s dependency on imported animal feed, especially maize (MoFF, 2013).
http://www.maff.go.jp/j/zyukyu/zikyu_ritu/012.html

\textsuperscript{82} The reason that the Japanese government now focuses so much on “value chains” is that they recognise their failure in this regard with PRODECER. The objective of the cooperation with Brazil for PRODECER was to obtain a secure source of grain for Japan, in light of the US embargo on soybean exportation in 1973 (JICA, 2012). Receiving strong criticism from the Brazilian society regarding the hidden agenda of the Japanese involvement with development of the Cerrado, the Japanese government had to change their strategy. Also, due to bankruptcies of the largest Nikkei cooperative and principle ally of PRODECER, COTIA, and other “colonos” of PRODECER, not to mention the rapidly increasing presence of international grain companies in the region, Japan lost its dominate position as the single major importer of the products produced in the Cerrado (JICA, 2001). Currently, China is the leading importer of these products.
Soybean and maize are identified to be the target crops for this cooperation, and Japanese companies are expected to directly involve with agricultural production (including acquisition of land).

In the released documents, MoFA also recognised the growing global criticism of overseas agricultural investment, in some cases being called “land-grabbing” and considered by some critics as a form of “neo-colonialism”. Clearly wanting to avoid being the object of such criticism, MoFA sought to earn for itself a good reputation internationally by participating in the World Bank’s discussions to create international principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (NHK, 2010). In doing so, MoFA attempted to shield itself from criticism of “land-grabbing” and was effectively able to engage proactively in overseas food production and agricultural development.

It is against this particular historical and socio-political backdrop that the idea for ProSAVANA was born. From the outset, MoFA wanted to devise a set of international rules and “responsible” practices, such as those embodied by PRAI, that would differentiate “good investment” from “bad investment”, and, in the process, sought to offer up an example of the former (NHK, 2010). The decreasing role played by Japan in international economic affairs and diplomacy, particularly compared to China, Japan’s No. 1 rival, by that time had become all too apparent, particularly following the G8 summit held in Japan in 2008. MoFA was looking for a way to enhance the country’s presence in the international arena. With the participation of JICA, JETRO and the private sector, MoFA began its quest to create “an example of good investment”; the example they offered to the world was ProSAVANA. Given that the signing of the MoU of ProSAVANA took place just a week before the RAI conference held in New York in September 26, 2009, it is only more than natural for ProSAVANA to have adopted and sought to incorporate PRAI in its design and planning.

Immediately after the conference in New York, however, the newly presented PRAI were met with criticism coming from many internationally recognised experts on food and land issues, and farmers’ organisations and civil society groups on the local, regional, national and international levels. Much of the criticism directed at PRAI focused on the fact that the principles had been formulated without the participation of farmers’ organisations from developing countries, ultimately those who will be most affected by international agricultural investment. PRAI had also been developed without any input from the broader community of internationally recognised experts on food and land issues and without the participation of international CSOs. Nowhere do the PRAI refer to “human rights”.

84 Of course, as with much of Japanese diplomatic policy, Japan wanted to set itself apart from China who was accused as being one of the principle “land-grabbers”.
Further, they do not effectively determine any mechanism or particular body/bodies that would oversee their implementation and judge the appropriateness of investment activities. PRAI places the recipient government and overseas investors, and the local people in a sort of parallel priority status. In other words, PRAI do not give priority to the rights of local people. Finally, it should be noted that the PRAI are only “voluntary” principles, and do not include any kind of compulsory regulation that would protect local farmers and the environment and safeguard against their potential abuse and over-exploitation.

The decision to implement PRAI, or not, effectively depends on the goodwill of investors and corporations. So, to put it simply, PRAI have no teeth. It is for precisely these very reasons that PRAI have been widely denounced as being inadequate to protect farmers’ rights and ensure a “responsible” model development that does not result in damage to the environment. In his article entitled “Responsibly Destroying the World’s Peasantry”, Oliver De Shutter, the UN’s rapporteur for Food Sovereignty, wrote that with PRAI “we act as if accelerating the destruction of the global peasantry could be accomplished responsibly” under (De Shutter, 2009).

(c) Will ProSAVANA’s “Guidelines on PRAI” protect local farmers and environment?

For academics, CSOs and farmers’ rights advocates who have long been working in the field of agriculture, rural development, and on food and human rights issues, it soon became clear (as many had suspected) that in practice, PRAI have not actually been effective in preventing instances of land-grabbing. On the contrary, PRAI have often been “used” or held up by investors, corporations and their financiers in order to justify projects, fast-track project approval or otherwise deflect criticism and deny any wrong doing, when problems arise. It is in this global political-climate marked by growing tensions and criticism that the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), under pressure from academia and civil society groups, began its discussions to establish a different set of guidelines to govern the growing wave of international investment in land and agriculture, and – which would effectively supersede PRAI.

However, the “Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests” (VGGT) developed by the FAO are also plagued by many of the same problems as PRAI, in particular, as the name indicates, their implementation remains “voluntary” – they are mere “guidelines” and, therefore, like PRAI, also bear no teeth. Still, as the FAO’s VGGT were formulated based on critical reviews of PRAI, they are in some regards more comprehensive than the World Bank’s PRAI, and should be prioritised, rather than PRAI, in order to overcome the clear shortages inherent in the former.

Yet, in Report No.2 there is almost no mention of the FAO’s VGGT, rather it is PRAI which are given priority and discussed in some detail (ProSAVANA-PD, Report No.2, 2013: 5-1). Only three paragraphs in the entire report are devoted to discussing the FAO’s VGGT, and following their brief mention, it is concluded that “[for the Master Plan, it is] advisable to refer to [the FAO’s VGGT]” as well as PRAI, although the latter ultimately form the basis of the ProSAVANA conflict mitigation strategy (Ibid.: 5-3). ProSAVANA actors and promoters do not seem to be interested in bringing the FAO’s VGGT, more comprehensive international guidelines, into the programme. One can argue that PRAI could function effectively if the proper mechanisms were simply put in place. But, what does Report No.2 offer in this regard?

In the report, the “Mechanisms for the application and enforcement” of the “ProSAVANA guidelines on PRAI” include the following five elements: (a) “to disseminate the Guidelines”; (b) to promote a “better understanding of [PRAI]” among those who adhere to the principles; (c) “to strengthen the law enforcement” and monitoring capacities of “the (local and national)
government”; (d) to create “financial conditions” which would “induce or restrict the behaviour of private investors”; and (e) “to create an autonomous agency with specialised functions to address RAI issues” (Ibid.: 5-6). The only meaningful mechanism seems to be (e) the last. This “autonomous agency”, however, is not given any legal power to impose sanctions or penalties (Ibid.). Further, when and if problems arise, the report states that “the agency can disclose necessary documents and information if necessary” (Ibid.: 5-8).

It is not clear how any of the mechanisms mentioned in the report to prevent land-grabbing and promote “responsible investment” will actually achieve these objectives, and how exactly “irresponsible investment” will be prevented and people’s rights and the environment will be effectively protected. Considering that 96.4% of cultivated area in Mozambique is occupied by small farmers (Agriculture Census 2009-2010 by INE) and almost 77% of the area in Niassa Province is covered by forest, the protective mechanisms described in Report No.2 appear to be incredibly weak, and ultimately unenforceable. If the main objective of ProSAVANA is really to support local small famers and the three signatory governments are truly serious about protecting farmer’s rights and the environment (as they claim to be), the ProSAVANA-PD “draft” report for the Master Plan should not have been written and presented in this way. (Ibid.: 5-5).

(d) 6 QIPs may involve “involuntary resettlement”

The report lists 8 Public and 8 Private Sector Projects (Ibid.: 4-3; 4-4), and admits that six of them “may eventually imply the need for involuntary resettlement” (Ibid.: 4-60). Still, ProSAVANA-PD welcomes these projects since they are “quick and visible and will generate attractive impacts”. According to the report:

“In case that involuntary resettlement is inevitable, the resettlement activities should be formulated and implemented as sustainable development plans, providing resources for the displaced people so that they can enjoy benefit derived from the project”.

**4.2.2 Support for preparation of Resettlement Action Plan in relation to QIPs**

ProSAVANA will fully adopt the concept of RAI (Responsible Agricultural Investment). In this perspective, the QIPs of both public sector and private sector will be subject to the 7 internationally accepted fundamental principles.

There are 6 QIPs that may eventually imply the need for involuntary resettlement, though its necessity is still difficult to evaluate due to the lack of precise information. As a support for the public entities as well as private enterprises that will take responsibility of the implementation of these QIPs, standard TORs for the resettlement planning will be presented in the Draft Final Report.

Source: ProSAVANA-PD, Relatório No.2, 2013: 4-60.

The report does not mention which 6 QIPs are those that may require “involuntary resettlement”, but there is the project called “Planning of Land Reserve for Medium and Large Scale Investment” in Ribáuè of Nampula Province (Ibid.:4-19) that seems to imply the need for such “involuntary”, or in other words, forced resettlement. Readers of the report are left wondering as to which of the other QIPs may require resettlement. In which specific districts are rural livelihoods being put at risk by the programme and its projects? Here, we can see yet another example of how ProSAVANA has prioritised business interests over those of local farmers and rural communities.
2-4-2. “ProSAVANA has no connection with the Nacala Fund”?

(a) FGV’s dual role in ProSAVANA and the Nacala Fund

Fingermann declares: “[ProSAVANA] has no connection with the Nacala Fund”, based on her interview with “Mozambican policy makers” (Fingermann, 2013:2). Then why does Report No.2 mention that the Nacala Fund is one of the “33 component projects” and “prioritised projects” for the Master Plan (ProSAVANA-PD, Report No.2, 2013: 3-2; 3-7).

As a result of these review and rearrangement, 33 component projects in total are proposed for the Master Plan. The result of review and rearrangement is summarised in Table 3.1.1.

Table 3.1.1 Rearrangement of Proposed Project in Draft Development Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original No.</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>New No.</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Project for Financial Supporting System for Large Investors</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Formulation of the Nacala Corridor agriculture investment fund for large-scale agriculture development project (the Nacala Fund)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks: To be filled after confirming the contents of the Nacala Fund.


Table 3.1.4 Prioritization of Project

1) Prioritization of Platform Project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Master Plan Project</th>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Priority Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Project for Land Registration (DUAT) of Small and Medium Scale Farmers</td>
<td>A A A A A X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Project for Planning of Availability of Land for Investment</td>
<td>A A A - A A X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Formulation of the Nacala Corridor agriculture investment fund for large-scale agriculture development project (the Nacala Fund)</td>
<td>A A A A A X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* The letter A used in the table represents the selection as being “very necessary” for Phase I.

Also, although she did not mention this in her article, there is another obvious and direct linkage between ProSAVANA-PD and the Nacala Fund. ProSAVANA-PD’s sole contracted consultant from the Brazilian side and the “independent initiator of the fund” (Fingermann, 2013:1) are the same
institution: FGV (Fundação Getúlio Vargas) Projetos. It was Giuliano Senatore of FGV Projetos, a Brazilian team leader of ProSAVANA-PD and one of his staff members who gave presentations on ProSAVANA and the Nacala Fund during an international conference in November 2012. Why are the same personnel from the same institution working on and making public presentations about both the ProSAVANA and the Nacala Fund if the two have nothing to do with each other?

FGV is a Brazilian research, educational and business institution, and said to be the “principal author of Report No.2,” whose stated objective was to “attract large-scale agricultural development projects/investment” (ProSAVANA-PD, Report No.2, 2013:3-2:3-7). The international researchers from Future Agricultures Consortium also question the “parallel role” of FGV: “How FGV’s involvement in the technical cooperation component of ProSavana [sic.] is related to its involvement in a parallel private initiative of mobilising foreign direct investment into the Nacala region (through the launch of the Nacala Fund)” is a question arising (Cabral & Shankland, 2013:15).

During a presentation on ProSAVANA in November 2012, Kota Sakaguchi of JICA was directly asked about the Japanese involvement with the Nacala Fund. Sakaguchi offered the following reply: “We are not at the stage of (…) saying that we will offer our support [to the Nacala Fund], but if [the fund] can reach [the goals of] social inclusiveness, [economic and social] development and environmental protection, we shall consider participating in it” (Sakaguchi, Nov. 15, 2012).

Japan’s decision to opt out of participating in or contributing to the fund is related to the strong criticism that MoFA and JICA received regarding ProSAVANA, and the manner in which this matter had been taken to the media and parliamentarians and publically aired out. Its decision is also related to the aforementioned ODA scandals that had taken place in Japan in the past and the subsequent process of ODA reform. Following the reforms in Japan, it was made very clear that the use of public funds to support agribusiness (especially from Brazil or foreign) while potentially increasing the possibility of harming local farmers’ rights, is wholly unacceptable. Thus, Japan’s detachment of ProSAVANA from investment models such as the Nacala Fund became important.

Interestingly, during the presentation given by FGV personnel in November 2012, JICA’s logo was added to a slide in the power point presentation in which the Nacala Fund was discussed, even though Japan had officially opted out of providing support to ProSAVANA through the fund. They even went far to mention that “[the Nacala Fund offers] investments with low risk and high return”, since risks should be minimised by ProSAVANA’s “institutional package” (FGV Projetos, 2012).

85 See the following site for FGV Projectos: [http://fgvprojetos.fgv.br/](http://fgvprojetos.fgv.br/)
86 FGV Projetos (November 6, 2012). In their presentation, the close link between ProSAVANA and the Nacala Fund is obvious, and they even put JICA’s logo for the explanation of the Nacala Fund. [http://www.g15.org/Renewable_Energies/12-06-11-2012-%20PRESENTATION_DAKAR-06-11-2012.pptx](http://www.g15.org/Renewable_Energies/12-06-11-2012-%20PRESENTATION_DAKAR-06-11-2012.pptx)
87 This was confirmed by a Japanese staff at the Japanese embassy in Mozambique (July 2013).
Why is Brazil's FGV Projetos, which is collecting investment money around the world to the Nacala Corridor (the first estimate to be some 2 billion US dollars), allowed to draw up the “blueprint” of the Master Plan of the same region? How can it be held accountable enough to serve the interests of the people and prioritise the environment over their clients’ (investors) interests? As far as we can observe from close analysis of Report No.2 written by FGV Projetos, their intention to prioritise and serve business interests is very clear while their enthusiasm for protecting locals’ rights is terribly weak. Where land rush and conflicts are occurring (The Oakland Institute, 2011; UNAC & JA, 2011; Land Matrix, 2012; 2013), does not this present severe obstacles to the transparency and accountability of the programme, and contradict the objective of ProSAVANA to “support local small farmers”?

According to the “Joint Statement”, drawn up by civil society organisations and previously referred to in this paper, through the Nacala Fund, FGV is serving Brazilian and Portuguese business interests in the Nacala Corridor, not to mention the financial interests of the Mozambican President himself:

“The Master Plan was drawn up by a group of consultants from FGV. These consultants are also directors at Vigna Brasil, also known as Vigna Projetos, which provides agribusines consultancy services to corporations such as Galp Energia, Vale, Syngenta, Petrobras, and ADM. Galp, owned by the Amorim family of Portugal, is already invested in a large-scale soybean farming operation in the ProSAVANA project area through a joint venture called AgroMoz with Intelec, a holding company partly controlled by the family of the Mozambican President. Vigna Brasil has the same contact address as the company 4I.Green, which is described as the technical manager for the Nacala Fund-- the main financing vehicle for the big agribusiness projects in the Nacala Corridor” (“Joint Statement”, April 29, 2013).

Whether it is FGV’s intention or not, will it not gain financially through its dealings with this fund, either directly and/or indirectly? In the Japanese context, this could be easily considered as a corrupt mechanism. Why not in Brazil or in Mozambique?

(b) Brazilian agribusinesses – no interests in Northern Mozambique?

Finally, there is another important element that is conspicuously missing from Fingermann’s argument and which should be given some consideration here. That is that, Brazilian business people associated with agribusiness enterprises have been travelling to Northern Mozambique to see for themselves the agricultural potential of the region’s lands. Many of these Brazilians are those comprising ProSAVANA’s Brazilian delegates, officially dispatched by the Brazilian public fund and led by Deputy Luiz Nishimori. These Brazilians have talked openly about their intention of bringing “Brazilian colonos” to the Nacala Corridor (SankeiBiz, Aug.20, 2012; Nikkei Shimbun, May 1, 2012), of obtaining extremely “cheap and fertile” land in the region (President of the Cotton Association of Mato Grosso, Reuters, Aug. 15, 2011). During a television interview that he gave in mid 2012, Nishimori described the objective of ProSAVANA as follows:

“This accord [ProSAVANA] was established to transplant the experiences of the Brazilian Cerrado to the African Savannah. (…) In this area, Vale do Rio Doce [a Brazilian mining company] has already begun extracting mineral sources. We are now taking Brazilian agricultural workers to the same area. These are young people who cannot practice agriculture due to lack of

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88 TV CAMARA Palavrabrerta, June 27, 2012 on air:http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/21652
land. (…) [ProSAVANA] will give many opportunities to those young farmers who are farming on 4 to 5 ha of land in Southern Brazil where land shortage is serious and who are willing to operate modern and large-scale farming” (TV CÂMARA, June 27, 2012).

Deputy Nishimori is not just any other member of parliament, as JICA’s Hongo tried to emphasise during the official visit of the president of UNAC to MoFA in Feb. 2013. He is a key figure involved in the initial planning phase of ProSAVANA, and being a Nikkei Brazilian deputy, has many influential connections at the Japanese embassy and JICA. Nishimori was also head of a Brazilian delegation comprised of 15 agribusiness representatives, governmental officials and journalists that travelled to Mozambique on a joint mission to tour the Nacala Corridor region in April 2012.

In response to Nishimori’s above made remarks, at the 2nd NGO-MoFA meeting JICA stated that he must have been: “confused about the objective of the programme, but now he knows” (Kota Sakaguchi, March 5, 2013). Yet, JICA’s official information about the outcome of this joint mission seems to contradict this disjunction, declaring that “through participating in this mission, the related actors from Japan, Brazil and Mozambique, were able to share the common vision with the same consciousness (…)” (JICA, May 14, 2012).

On the Brazilian side, actors involved with ProSAVANA (or otherwise interested in getting involved) have been much more blatant when talking about the intentions for their involvement in the programme (than say their Japanese counterparts, for example). The remarks made by Nishimori are not just an isolated instance. Rather, such remarks seem to be representative of what appears to be a widespread understanding among many Brazilian actors, who regard the programme as a way to acquire agricultural land at a low cost, gain access to export markets and low-wage labour, and generate tremendous private profits (Reuters, Aug. 15, 2011). Within and among Brazilian business and political circles, the ProSAVANA discourse has been largely dominated by the idea that land is both “available”, “fertile” and incredibly “cheap” in Northern Mozambique.

Brazilian agribusiness is tightly integrated within global agribusiness chains both domestically and internationally, and plays a key role in supplying several important agricultural commodities to the global market (Schelsinger, 2012). Given the country’s advanced level of technical expertise and knowledge of large-scale tropical agricultural development, Brazilians are an essential component of the initial objective of the ProSAVANA programme. Their involvement is also essential due to the fact that Brazil and Mozambique share a common language – Portuguese. Several agribusinesses interested in investing in Mozambique have already been able to obtain detailed data
and information of the area and actors of Northern Mozambique and have established strong
connections with the Mozambican government through their involvement with ProSAVANA. As the
research by Future Agriculture confirms, “Brazil’s representation in the country [Mozambique] has
been considerably strengthened with this particular programme (ProSAVANA)” (Chivava, et al.,
2013: 12).

Many of the above points were brought to international attention as early as September 2012 by
Clements & Fernandes (2012) although Fingermann calls their argument a “myth” (Fingermann,
2013:1-2); two recently published studies by Nogueira & Ollinhaö (2013) and Schlesinger (2013c)
on ProSAVANA confirm these points. After conducting a thorough examination of 41 interviews
with the ProSAVANA actors in/from the three countries and field research in the ProSAVANA target
area, Nogueira and Ollinhaö share their findings as follows:

“The Mozambican focal point in Nampula reported that ‘Brazilian investors are the ones that
come in larger numbers within the scope of ProSAVANA’. ‘There have been two big [Brazilian]
missions, and in one of them they have hired a full Boeing, with 70 investors in November 2012.
(…) Last Saturday there was a Brazilian team to search for land to work in here. But they left
with a bit of a deception, because land here is not what they had imagined. To find 20,000 ha here
is not easy (…), there is a lot of hidden land but the investor comes and looks around the road.
With the zoning done by ProSAVANA it will be easier’. Besides Grupo Pinesso, up to mid-2013
at least three Brazilian agribusiness companies were waiting for the approval of their DUAT, the
state-granted land use right” (Nogueira & Ollinhaö, 2013: 9).

2-5. Examining “Myth 3 - Conflicts between Agribusiness and small scale farmers”

The last “myth” Fingermann tackles is a question of (a) whether there will be land conflicts caused
by ProSAVANA or not; and (b) if there are currently such conflicts taking place in the Nacala
Corridor area (Fingermann, 2013: 2). Her answer for (a) is that “it cannot be said if there will be
(what kind of) conflicts related to ProSAVANA” since “the time has not arrived” (Ibid.). One
wonders why wait to confirm if these conflicts will really occur when all the ProSAVANA related
documents indicate the possibility of land conflicts between the locals and agribusinesses? As we
have already discussed, six QIPs are listed as potentially requiring “involuntary relocations”

2-5-1 “Only one case of land conflict in the region”?

Fingermann wrote that she recognises only one case of such conflict in the region; a case in
Matanusca, Nampula Province, pointing to a report published by UNAC and Justiça Ambiental,
organisations that she considers as creators of “myths” (Fingermann, 2013:1; UNAC & JA, 2011).
Yet, two years have passed since the publication of the report, and many more land conflicts
between agribusiness and local farmers are occurring not only in the Nacala Corridor area, but also
all over Mozambique.

Let us take a look at the most famous case located in the ProSAVANA target area, the case of Hoyo
Hoyo, in Lioma, Gurué District, Zambézia Province. This case was first written about by Hanlon
and Smart (2012), and IPS followed it up in their recent article (IPS, Feb. 25, 2013). Hoyo Hoyo, or
Quifel (the registered company name), obtained 10,000 ha of Lioma State Farm that was abandoned
by the government during the war, but which returnees began using after the 1992 peace accord.
When the company showed up, 836 local small farmers were cultivating 3,500 ha of the farm. Hoyo
Hoyo promised the locals compensation, employment, and new land to work. But the company only
partially fulfilled their promise, and no land was ever offered (Ibid.).

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As of Aug. 2013 the above problems had not been resolved (the author’s field research\(^{89}\)). According to the local farmers and farmers’ associations, the land offered by the company was a swamp. Local farmers refused, and requested better land for cultivation, but Hoyo Hoyo did not agree. After being unable to cultivate for a year, hungry farmers began their cultivation in “mato” (forest) far from their own community (3 hours walk instead of 1.5 hour to Lioma State Farm). They requested that the company assist in the preparation of farmland, by cutting trees and ploughing, for example, but Hoyo Hoyo refused on the basis that the company had already offered “new land for farming”, the swamp (the author’s interview with local farmers, Aug. 11, 2013). A local member of the council says that a commission to solve these problems was set up by the company and local government, but no farmers who are actively protesting the company and its actions were invited to take part in the commission (the author’s interview with a council member, August 2013).

Pointing to the field where she used to cultivate within the state farm, a 30 min. walk from her residence, a mother of seven children told the author:

“Look at this. We used to produce everything on my machamba [field]. We were eating 4 times a day. We were producing not only our food, but surplus. Not only my family, but children here were eating well, going to secondary schools, and we could even manage for them to stay in dormitories. We were cultivating this land for more than 10 years, but Hoyo Hoyo insisted that it was theirs now. One day their tractor came, and damaged all the crops we planted in front of our own eyes. We shouted to stop and cried, and told them at least to wait until we harvest them, but didn’t listen (…). More than one year, we eat only once a day. Children are always hungry, but I don’t know what to do” (the author’s interview, Aug. 11, 2013).

\(^{89}\) This information was cross-checked by a local council member, but interviews with representatives of Hoyo Hoyo is still lacking.

[Left] Farmland held under Hoyo Hoyo’s DUAT (photo taken by the author, March 2012);
[Right] Tractors and machineries of Hoyo Hoyo (photo taken by the author, August 2013).
Even if Fingermann did not have time to visit Lioma during her “trip to the Nacala Corridor” to confirm the land conflicts that are on-going in the district, the information is readily available on internet (Hanlon & Smart, 2012; *IPS*, Feb. 25, 2013). Further, Fingermann could have referred to the information regarding existing land conflicts in various districts of the ProSAVANA target area which was provided in Report No.2. In the section of the report discussing the results of the SWOT analysis, cases of land conflicts between the local farmers and agribusiness in 4 out of 6 ProSAVANA zones (Zone I, Zone III, Zone V, Zone VI) are clearly identified and highlighted:

“Land conflict among local farmers, and between local farmers and corporate farms” in Monapo and Alto Molocue [sic.]; “Serious land conflict between local farmers and corporate farms [Lioma administration post and Mandimba], and among local farmers in Cuamba”; “Serious land conflict between local farmers and corporate farms in all districts [in Majune, Lichinga and Sanga]” (ProSAVANA-PD, Report No.2, 2013:2-24; 2-26; 2-27).

On what basis, then, did Fingermann conclude that there is only one case of land conflict in the region? Even if one does not call it “land-grabbing”, rapid large-scale land acquisition by agribusiness in the target area of ProSAVANA is a reality.

There are many other agribusiness investments in Lioma, including some actors related to ProSAVANA. Hanlon and Smart (2012) report that AgroMoz obtained 10,000 ha of land for large-scale soybean production in September 2012, and it is owned by Grupos Américo Amorim of Portugal (which owns Banco Único in Mozambique), Pinesso (a major Brazilian soya producer), and Intelec Holdings (a Mozambican company partly owned by President Armando Guebuza) (Hanlon & Smart, 2012:7; *Mail & Guardian*, Jan 6, 2012). According to Devlin Kuyek of GRAIN and “Joint Statement”, Grupo Américo Amorim controls Galp Energia to whom FGV seems to offer consultant services for their agribusiness activities (Kuyek, 2013\textsuperscript{90}; “Joint Statement”, 2013).

Is it a pure coincidence that many of the ProSAVANA players, such as FGV, the Mozambican president, and a Brazilian soybean producer, are listed? Why are they together obtaining vast areas of land in the ProSAVANA target area a year after another accord for implementing ProSAVANA signed by the governments of Brazil, Mozambique and Japan, and in the middle of the Master Plan

\textsuperscript{90} Presentation given by Devlin Kuyek in Yokohama, May 29, 2013. The presentation can be accessed at: http://mozambiquekaihatsu.blog.fc2.com/blog-entry-36.html
preparation? A brief account of the case of AgroMoz and land exploitation is a particularity elucidating case in point.

AgroMoz Soybean plantation. The company obtained DUAT of 3,000 ha in this area (photo taken by the author, August 2013).

Within the area where AgroMoz obtained DUAT there were previously 199 farm households or 464 individual farmers using total of 275.4 ha (the author’s interview with the local governmental authority, Aug. 11, 2013). According to a local traditional leader and some members of the community, the local farmers who gave up their land were only paid 500 meticais (or 16 $ US) per 1 ha while most of them were cultivating 1-2 ha. Since these farmers accepted “compensation” for their land, the company refused to prepare any farmland for them. Thus, the traditional leader had to look for alternative land (forest), and allocate it to those who had lost land; still the company did not offer its assistance for logging and ploughing (the author’s interview, Aug. 11, 2013). Some farmers are becoming anxious about not being ready for the next raining season.\(^91\)

However, the local governmental authority denied that any “problems” existed between the company and local residents, and assured that: “Since the entire community is very happy with the investors and what they have brought to them [such as employment and donation of notebooks and food to schools], there were no problems raised by local residents during our trilateral meeting [among the community, the representatives of AgroMoz and the administration] (the author’s interview with the local governmental authority, Aug. 11, 2013).\(^92\) However, both the traditional leader and governmental leader agreed on one point (in separate interviews): “We shall not accept any more investors seeking land to this community. We don’t have any more land”.

How is it possible to protect the rights of local small farmers when the highest level of governmental figure of the country and the principle writers of the ProSAVANA master plan are

\(^{91}\) According to the traditional leader, during the consultation with the community prior to land title application which took place in May 2012, the representatives of the company did not give any information about the amount of “compensation” that would be received for those who gave up their land and had promised to prepare new farmland even if one received financial compensation for land (the author’s interview, Aug. 11, 2013). The author’s interview with the company representatives was postponed due to logistical problems, has to be followed-up.

\(^{92}\) This case will be discussed in detail in future publications, but the particular challenges faced in conducting research on this case due to the highly politicised nature of this company and area, should be noted. Many people are scared to talk about these issues, and the setting and process of interviews had to be constantly changed. The past experience of field research on war in the region certainly helped in many interviews.
implicated in the same projects that they are promoting for international donors, and both clearly have business interests in the same areas? The following question posed by a female farmer in Lioma District illustrates the gravity of situation on the ground for many local farmers.

“Where is our “pai [father]”? We are abandoned children. We have no one who can protect us and our rights” (the author’s interview, Aug. 11, 2013).

2-5-2. “The current business in the area has no connection with ProSAVANA”?

While it is easy for ProSAVANA actors to say that there is “officially” no connection or relationship between the programme and the wave of agribusinesses now rushing to acquire land in the Nacala Corridor area, the two events are obviously developing simultaneously in the same region, and often involve the same circle of people that are involved with ProSAVANA. Thus, we need to ask the simple question: “Why”? The extent to which the “land rush” phenomenon presently taking place in the Nacala Corridor is actually related to ProSAVANA needs to be thoroughly analysed. MoFA representative, Yoshiko Kijima, agreed on this point during the 2nd NGO-MoFA meeting on ProSAVANA held in March, 2013 after receiving similar information highlighting such concerns.

Indeed, in recent years many foreign companies have obtained DUATs and invested in large-scale development projects in the Nacala Corridor, in particular in the forestry and mining sectors, and this trend has resulted in the creation of severe and on-going land conflicts in the region. The human rights impacts related to the operations of Chikweti Forests in Niassa province (Zone VI for the ProSAVANA) provide but one particular case in point. Another exemplary case is found in the emergence of serious conflicts over land between mining companies, such as Vale (Brazil), Rio Tinto (UK-Australia) and Jindal (India), and the local population in Moatize District, Tete Province. The social and environmental impacts related to the operations of these companies in Mozambique are continually being broadcasted by international media (BBC and Reuters), and have been well-documented in several academic publications (Mosca & Selemane, 2011; Garcia, et al., 2012; Mosca & Selemane, 2013). The conflicts that have arisen in the Moatize District are on-going and are seen to be contributing to the political destabilisation of the region and the country.

Although Moatize District or Tete Province is not included in the ProSAVANA target area, it is included in the scope of JICA’s “Nacala Corridor Comprehensive Development Approach” announced during the TICAD V. This is also clear in the following slides.

93 If one focuses on issues of soybean, the direct connection will be obvious. The analysis using this issue will be carried out in future publications.
96 http://www.ticad.net/africa/jicaevents/img/summary/2Jun9-12Corridor%20development%20in%20Africa.pdf

This demonstrates how ProSAVANA is connected to the broader scope and institutional agenda of JICA, as one can see from their documents and maps. One example is the map below showing the connection of Tete’s coal mines to Nacala Port through Malawi (represented by the green line). Just as PRODECER was connected to the Great Carajas Project in Brazil, ProSAVANA is connected to the large-scale mining enterprises in Tete through infrastructure developments controlled by certain Japan and Brazil actors/companies. In fact, a Japanese company, Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal, has already obtained mining concessions for the Ruvuboé Mine in Tete Province, “adjoining the Moatize mine operated by Vale” according to the company.

The following maps show the areas of land that have already been ceded to mining companies in Moatize District and, more generally, in Tete Province, and the areas under negotiation (Human Rights Watch, 2013). These maps show the magnitude of land “grabs” occurring in the region and paint a picture of the scale of dispossession of local communities that these “grabs” too often seem to require. Resistance by local people is becoming violent due to lack of meaningful response from

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97 This point will be explored more deeply in future works.
the companies or the Mozambican government\(^99\).

Prioritising business interests before rights of people is all happening while Mozambique has the same administration and the “pro-poor” land law. This is not a phenomenon limited to Mozambique, according to an expert on land issues, Liz Alden Wily (2013). Many comparative studies have already analysed this phenomenon using Mozambique cases (Palmer, 2003; Theting & Brekke, 2010; FIAN, 2010). It is simply not enough to compare Northern Mozambique with PRODECER in Brazil, and assume that “there will be no land-grabbing because “ProSAVANA is not a replica of PRODECER”. The current land rush driven by agricultural investment is a world-wide phenomenon, and there is no reason why Mozambique or ProSAVANA (or the Nacala Fund) should be discussed in isolation.

Rather Mozambique is one of the main targets of the global land rush (WB, 2010; UNCWFS- HLPE, 2011; GRAIN, 2011; Land Matrix, 2012; 2013). Considering the latest data, about half of all land transactions globally have taken place in Africa, “with many in Mozambique and Ethiopia” (BBC, June 10, 2013). In the latest dataset published by Land Matrix, Mozambique is listed as one of the five most-targeted countries in the world, and over 2 million ha have already been acquired by transnational land deals (Land Matrix 2013\(^100\)).

**Conclusion**

As we have seen, from the examination of primary sources obtained from the ProSAVANA actors (JICA, MoFA, EMBRAPA, ProSAVANA-PD, Ministry of Agriculture, and consultants), Mozambican, Brazilian, Japanese and International CSOs, Japanese, international, Mozambican and Brazilian media, through public and personal access, interviews and participant observation, Fingermann’s arguments do not stand up to minimum scrutiny. Most of her arguments are based on assumptions, and when she offered “evidences”, these were based mainly on “interviews” of the ProSAVANA actors. It became also apparent that she excluded crucial documents or methods from her analysis and conclusions.

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\(^100\) [http://landmatrix.org/get-the-idea/web-transnational-deals/](http://landmatrix.org/get-the-idea/web-transnational-deals/) The details of these land deals can be obtained from the following site. [http://landmatrix.org/get-the-detail/by-target-country/mozambique/](http://landmatrix.org/get-the-detail/by-target-country/mozambique/)
In this paper I have discussed the challenges of researching ProSAVANA, such as the limited availability of publicly open sources; constantly shifting discourse; the importance of consulting not only Portuguese and English but also Japanese sources; problems with depending too much on interviews of the ProSAVANA actors, and on hasty field research organised by the authority using fixed questionnaires; and the dangers of an attitude of “waiting to see until things occur”. From our painful “lessons of Fukushima”, I suggest re-discovering the importance of a “precautionary approach” allowing future harm to be anticipated, and four methods for academically-sound research of this type: (1) historical and critical examination of sources; (2) participant observation; (3) field research; and (4) comparative study. In this paper, I used all of these methods, but especially (1) and (2). Lastly, we should not forget that whoever we are and however we conduct our research, we cannot omit consideration and analysis of power relations.

From what we have observed, it becomes clear that we are at a crucial moment for determining the direction of ProSAVANA and its Master Plan. The plan was supposed to have been completed in October 2013, without much modification of Report No.2, had the reports not leaked and had advocacy by local and international civil society not intensified since UNAC’s statement on Oct. 2012. I wonder why Fingermann, who listed many of the same sources as I have (except the Japanese ones), does not appear to have fully examined these. Instead, she has created her own “myths” and denounced those who have been fighting for people’s rights and the environment, basing her conclusions only on “interviews” and assumptions.

In Africa, in Mozambique, and even in Japan, certain people are not just poor and vulnerable. Many of them are deprived. It means that their rights are easily denied, and they are not protected when political power and business interests come into the picture. Under such circumstances, the role of independent researchers is very important, as was proven in the case of Fukushima and aftermath.

I end this article citing Ruth First, who contributed to establishing the basis for academia in Mozambique. I shall quote the September 2012 speech given by Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco, director of the Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE) – which it seems that Fingermann is/was an associate researcher:

“[Ruth used to say:] research is about what we do not know and what we know. Do not begin with ‘solutions’, but focus on ‘what is happening’ and ‘how it is happening’. Do not focus on ‘what is lacking’, but ‘how the current situation is’, and ‘why it is this way’. Politics and Economy seems to exist separately, but always connected. Keep questioning, question even your frame of cognitions”.

101 The detailed report and articles on field research will be published in near future. The discussions on “G8 New Alliance of Food Security and Nutrition in Mozambique” in the context of ProSAVANA will be included in these documents. ProSAVANA is listed as a project of the Alliance, and the Japanese government is responsible for its implementation in Mozambique together with the U.S. government.
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