

## 5.0 DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 5.1 KEY RESULTS

- 1) It was very clear during the interview process, and from the very first interview, that Mozambican civil society organizations are in close communication and coordination with respect to dialogue with ProSAVANA. No organization agreed to talk to the Majol team without first checking in with its sister and partners CSO's/ NGOs, and receiving a go-ahead from these partners to talk to the Majol team about ProSAVANA.
- 2) It was also evident that there is both funding for and a focus on compliance and oversight. Many CSO's and NGO's occupy this space at present, while in the past more effort was devoted by the NGO community to service delivery/ implementation activities. ProSAVANA will have to deal with this new 'watchdog' focus of the NGO/CSO community. One positive and proactive reaction might be to actively include 'watchdog' NGO's in ongoing monitoring and evaluation exercises.
- 3) There are two main camps, represented by the "No to ProSAVANA" campaign, and the "Campaign Against Land Grabbing" (ASCUTE). The No to ProSAVANA campaign in general is more hardline, though some members are willing to engage in constructive dialogue on improving ProSAVANA if they are assured of genuine dialogue and full participation (see points three, four, five and six below). Members of the Campaign Against Land Grabbing are uniformly open to dialogue with ProSAVANA, but insist that for such engagement to take place, they must also be a genuine dialogue and full participation of NGO's and CSO's.
- 4) This means that in strategic terms, CSO's and NGOs can be treated as a single block, with an essentially identical set of demands. The only difference is that some few members of the No to ProSAVANA campaign say will not engage in dialogue under any circumstances. Since these represent only four of the 32 CSO's and NGOs interviewed, these can be considered a minority that is small enough to be essentially disregarded in terms of negotiations. The ProSAVANA team should instead focus on the nearly unified demands of the other 32. It is the Majol belief that if genuine and constructive dialogue, and in particular a roadmap can be agreed upon, these four institutions may well join the ProSAVANA dialogue process.
- 5) Among all NGOs, levels of fear and distrust of the ProSAVANA planning process were very high. All recognized the conflicts of the past, and without exception, attributed these to poor communication and lack of openness for dialogue on the part of the ProSAVANA team and MASA. Interviewees note that there has not been a good information flow throughout the consultation process, with a lack of transparency and sometimes intimidation. Interviewees in particular mentioned the fact that some MASA officials have attitudes and behaviours that make dialogue difficult or impossible.
- 6) All felt that the ProSAVANA team needed to engage in a much more participative process. Specifically, many interviewees noted that commenting on documents was not sufficiently participative. Many spoke of the need to 'co-create' ProSAVANA, meaning that civil society partners should have as much input into the documents as the trilateral

agencies involved. Civil society would like to be called for a much more in-depth round of discussions, rather than simply being asked to comment on documents.


- 7) The negative reactions to commenting on documents were indeed very strong. Several interviewees mentioned that they were “tired of commenting on documents” and specifically would refuse to do so in the future. Many specifically said that the release another version of the ProSAVANA Master Plan, created on the basis of dialogue to date, would be seen as further marginalization of civil society. This opinion may be in conflict with the JICA desire to release Draft One of the ProSAVANA Master Plan, based on comments received in the first round of consultations, in the near future.
- 8) All felt that the co-creation process was a much more in-depth, detailed, and time-consuming process than current JICA plans allow for. Civil society in general believes that the document must be re-created from the very beginning. Majol would like to specifically call JICA’s attention to this, as an area where civil society demands and JICA expectations may be in conflict.
- 9) The April timeline was mentioned by several organizations as unrealistic. This point, as well as point number seven above may not all harmonise well with JICA desires to complete the second round of public consultations, based on a revision of the draft 1 Master plan, by April, 2016. JICA should start to think about what its reactions might be and what alternatives might be available
- 10) The name ProSAVANA was considered by some organizations to be a clear sign that ProSAVANA planners did not understand the environmental and social context, and not enough studies and dialogue have been done. This is because the Nacala Corridor in fact is largely miombo woodland, not savannah<sup>4</sup>.
- 11) On the other hand, there is the possibility of a very strong partnership to be developed with WeEffect. WeEffect even has institutional financing available specifically for the creation of a positive dialogue for the improvement of the ProSAVANA program. Development of this partnership should be given the very highest priority.
- 12) Some of the reasons given to ‘re-create’ the ProSAVANA Master Plan are detailed under numbers 13-21, below.
- 13) Interviewees were clear about the inadequacy of the development models as outlined in the ProSAVANA Master Plan Zero Draft. They particularly noted that the agribusiness development model as laid out in this plan was vague, not clear enough for the reader to understand the roles of family farmers, agribusinesses, and financial institutions. Key questions like, “how will family scale farmers access markets?”, “How will family sector products be transported to markets?”, and “How will family sector farmers access the credit they need?” are not clearly answered.
- 14) That being said, there did not seem to be clear consensus among interviewees on what agricultural and agribusiness development models should be used. To quote a very simple example, civil society opinion is divided about the use of fertilizers. Some point to World Bank studies showing that use of fertilizers can lead to impoverishment of

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<sup>4</sup> <http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/w4442e/w4442e05.htm#TopOfPage>

family sector farmers, while others point to possible environmental side effects. Still others think that the use of fertilizers is a necessary step in developing a more vibrant family sector farming economy. Most interviewees acknowledged that there was no consensus, but cited this fact as simply underlining the importance of a broader and more in-depth discussion of development models, before Master Planning can be undertaken. This position was frequently and succinctly summed up by the phrase, “If we are going to talk to ProSAVANA, then everything must be on the table”, in other words, ProSAVANA must be willing to start negotiations from the very beginning, with a discussion of the development model to be used.

- 15) Both government and CSO stakeholders referred to the need to “Mozambicanise” ProSAVANA, that is, to create a program that was more adapted to the local situation and more in line with local realities, as well as the ambitions and aspirations of the local population.
- 16) Again, and with specific reference to developmental models, several institutions (including the opinion leader and former No to ProSAVANA campaign financier, WeEffect), noted that the current Zero Draft Master plan is based on an approach and model nearly identical to previous projects such as ProAgri and PAMA, neither of which are judged to have left any lasting benefit with rural communities.
- 17) Nearly everyone interviewed noted that land tenure and environmental safeguards as outlined in the zero draft are inadequate, and even more significantly, that unless these are made compulsory and specific, with specific guarantees, opposition to ProSAVANA will not cease.
- 18) Land rights are particularly problematic given the current level of conflicts with incoming investors; civil society feels that the current legal framework and government guarantees are insufficient and that ProSAVANA must adopt clearer, compulsory, and more stringent standards than those existing in Mozambican Law.
- 19) There are also questions about political will and government capacity to adequately implement family sector safeguards.
- 20) The document does not discuss social and environmental risks associated with the project. Something like an ESIA (Environmental and Social Impact Assessment) is needed.
- 21) All had questions about where will NGO’s and CSO’s fit into ProSAVANA? This is not clearly explained. And will there be components for them to implement? The documents mention the need for their involvement but do not specify any mechanisms.
- 22) Many interviewees praised the concept of a third-party intermediary, and noted that ongoing dialogue should continue to be mediated by third parties.
- 23) Only two interviewees mentioned the need to plan more adequately for the impacts of climate change, not only on agricultural production, but also on transport and marketing networks. Majol however feels it is important to mention these here, particularly given current and long-term tendencies towards ever increasing numbers of disaster events due to climate change. These have increased by a factor of 28 (28 times as many) in the between the decade of the 1950s and the decade of the 2000’s. See figure below.



**Figure 2: Number of natural disasters in Mozambique (period 1956-2008). Source: Queface, 2009.**

**Natural disasters have increased from one per decade in the 1950s to 28 per decade in the years between 2000 and 2010.**

- 24) Climate change is also an opportunity for ProSAVANA. Farmers are really very desperate this year with the drought (as they were last year with the floods). Dialogue with them about new technologies, new crops, new ways of planning and adapting, and the building of climate-change resilient cropping systems, would be seen by many farmers and partners as opportune and very necessary.

## 5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the above results, the Majol team believes that it is probably realistic to expect that a dialogue platform can be established, particularly given new civil society openness to dialogue. This openness is based at least in part upon the changes introduced to the ProSAVANA program by the Zero Draft Master Plan.

However, there do seem to be differences between civil society expectations of a complete and open dialogue, starting over from the very beginning, and JICA expectations of consultations leading fairly quickly to a second round of public consultations, before April, 2016. JICA would do well to begin to consider what its position might be should the roadmap proposed by civil society differ substantially from JICA expectations.

CSO's and NGOs have collectively many years of experience and their input would probably add value to the quality of the Master Plan. However, process is important as well as product. CSO's and NGOs must feel that they are essential elements of the process, and that their input is valued and considered. Otherwise, opposition to ProSAVANA will continue.

Opposition to ProSAVANA was triggered initially about concerns of land tenure for family sector farmers. ProSAVANA proponents must be prepared to go beyond Mozambican law

and what is currently written in the draft ProSAVANA master plans, to create broadly accepted and publicly monitored safeguards for family sector land and resource access. Otherwise, opposition to ProSAVANA will continue.

## 6.0 *LIST OF APPENDIXES*

Appendix 1. *Comentários ao Plano Director Versão Draft Zero, Marco de 2015, no Contexto da Campanha Não ao ProSAVANA*

Appendix 2. Survey Monkey Questionnaires and Results